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EPIGRAPH 
Lord, thou hast been our dwelling place in all generations. Before the mountains were brought 
forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, 
thou art God. Thou turnest man to destruction; and sayest, Return, ye children of men. For a 
thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night. 
Thou carriest them away as with a flood; they are as a sleep: in the morning they are like grass 
which groweth up. In the morning it flourisheth, and groweth up; in the evening it is cut down, 
and withereth. For we are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we troubled. Thou 
hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins in the light of thy countenance. For all our 
days are passed away in thy wrath: we spend our years as a tale that is told. The days of our 
years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is 
their strength labour and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power 
of thine anger? even according to thy fear, so is thy wrath. So teach us to number our days, that 
we may apply our hearts unto wisdom. Return, 0 LORD, how long? and let it repent thee 
concerning thy servants. 0 satisfy us early with thy mercy; that we may rejoice and be glad all 
our days. Make us glad according to the days wherein thou hast ajjlicted us, and the years 
wherein we have seen evil. Let thy work appear unto thy servants, and thy glory unto their 
children. And let the beauty of the LORD our God be upon us: and establish thou the work of 
our hands upon us; yea, the work of our hands establish thou it. 
(Moses, Hebrew Lawgiver, 13th cent. B. C.) 
"I do not feel obliged to believe that the same God who has endowed us with sense, reason, and 
intellect has intended us to forgo their use. " 
(Galileo Galilei, Italian Astronomer and Physicist, 1564-1642) 
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objective of guaranteeing the availability of funds for the compliance of all ex -post 
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safeguard government and taxpayers by attaining reasonable protection from default at a 
minimum increase in project costs; and (3) protect the environment from potential harm resulting 
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cash flow analysis this study uses an experimental approach, suggesting interactive decision 
models (simulation models) estimating costs, and identifying the instrument option which offers 
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for all stakeholders involved in the process. Simulations confirm the current scenario where 
regulators are likely to require surety bonds, letters of credit, and periodic payment collateral 
account tools. Sensitivity analysis of Net Present Value and Government Take value indicate ex-
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exigir a realizayao de algumas operayoes especificas, visando aspectos arnbientais e de 
seguranya. Este processo tern sido denominado "fase de abandono". 
Desde entao, a preocupayao passou a ser com o risco de descumprimento de tais 
obrigayoes, ja que se estas nao fossem cumpridas, a responsabilidade seria naturalmente 
transferida para o 6rgao regulador. 0 sistema de garantia fmanceira comeyou, entao, a ser 
aplicado no setor como uma forma de gerar incentivos financeiros e garantir recursos para o 
cumprimento de tais obrigayoes mesmo em caso de abandono prematuro, insolvencia ou 
negligencia. 
Nos ultimos anos, com a exaustao econ6mica de inumeros reservat6rios de oleo e gas e 
com o persistente aumento da demanda mundial por combustiveis f6sseis, iniciou-se urn processo 
de disponibilizayao e oferta de campos marginais no cenano intemacional e nacional. Esta oferta 
deve-se tarnbem ao desinteresse das grandes companhias em aplicar recursos em projetos deste 
tipo, onde o lucro geralmente e marginal ou inexistente. No entanto, concessionanas pequenas e 
independentes sao capazes de produzir com custos operacionais significativamente mais baixos, 
viabilizando lucros satisfat6rios, a depender das condiyoes do mercado. 
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Com a abertura do setor de petr6leo e gas natural no Brasil, aumentou o interesse por 
oportunidades no pais. Apesar da preocupayao em fornecer urn cenfuio atrativo para novos 
investimentos, a Agencia Nacional do Petr6leo (ANP) e demais 6rgao ambientais sao tambem 
responsaveis pela garantia de que as concessoes sejam retornadas em condiyoes de auto-
sustentabilidade ambiental e sem oferecer riscos de seguranya. 
Dentro deste cenfuio, o 6rgao regulador enfrenta alguns graves problemas: (1) grandes 
concessionfuias iniciam urn processo de oferta de campos marginais negligenciando a 
responsabilidade de verificar a capacitayao dos candidatos em cumprir as obrigayoes de final de 
contrato; (2) algumas empresas podem ser tentadas a formar companhias espUrias visando a 
exonerayao de suas responsabilidades ambientais futuras; (3) flutuayoes no mercado afetam 
significativamente companhias pequenas e independentes que operam campos margma1s, 
aumentando o risco de insolvencia; (4) pequenos operadores, alem de financeiramente 
vulneraveis, muitas vezes nao possuem a experiencia necessaria para lidar com problemas 
ambientais, aumentando o risco de danos catastr6ficos e/ou irreversiveis; (5) na tentativa de 
salvaguardar-se das responsabilidades financeiras e ambientais, o 6rgao regulador pode ser 
acusado de discriminar contra pequenas e recem formadas concessionfuias. 
A atual situayao dos 6rgaos reguladores e complexa. Como mostra o hist6rico de vfuios 
paises, as responsabilidades negligenciadas ou ignoradas por 6rgaos reguladores durante esta fase 
serao eventualmente trazidas ao conhecimento publico que, por sua vez, responsabilizara o 6rgao 
regulador. 
Algumas organizayoes nao governamentais (ONGs) tern utilizado eficientemente diversos 
mecanismos de marketing como ferramentas de informayao, e em alguns casos desinformayao, 
promovendo investidas contra a industria e 6rgaos reguladores. Dentro deste cenfuio, o governo 
nao tern como se exonerar das responsabilidades financeiras deixadas por companhias insolventes 
ou negligentes, e busca meios de reduzir seus riscos fornecendo incentivos financeiros para o 
cumprimento das obrigayoes ambientais, restringindo assim a participayao de concessionfuias nao 
qualificadas. A tarefa nao e simples pois alem de diminuir seus riscos, o 6rgao regulador precisa 
manter o setor competitivo e atrativo para manutenyao e ampliayao do fluxo de investimentos. 
Os metodos de regulamentayao tradicional (Sistema de Comando e Controle ), tern algum 
sucesso no controle do desempenho ambiental durante a vida de urn projeto, mas nao sao capazes 
de garantir que as obrigayoes ambientais de final de contrato sejam satisfatoriamente cumpridas. 
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Ja os Mecanismos de Incentivo Financeiro (Sistema de Mercado) vern sendo utilizados com 
sucesso para o mesmo prop6sito. 
Dentro dos setores de petr6leo e mineravao, mecanismos de garantia financeira ja sao 
comurnente aplicados para garantir o cumprimento de obrigayoes ambientais (bond de 
performance) durante a fase de abandono e reabilitas;ao (mine closure). Atualmente, este conceito 
vern sendo estendido para abranger todas as fases de urn projeto (licitav5es, exploravao, 
desenvolvimento, produs;ao, abandono e p6s-abandono ), inclusive para garantir o pagamento de 
obrigas;oes financeiras eo curnprimento de prazos (bondsfinanceiros). 
Os setores de mineravao e petr6leo tern atraido excessiva controversia em decorrencia de 
varios problemas ambientais associados com empresas negligentes, irresponsaveis e nao 
capacitadas. A industria esta preocupada com a imagem negativa que o setor vern ostentando 
nessas situas;oes. Por esta razao, varios de seus representantes, principalmente grandes empresas, 
concordam que existe a necessidade de uma regulamentas;ao exigindo garantias financeiras. 
0 objetivo maior deste trabalho e o de fornecer inforrnavao sistematizada para auxiliar 
agencias reguladoras no processo de elaboravao de urn sistema regulat6rio de garantia financeira 
que seja verdadeiramente pratico e eficaz, garantindo e/ou custeando as obrigas;oes ambientais 
ex-post (de final de contrato) atraves: (1) da geras;ao de incentivos reais e eficazes fazendo com 
que a industria atue com responsabilidade; (2) do atendimento das atuais demandas de 
preservavao ambiental; (3) do atendimento das necessidades da industria perrnitindo a 
competitividade e a manutens;ao do fluxo de investimentos no setor de exploras;ao e produvao de 
petrol eo e gas natural (E&P); e ( 4) da identificas;ao de mecanismos de salvaguarda protegendo o 
6rgao regulador, e no fim, o contribuinte, de arcar com o onus financeiro deixado por 
concessionlirias insolventes ou negligentes. 
Dentre as contribuiv5es desta tese, destacam-se a parte conceitual, fornecendo defmis;oes 
que perrnitam a sistematizavao da discussao, e a parte empirica, fornecendo urna ferramenta 
capaz de auxiliar reguladores e industria no processo decis6rio gerando fluxos de caixa e analises 
de sensibilidade. As principais contribuiv5es podem ser sintetizadas em: (1) uma classificavao 
sistematica para danos ambientais que ocorrem ao Iongo de projetos de petr6leo no setor E&P 
( danos acidentais, continuos, e ex-post); (2) urna discussao sobre custos ambientais dentro do 
setor; (3) definivao de duas categorias distintas de garantias financeiras atualmente utilizadas e 
que, apesar de sempre referidas pela mesma denominas;ao, "bonds", se comportam de maneira 
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diferente, almejando objetivos diferentes e, conseqiientemente, atingindo resultados diferentes 
(bonds financeiros e bonds de performance); (4) identifica91io e descri91io de instrumentos 
financeiros propondo uma classificayao inovadora para os vanos tipos utilizados como garantia 
financeiras hoje disponiveis no mercado; ( 4) uma ferramenta decisoria que permite empresas e 
organismos reguladores antecipar os potenciais impactos financeiros de suas decisoes, inclusive 
decisoes sobre o tipo de instrumento a ser utilizado como garantia financeira. 
As ferramentas decisorias desenvolvidas auxiliam na redu91io dos impactos financeiros 
oriundos da implementayao de regulamenta96es ambientais na rentabilidade de projetos de 
petroleo. Para tanto, neste trabalho sao propostos alguns exercicios de modelagem decisoria 
interativa, permitindo a visualizayao dos impactos no fluxo de caixa do projeto possibilitando aos 
tomadores de decisao trabalhar com diversos cemmos, alterando variaveis, simulando 
contingencias, antecipando os impactos financeiros de suas decisoes, testando o impacto 
financeiro das vanas op96es de instrumentos de garantia fmanceira disponiveis no mercado e, 
principalmente, visualizando solu96es que nao seriam tao 6bvias de outra forma. 
Para que seja viabilizada a elaborayao de urn modelo decisorio como proposto acima, faz-
se necessaria uma ampla descriyao do sistema de garantia financeira e dos instrumentos 
disponiveis, alem de vanas questoes envolvendo o tema descomissionamento de plataformas 
maritimas. 
As principais motiva96es para esta tese sao: (I) as grandes quantias envolvidas em 
questoes ambientais, principalmente no descomissionamento de instala96es maritimas; (2) o 
evidente nivel de ineficiencia do atual sistema de regulamentayao ambiental "Comando e 
Controle"; (3) a experiencia positiva do sistema de garantia financeira acompanhada em vanas 
partes do mundo; ( 4) a atual tendencia mundial da aplicayao de mecanismos de incentivo para 
fazer valer as exigencias ambientais ex-post; e ( 5) a inexistencia de uma ferramenta decisoria 
integrada para avaliar os impactos da aplicayao de diferentes instrumentos de garantia financeira 
em diferentes cenanos. 
Dentre as principais variaveis do modelo proposto estao: (!) as vanas op96es de 
descomissionamento possiveis; (2) as op96es de instrumentos financeiros disponiveis no mercado 
e aceitas como garantia fmanceira para opera96es de descomissionamento; (3) o tipo de 
tratamento fiscal dado aos gastos com as opera96es de descomissionamento e aos gastos com a 
aquisi91io de instrumentos de garantia financeira; ( 4) os parametros inerentes dos projetos, como 
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dimensao, duras:ao, etc.; (5) o desempenho operacional do projeto e (6) a variaveis de mercado, 
como pres:o do oleo, inflas:ao, taxa de juros, varias:ao cambial, etc. 
0 sistema de garantia financeira descentraliza o processo decis6rio, estimulando o 
comportamento adequado de empresas, definindo seus objetivos de desempenho ambiental e nao 
urn protocolo de as:ao a ser estritarnente seguido. Com isso, da-se uma motivas:ao ao 
desenvolvimento de tecnologias inovadoras capazes de reduzir a possibilidade de problemas 
ambientais e, principalmente, reduzir os custos de descomissionamento. Alem disso, a exigencia 
de garantia fmanceira assegura a disponibilidade de recursos e elimina a possibilidade de futuros 
litigios. Neste contexto, as empresas sao obrigadas a intemalizar seus custos ambientais (ex-post, 
continuo e acidentais), e, voluntariamente, monitorar as conseqiiencias de suas decisoes. Em 
outras palavras, as companhias assumem a responsabilidade financeira de final de contrato de 
demonstrar que o suas obrigas;oes ambientais, principalmente obrigas:oes ex-post como 
descomissionamento, ocorrerao de forma satisfat6ria, fazendo com que o risco financeiro seja 
transferido das vitimas (govemo e contribuintes) para os causadores (produtores e operadores ). 
Desta forma, as autoridades salvaguardam-se de riscos tecnicos e financeiros, inclusive de 
encerramentos prematuros ou nao planejados. 
Existe uma grande variedade de tipos de instrumentos financeiros disponiveis para 
garantir operas:oes de descomissionamento, alguns oferecem generosas flexibilidade e outros 
significativos pesos financeiros. Todos porem, causam algum tipo de impacto, seja impactos 
diretos, como custos de oportunidade, ou indiretos, como redus:ao da capacidade obtens:ao de 
emprestimos. No entanto, uma bern elaborada regulamentas:ao e a aplicas:ao adequada da 
engenharia financeira, permitem a aplicas:ao eficiente do sistema de garantia financeira, sem 
desestimular investimentos no setor. 
Dois tipos de mode los decis6rios serao oferecidos: ( 1) urn algoritmo computacional 
denominado Petrobond e (2) urn modelo produzido com a ferramenta STELLA®. Dentro do 
planejamento estrategico de projetos de petr6leo off.shore tais modelos permitem: simplificar e 
sistematizar o conhecimento disponivel; diagnosticar, interpretar e discemir os dados; interpolar, 
extrapolar e prever resultados; julgar incertezas; avaliar a sensibilidade dos parametros 
envolvidos; e interpretar e avaliar as diferentes altemativas e cenanos. Essas ferramentas 
possibilitarn tambem solus:oes 6timas que nao seriam 6bvias de outra forma, permitindo a crias:ao 
urn de cenario de diagramas dinamicos. 
UN I CAtV: 
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Simula~oes confirmam o presente cenario, onde 6rgaos reguladores tendem a exigir bonds 
do tipo surety, cartas de credito, e contas do tipo cau~ao com pagamentos peri6dicos. Analises de 
sensibilidade de resultados de Valor Presente Liquido e Por~ao Govemamental indicam que 
ap61ices de seguro do tipo ex-post, bonds do tipo surety, e cartas de credito podem causar 
impactos menores permitindo melhores resultados. Simulayoes tambem confirmam que projetos 
pequenos sao geralmente severamente afetados quando instrumentos do tipo colaterais, como 
contas cau~oes, sao utilizados. 
Quanto it terminologia empregada em portugues, o autor argumenta o seguinte: 
1. A aplicayao do termo "abandono", tanto para o projeto como urn todo, ou como para o 
tamponamento de poyos ("well plugging and capping") ou para o descomissionamento de 
instalayoes maritimas (remoyao e disposi9ao ), nao sugere uma atividade confiavel. 0 
termo parece ser "politicamente incorreto" ja que "abandono" exprime a ideia de "deixar 
sem cui dado", o que nao faz justi~a ao verdadeiro objetivo das opera9oes de final de 
contrato de explora9ao e produyao de petr61eo. 
2. Os termos "cessayao", "desativayao" ou "encerramento", sao suficientemente amplos para 
descrever as atividades de retirada, transporte e disposiyao final de instalayoes maritimas. 
Estes termos parecem ser ideais para descrever todo o processo que inclui as varias 
atividades de final de contrato de concessao visando a reabilita9ao dos danos ex-post, 
mas, no entanto, nao exprime com clareza a especifica operayao de retirada e disposiyao 
de instalay5es maritimas. 
3. 0 termo "descomissionamento" e utilizado no Brasil para a "descontinua~ao" da 
utilizayao de embarcayoes maritimas. 0 autor considera que as instalayoes maritimas 
(plataformas, reservat6rios, etc.), ass1m como embarcayoes maritimas, sao 
"comissionadas" para uma atividade especifica e depois, ao se tomarem desnecessarias 
( seja por motivos tecnicos ou economicos ), estas tambem devem ser "descomissionadas". 
4. 0 termo ingles "decommissioning" ja vern sendo amplamente adotado pela industria 
mundial, e mesmo que nao houvesse uma palavra portuguesa correspondente 
("descomissionamento"), a aplicayao de uma palavra transliterada da original inglesa 
tambem seria viavel. Alem do mais, a palavra "descomissionamento" ja vern sendo 
natural e amplamente adotada pela industria no Brasil. 
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A tese esta organizada em 6 capitulos: (I) Introduyiio, (II) Principal Conceitos, (III) 
Descomissionarnento, (IV) Mecanismos de garantia Financeira, (V) Tratarnento Fiscal, (VI) 
Mecanismos Decis6rios/Modelagem Economica, e (VII) Conclusoes. Ao final, quatro anexos 
fornecem subsidies adicionais para a compreensao de alguns capitulos: (A) Questionano para 
Avaliayao de Instrumentos, (B) Descomissionarnento de Instalayoes maritimas, (C) Algoritmo 
Petrobond, e (D) Ferrarnenta de Modelagem Stella. No Capitulo ll, "Principais Conceitos", o 
artigo "A Decision Model for Financial Assurance Instruments in the Upstream Petroleum 
Sector", publicado na revista Energy Policy, urn veiculo internacional arbitrado, e reproduzido. 
No Capitulo VI, "Mecanismos Decis6rios/Modelagem Economica", os artigos "An Exploratory 
Analysis of the Environmental Bonding System for Upstream Petroleum Projects" e "IdentifYing 
Potential Impacts of Bonding Instruments on Ojjshore Oil Projects", publicados respectivarnente 
nas revistas internacionais arbitradas Natural Resources Research e Resources Policy, sao 
igualmente reproduzidos. 
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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
The world depends on fossil fuels for more than 60% of its total energy needs (ODCP, 
1998). Offshore exploration became a very important energy source since it was discovered in 
1947 in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). In 1965, natural gas was discovered in the British portion of 
the North Sea, followed by the discovery of oil in 1970. Furthermore, of great significance for 
Brazilian economy, was the discovery of offshore reserves at Campos basin during the 1980's 
(FORMIGLI and PORCIUNCULA, 1997). 
There are over 7,270 offshore installations in place around the world, installed in the 
continental shelves of more than 53 countries worldwide, of which 40 produce offshore oil and 
gas in significant amounts (Figure 1.1). The present distribution of offshore installations is 
approximately as follow: 4,500 in Gulf of Mexico, 950 in Asia, 750 in the Middle East, 457 in 
North Sea, 445 in South America, 649 in Africa, and 53 in Australia (PROGNOS, 1997; ODCP, 
1998; POREMSKI, 1998; PANE AND HENDARJO, 1998; GRIFFIN, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 
1998b, 1998c, 2000a, 2000b). Retaining the record for deep-water completion, Brazil has 
approximately 105 producing offshore platforms (ANP, 2003). 
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Figure 1.1. World Platform Population. Numbers are compiled from a number of sources including government 
reports, industry staff, and academic literature. 

Although offshore installations must be decommissioned at the end of petroleum projects, 
most offshore structures were not designed to be removed. In the next 20 years, between now 
and 2025, it should be expected that over 6,500 installations will be decommissioned, and at an 
estimated cost of US$ 20-40 billion (COLEMAN, 1998). 
Several potential problems related to the abandonment of offshore installations have been 
officially acknowledged since the 19 58 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf According 
to CAMERON (1998), this sudden interest had two main motivations: (1) Maturing of several 
large oil and gas provinces around the world turn decommissioning costs public. (2) The need 
for offshore decommissioning has coincided with the growing impact of environmental concerns 
in international affairs. In fact, the first "decommissioning boom" has landed right in the middle 
of the international sustainable development agenda. 
Decommissioning has become a very emotional issue, and, as illustrated during the over-
publicized and politicized Brent Spar episode, compliance with all international, regional, and 
domestic legal requirements may not necessarily be sufficient to satisfy the expectations of public 
and interest groups. Presently, there is a movement in the United Nations Commission on 
Sustainable Development to set up a Global Authority for offshore oil and gas operations (MMS, 
1999a). 
Based on estimated costs, offshore decommissioning may become in the near future one 
of the major issues facing the global offshore petroleum industry. The impacts of 
decommissioning expenditures in the profitability of offshore projects and government earnings 
are significant and must be carefully considered. In this thesis, the author elaborates on the issue 
of how to anticipate and reduce the impacts of environmental regulations upon the profitability of 
offshore oil projects. Several approaches can be adopted to guarantee that all decommissioning 
obligations will be met. This study focuses specifically on the application of the financial 
assurance system, which is a form of financial security used to safeguard authorities against 
environmental liabilities. Financial assurance systems and instruments can be found in the 
literature with different denominations such as: financial surety, financial security, financial 
guarantee, and bonds. 
If financial assurance mechanisms (bonding mechanisms) are to be adopted, the key to 
avoid investment migration from the sector is the implementation of reasonable policies, making 
available different forms of bonding instruments that offer reasonable flexibility to companies. 
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Investment flow in the oil sector is a very important source of capital for economic development. 
Impacts may also be reduced by the application of adequate financial engineering techniques and 
comprehensive early decommissioning planning. 
Although the author recognizes several other essential economic issues involved in the 
decommissioning process (i.e. optimum period to initiate decommissioning activities; operation 
method- single or phased approaches; removal and disposal options; technological innovations), 
the focus in the present work is on the application of bonding mechanisms to guarantee the 
satisfactory performance of decommissioning operations and other ex -post environmental 
obligations. It includes: 
• Identification of corporate environmental costs and liabilities related to ex -post 
obligations; 
• Identification and description of forms of bonding instruments currently available; 
• Identification and description of existing fiscal regimes in what ex -post environmental 
costs and bonding-related expenditure are concerned; 
• Simulation of offshore oil-producing fields in the Brazilian Outer Continental Shelf 
(OCS) where different bond options are tested in a series of discounted cash flow 
scenario analyses based upon the current Brazilian fiscal regime; and 
• Suggestion of a decision tool, which will allow the assessment of the potential 
financial impact caused by different bond options upon the profitability of offshore oil 
and gas projects. 
A hypothetical scenario is proposed based on existing bonding regimes around the world, 
mainly in the USA and Canada. Some alterations are made in order to adjust proposed bonding 
policies to new areas open for investment. 
1.2. PURPOSE AND JUSTIFICATION 
The present work involves two key themes: The decommissioning of offshore 
installations and the application of financial assurance mechanisms. Academically, both subjects 
are under explored. Decommissioning-related issues have been increasingly attracting the 
interest of the industry, government, and interest groups. Since 1995, several technical articles 
and some academic papers have been written on decommissioning-related issues. The literature 
record on the application of financial assurance mechanisms in the oil industry is rather scarce. 
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Most information on bonding mechanisms must be extracted from books on financial incentive 
tools, official documents (regulatory literature) on financial assurance legal requirements, and 
from interviews with bonding experts from regulatory agencies and the financial sector. 
In Brazil, for instance, very little has been done on both areas. ANP is just beginning to 
deal with end-of-leasing obligations, including ex-post environmental operations such as 
decommissioning. Very little is known about the end-points of Petro bras' redundant platforms. 
In 2002, ANP defined well abandonment rules for the Brazilian industry. Petrobras has recently 
initiated internal studies and activities aimed at improving company's knowledge on 
decommissioning and other ex-post related matters (ANl', 2000b). ANP has recently intensified 
its interest on decommissioning issues what lead to the establishment of a technical consulting 
project, a research partnership between State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) and the 
Agency. At the beginning of this project, the present theme was merely an academic essay 
proposing an eventual application of financial assurance instruments on new oil frontiers in 
Brazil. Today, as Brazilian authorities in accordance with international conferences and treaties 
are developing sound decommissioning regulations, the establishment of a Brazilian financial 
assurance regime involving several ex-post offshore activities is very likely. Progressively being 
implemented, financial bonds1 are already required to guarantee contractual obligations in the 
bidding process (letters of credit). 
The main motivations for a comprehensive study on the application of financial assurance 
mechanisms are: 
• Large sums of money involved in meeting decommissioning obligations, which can 
significantly impact offshore oil projects at the end of their productive lives; 
• The noticeable inefficiency of the current command and control regulatory system; 
• Encouraging results increasingly obtained from regulatory agencies currently adopting 
fmancial assurance mechanisms around the world; 
• The perception of a trend in which agencies from different countries begin to adopt 
economic incentive mechanisms to deal with the uncertainties of environmental 
regulations; and 
• The lack of quantitative studies and publications involving the application of financial 
assurance mechanisms and their potential impacts on oil projects. 
1 A fmancial token claiming that the bid will be honored and areas will be explored. 
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No bonding requirements should be adopted in the oil sector without a comprehensive 
assessment of their economic impacts. Wrong decisions may drive away important investments. 
For this reason, Chapter VI is devoted to the proposal of a decision model aimed at anticipating 
the financial impacts upon the profitability of offshore oil projects caused by the different forms 
of financial assurance instruments. Decision models are essential for managing oil projects, and 
for simulating potential effects of requirements being proposed by authorities. A well-designed 
flexible financial assurance system is likely to maintain the flow of investment in the sector and 
at same time preserving the industry and authorities from the kind of wearing off observed during 
the Brent Spar episode. 
1.3. METHODOLOGY 
The main steps for achieving the proposed products of this research project are illustrated 
on Figure 1.2. Information on decommissioning was gathered through literature research, 
reviews of documents of several countries, periodicals, and interviews conducted with 
decommissioning managers and government officials via electronic mail, telephone, and 
specially arranged meetings in the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, and Brazil. Important 
technical literature on decommissioning has become available in recent years. The majority of 
government documents has been acquired directly from the competent agencies. 
Most specialists were involved in the areas of hardrock and coal mining, and onshore and 
offshore upstream petroleum recovery; all in the United States and Canada. This process is 
illustrated in Figure 1.3. 
In this thesis, the author attempts to answer the following questions: 
• Question 1: How to guarantee that oil and gas leasing areas will be ultimately returned in 
environmental conditions at least similar to preexisting ones? 
• Question 2: How to ensure that all ex-post (end-of-leasing) obligations will be satisfactorily 
met, safeguarding public environmental and economic interests by maintaining investments in 
the sector and, simultaneously, providing protection against insolvent and negligent lessees, 
and eventual unplanned closures? 
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Figure 1.2. Flowchart of main project activities. 
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• Question 3: How to make such a regime viable? 
• Question 4: How to anticipate and attenuate the financial impacts caused by each of the 
different forms of performance bonds required as guarantee for the fulfillment of ex-post 
environmental obligations? 
Literature 
Industry 
Government 
Decommissioning 
0 ptions 
Bond Options 
Figure 1.3. Methodology for approaching proposed goals. 
Best 0 ption 
Question one through three involves the conceptual part of this thesis. Part four involves 
the empirical part. In order to approach the forth question, a variety of financial instruments that 
are available to be applied as financial guarantees in offshore oil projects were identified. How to 
decide on the best option, the one that will offer the least cash flow impact? How to select the 
bond instrument that will allow the ultimate maximization of project value? 
Main Parameters includes: 
• Existing decommissioning legal framework and potential trends. 
• Existing financial assurance regimes. 
• Existing fiscal regimes. 
• Existing historical data 
• Existing decision models. 
• IdentifY: 
o Static Parameters 
o Probability Distribution Parameters 
o Dynamic sub-model simulations 
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The construction of a basic tool to work out the problem: the economic analysis technique 
is primarily based upon a discounted cash flow. The main economic analysis output will be the 
Net Present Value (NPV). The reason for using the discounted cash flow method for the 
economic analysis is to present a systematic and quantitative approach for problem solving, in 
addition this method can be easily implemented by oil companies2 . 
• Economic Analysis: evaluation of the relative merits of situations - profit and cost 
viewpoints. 
• Financial Analysis: behavior of funds - what are the instruments that allow the best 
yields? 
• Intangible Analysis: consideration of factors that affect project but which cannot be 
easily quantified. 
A decision model was designed in order to test all financial assurance mechanisms and 
compare them against available data using the algorithm Petro bond (Appendix C). The strategic 
planning of offshore oil projects, allows: the simplification and systematization of the available 
information; sensitivity evaluation of important parameters involved; and the interpretation and 
evaluation of different alternatives and scenarios. Petrobond also provides a way of finding 
optimum solutions, which would not be obvious otherwise. For this same purpose, a 
complementary decision model using the STELLA® software is also proposed (Appendix D). 
Approaches used to incorporate risk and uncertainty into analysis: 
• Sensitivity Analysis: used to evaluate the effects of uncertainty on projects by 
determining the variation of investment. 
• Probabilistic sensitivity analysis: used to account for the uncertainty associated with 
possible variation in project parameters and expected present value to account for risk 
associated with finite probability of failure. 
1.4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Until 1995, articles on decommissioning of offshore installations were scarce. The Brent 
Spar episode triggered a boom in the specialized literature. One of the first important works on 
the subject was the PROGNOS (1997), a socio-economic report on impacts of varying 
2 The designation "oil companies" includes other parties that may be responsible for the performance of closure activities (i.e. 
operators, individuals, lessees). 
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decommissioning options. This study was done in London in behalf of the Offshore 
Decommissioning Communications Project (ODCP), and carried out by PROGNOS. Several 
other studies were conducted by agencies and the industry. The Phillips Petroleum Norway, has 
been conducting cost assessment studies since 197 5, but most of these studies have not been 
published. 
The literature record on the application of financial assurance systems within the upstream 
petroleum sector is especially limited. Nearly all information is extracted from internal 
government publications and reports, and a few sprinkled lines in legal publications. The 
application of financial assurance mechanisms in the US coal industry is particularly well 
documented and can be used for a better understanding of the different bonding instruments 
presently available. 
COSTANZA and CORNWELL (1990, 1992), and CORNWELL and COSTANZA (1994, 
1999) have comprehensively written about environmental assurance bonding. Their work should 
be used as an important reference on the general application of such mechanisms. Documents 
from regulatory agencies (MMS, 1998, 1999, 2002; OSM, 1987, 2000a; BLM, 1995, 1996; ANP, 
2000a, 2002a; EPA, 1995, 1997; etc.) provide additional decommissioning and bonding 
information. GRIFFIN (1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2000a, 2000b) has extensively written 
about offshore decommissioning. Related information and decommissioning data has also been 
obtained from Bill Griffin's presentations and lectures. MILLER ( 1998), a study prepared for the 
International Council on Metals and the Environment (ICME), represents an important and 
extensive work on the application of bonding instruments on the hardrock mining sector. 1\'WF 
(2000) describes in detail the current situation of the hardrock mining sector, which is under a 
very lenient bonding regime. FERREIRA and SUSLICK (2003a) defines several concepts 
related to bonding mechanisms. It also provides a systematic classification for financial 
instruments used to fulfill bonding requirements. 
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CHAPTER II- MAIN CONCEPTS 
Which are the main contributions offered by this thesis work? Were there significant 
contributions to the advancement of knowledge in this area? Answer: The present work 
systematizes a series of concepts and describes aspects of the financial assurance systems that 
were not previously defined: 
• Proposes a classification for different forms of environmental damages in the upstream 
petroleum sector (e.g. accidental, continuous, and ex-post); 
• Defines the terminologies "financial bonds" and "performance bonds", which have been 
interchangeably used disregarding the fundamental difference between them; 
• Presents a comprehensive assessment of currently available financial assurance mechanisms 
and instruments; 
• Proposes an innovative, systematic, and ample classification for available financial 
instruments. The lack of such tool has caused significant misunderstandings in the debate of 
bonding systems; 
• Presents a series of modeling exercises with the STELLA® modeling tool, simulating project 
cash flows for oil projects under different bonding regimes in order to assist in the decision 
making process; 
• Presents a complex decision toll for managing offshore oil projects under bonding regimes. 
This tool, an algorithm denominated Petrobond, is aimed at anticipating the potential 
financial impacts of several bond alternatives and bonding requirements, providing a 
practical tool for both industry and regulators (FERREIRA eta!., 2003); and 
• Offers an exhaustive set of references for both themes, decommissioning of offshore 
installations and financial assurance mechanisms. 
All the above items should ultimately contribute to the development of sound bonding 
systems that will fund or guarantee ex-post environmental obligations within the upstream sector. 
They should also identify a portfolio of bonding instruments capable of providing coherent 
flexibility to companies, maintaining competitiveness within the sector and meeting the needs and 
aspirations of the regulatory agency 
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In this chapter, a conceptual article was prepared in order to deepen the current 
discussion involving financial assurance tools and their effectiveness in providing adequate 
guarantee for ex-post obligations in the upstream oil sector. In addition, this article presents a 
multiattribute decision model that attempts to explain the current choice of instruments by both 
regulators and industry. 
I. REFERRED ARTICLE I- Energy Policy, pnblished in 2003 
TITLE: A DECISION MODEL FOR FINANCIAL ASSURANCE INSTRUMENTS IN 
THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR 
AUTHORS: Doneivan Ferreira(!) "; Saul Suslick(J)(Z); Joshua Farley<3>; Robert Costanza<3>; 
Sergey Krivov(3>. 
(I)Department of Geology and Natural Resources - State University of Campinas (UN/CAMP), 
P.O. Box 6152, Campinas, SP 13083-970 - BRAZIL; <Z>center for Petroleum Studies 
(CEPETRO), P. 0. Box 6052 Campinas, SP 13083-970- BRAZIL; and <3>/nstitute for Ecological 
Economics (lEE) - University of Maryland, Box 38, Solomons, MD 20688- USA. 
ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this paper is to deepen the discussion regarding the application of financial 
assurance instruments, bonds, in the upstream oil sector. This paper will also attempt to explain 
the current choice of instruments within the sector. The concepts of environmental damages and 
internalization of environmental and regulatory costs will be briefly explored. Bonding 
mechanisms are presently being adopted by several goverrmients with the objective of 
guaranteeing the availability of funds for end-of-leasing operations. Regulators are mainly 
concerned with the prospect of inheriting liabilities from lessees. Several forms of bonding 
instruments currently available were identified and a new instrument classification was proposed. 
Ten commonly used instruments were selected and analyzed under the perspective of both 
regulators and industry (surety, paid-in and periodic-payment collateral accounts, letters of credit, 
self-guarantees, investment grade securities, real estate collaterals, insurance policies, pools, and 
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special funds). A multiattribute value function model was then proposed to examine current 
instrument preferences. Preliminary simulations confirm the current scenario where regulators 
are likely to require surety bonds, letters of credit, and periodic payment collateral account tools. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to current world developments and to the ever-increasing demand for nonrenewable 
fossil fuels, goverrunents are likely to intensifY exploration and production efforts, including 
small and marginal fields. In fact, several traditional and nontraditional producing nations have 
already established tax incentive policies and royalty relief programs. These policies and 
programs are based on the perception that oil imports carry profound economic and political 
costs, which are intensified during times of international instability. Even though governments 
are interested in maintaining (and improving) investment flow and competitiveness within the 
sector, safeguarding taxpayers against industry's environmental noncompliance costs is 
becoming a critical issue. 
The scenario described above calls for a number of considerations regarding a desirable 
balance between the public outcry for environmental accountability and the industry pressure for 
regulatory flexibility. Regulators are mainly concerned with the noncompliance risk offered by 
the increasing interest of newly formed and small companies in small and marginal fields 
(HAYNES, 1994; MMS, 2000a, 2001; ANP, 2000b, 2002a; DTI, 2000; BRYAN, 2000; 
MARTIN, 2000; WILLIAMS, 2000; MIRABELLA, 2000; BLM, 2001; BAIER, 2001; 
CORNWELL, 2001; NPD, 2001; MPC, 2001; STOKES, 2001). In addition, without protection 
mechanisms, large companies could open small spurious companies to evade closure liabilities. 
Owing to the evolution of social consciousness and pressure from interest groups, 
regulators are being compelled to establish stringent environmental policy requirements, 
including incentive mechanisms aimed at safeguarding society against environmental 
degradation and related fmancial liabilities (FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2001). Financial 
assurance requirements (bonds) come as a response to environmental compliance concerns in the 
oil sector, where it is being used to reduce the risk of noncompliance on end-of-leasing 
contractual obligations3• Several countries have adopted bonds in order to cope with these ex-
3 Recent events tend to significantly affect the political behavior among larger fuel consuming nations. At least initially, a 
regressive trend may be perceived on environmental policies. This may occur because in order to reduce fuel dependency from 
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post liabilities in the petroleum sector; among them, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia, and Brazil. 
The application of bonding mechanisms is a complex subject involving a great deal of 
controversy. The scope of this paper is limited and solely directed to the application of bonding 
instruments within the upstream petroleum sector aimed at ensuring compliance with closure 
obligations (reclamation, abandonment and decommissioning operations). As will be explained, 
these activities are specifically associated with the process of mitigating ex-post environmental 
damages, providing and enforcing conditions of negligible health and safety risk to local 
inhabitants, and ensuring safety for navigation and the environment. 
The present work does not focus on the nature or scale of potential environmental 
impacts; instead, it provides elements in a systematic effort to broaden the current discussion 
involving the application of bonding instruments in the Exploration and Production sector (E & 
P). This paper is divided into three sections. The first section describes different forms of 
environmental damages and presents an overview of environmental costs. It discusses some 
important concepts, such as assessment of monetary value of environmental damages and 
internalization of environmental costs. Section 2 briefly describes the main forms of regulatory 
approaches, explains the application of bonding mechanisms in the upstream petroleum sector, 
identifies and analyzes a number of bonding instruments currently being used in the sector, and 
proposes a systematic instrument classification. The last section offers a decision model to 
explain the current instrument choice among regulators and the industry. 
2.2. FORMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES 
Upstream petroleum activities have the potential of generating a wide range of 
environmental impacts (chemical, physical and biological disturbances). Such impacts may be 
manifested in the surface and subsurface, in the water and water bottoms, and in the atmosphere. 
In order to better assess potential environmental impacts, PATIN ( 1999) suggests a 
special classification for the development phases, taking into consideration the respective 
sequence of operations: (1) geological and geophysical survey (seismic surveys, test drilling, 
etc.); (2) exploration (rig emplacement, exploratory drilling, etc.); (3) development and 
unreliable and hostile foreign sources, governments may be tempted to relax environmental regulations for the upstream sector. 
However, in due course, domestic and international pressure should force them back on track towards more stringent 
environmental regulations, including the adoption of bonding requirements. 
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production (platform emplacement, pipe laying, drilling, extraction, separation, transport, well 
and pipeline maintenance, etc.); (4) closure and decommissioning (disassembling, structure 
removal, well plugging, site clearance, land reclamation, etc.). 
FERREIRA and SUSLICK (200 I) propose tbree broad categories of environmental 
damages within the specific context of hydrocarbon recovery: ex -post, accidental and continuous 
environmental damages (Figure 2.1). This classification was previously used by CORNWELL 
(1997) to explain the role of incentive tools on environmental regulation. This proposed tool 
helps to systematize the present discussion, assisting in the optimum application of bonding 
mechanisms. 
Accidental Damages 
This category includes environmental impacts caused by oil companies in unforeseen 
events during the course of daily operations. Levels of risk are assigned according to the 
availability of statistical data on specific events. For instance, an oil company may have control 
over some contingencies, making it possible to reduce the risk and intensity of accidental 
damages. In other cases, there is no control over events and no possibility of risk reduction. 
Examples of accidental damages: blowouts, accidental spillage, accidental discharge of drilling 
muds or produced waters, sinking of offshore installations, vessels or helicopters, acts of God 
(flood, lightning, earthquake, etc.), war, sabotage, terrorism, etc. 
Continuous Damages 
This category includes environmental damages resulting from on-going processes during 
the life of a project. Examples of continuous damages are: discharge of drilling muds and 
cuttings, emissions and discharge of pollutants, deforestation and other physical disturbances, 
generation of solid waste, emission of waste in streams, sediment resuspension, interference with 
humans, fisheries and other users, etc. 
Ex-post Damages 
This category includes environmental damages that are anticipated as a result of upstream 
oil activities. In this case, provisions for the remediation or mitigation of such damages are 
arranged before leases are granted for a specific project. For instance, companies conducting 
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offShore operations are required to reclaim the site by plugging and abandoning all wells, 
decommissioning all offshore installations and clearing the site of all obstructions. These 
operations take place at the end of a project, phase, or specific activity. The emphasis lies on 
achieving proper closure rather than on the closure process. In this case, regulators are not 
interested in monetary compensations, but rather in the fulfillment of closure obligations. In 
order to maximize project value, oil companies are motivated to avoid costs of repairing 
damages, and pursuing less costly closure alternatives. 
ProWction Begins 
Lease is 
1;'::1expaa~' !!:~:f.~:·.~~t __ ,_! .. Prod.!:!;::·riia:w1 -~~~ ,,,,,-:::::::1 -
I -............ ~ 
Accidenlal t:a nages 
Figure 2.1. Environmental Damage Categories. The life of an oil project, its phases, and potential for 
environmental damages (FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2001). 
Some examples of ex-post mitigating activities include: plugging and abandonment of 
wells, removal and disposal of offshore platforms and pipelines, removal and disposal of debris 
and obstructions on the ocean floor, site reclamation, revegetation, removal of constructions and 
access roads, etc. 
As also concluded by CORNWELL (1997), this is perhaps the best-suited category to be 
covered by bonds. In the upstream oil sector, some of the corroborating factors are: (I) oil 
projects have limited time horizons (a defined beginning and a defined end); (3) operations 
require a lease (or license) before they are undertaken; and (3) in most circumstances, costs for 

mitigating ex-post damages caused by upstream activities can be easily estimated (i.e. cost for 
plugging wells). 
Some of the arguments that make the oil sector more convenient for the application of 
bonding regulations include: 
• Petroleum exploration and production operations involve significantly smaller areas than 
other extractive activities. 
• In most circumstances, because of the potential for significant government revenue 
earnings, oil projects are subjected to more scrutiny and more rigorous licensing 
processes. 
• Currently, due to the costs involved in the licensing, exploration, and development 
phases, in most cases, oil and gas projects attract fewer risky parties when compared to 
the mining sector, for instance. 
• The potential for ex-post environmental damages in petroleum projects is significantly 
small when compared to potential ex-post damages in mining projects, for instance4• 
Nevertheless, a number of emerging issues are likely to introduce some complexity in 
estimating costs of ex -post damages in the oil sector: 
• Decommissioning of large fixed offshore installations: the industry does not have real 
experience in the decommissioning of large fixed platforms. Consequently, due to 
technological uncertainties, estimating decommissioning costs is a very controversial 
ISSUe; 
• Decommissioning of pipelines: so far, regulators do not require the removal of pipelines. 
However, this scenario may change bringing significant environmental and financial 
uncertainties to the closure process; 
• Cleanup of offshore sites: currently, there is significant discussion involving requirements 
for the removal and disposal of drill cuttings generated in offshore operations. As 
4 The internalization of ex-post environmental obligations is a very controversial issue. For instance, if ex-post costs 
are truly and ultimately internalized and transferred to the fmal user, as it should, what would be the cost of nuclear 
energy? Costs related to the decommissioning of nuclear power plant, storage of wastes, perpetual monitoring of 
radioactive waste is enormous, but such costs are never internalized and someone will eventually have to cover them. 
The same has been happening in the upstream oil sector where before the problem emerged during the Brent Spar 
episode, the cost for removing and disposing of offshore structure was largely ignored and never internalized. 
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regulatory standards for offshore site cleanup toughen, uncertainties will be introduced to 
the ex -post cost estimation process; 
• NORMs: the presence of Natural-Occurring Radioactive Material (NORMs) in waste, 
fluids and gases brought to the surface from producing subsurface oil and gas formations 
has become a great concern for the oil industry (MCFADDING, 1996). Long-overdue 
handling and disposal requirements for NORM-bearing waste and contaminated 
equipment will significantly impact ex -post costs; 
• Residual liability: the discussion on potential residual liability is also expected to add 
significant uncertainty to this debate: "when can a company walk away'' or "when is 
liability over". 
Although the application of bonds is mostly suitable for providing protection against ex-
post damages, it may indirectly generate incentives for the reduction of continuous and accidental 
damages. Bonds may be appropriate to cover accidental damages if the probabilities for 
contingencies are known and if potential damages are not catastrophic or irreversible. There is a 
wide spectrum of possible continuous damages, and the applicability of bonding mechanisms 
depends on the nature and extent of the damage. 
2.3. FINANCIAL ASSURANCE SYSTEMS A.l'o;'D INSTRUMENTS 
The main approaches to environmental policies are Command and Control (direct 
regulation) and Economic Incentive Mechanisms (market alternatives). Both Command and 
Control (CAC) and Economic Incentive Mechanisms (ElM) have been exhaustively discussed in 
the literature, including their characteristics, applications, and efficiencies (BOHM, 1981; 
STOLLERY, 1985; WEBBER AND WEBBER, 1985; CONRAD, 1987; BAUMAL and OATES, 
1988; PERRINGS, 1989; CORNWELL, 1997). 
CORNWELL and COSTANZA (1994) compare CAC and ElM approaches, and some 
aspects are here adapted to the offshore oil sector: The CAC approach consists of establishing 
and enforcing laws and regulations, and of setting objectives, standards and technologies with 
which agents must comply. The ElM provides incentives that encourage the desired behavior 
while allowing firms the flexibility to act on their unique knowledge of their own production and 
mitigation costs. This decentralizes the decision-making process to protect lease areas; and it 
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relies on performance objectives rather than on a pre-established course of action. Economic 
analysis indicates that present methods of environmental protection, mostly based on CAC 
strategies, are inefficient and often provide disincentives for directing resources toward 
abatement. The main causes are: (I) great uncertainties in calculating decommissioning and 
other ex-post costs; (2) costly and lengthy litigious processes involving oil companies and other 
key stakeholders; (3) unfair homogeneous treatment of oil companies (no record-based 
assessment); (4) great information burden on the regulatory agency (selecting the best 
technology, enforcing penalties for noncompliance, monitoring lessees and financial institutions); 
( 5) little incentive for the development of innovations that can result in improvements and cost 
reduction; ( 6) encourage regulatory evasion rather than regulatory compliance; and (7) vague 
regulatory language allowing oil companies to build persuasive cases by showing that ex-post 
requirements are unachievable. 
Environmental Costs 
The feasibility of bonding mechanisms will require that regulators and/or third party 
insurers possess a reasonable estimate of the costs that the mechanisms will need to cover. If 
costs are underestimated, the assurance is incomplete, and the regulator may be forced to cover 
the shortfall. If the costs are overestimated, desirable investment may be deterred, or companies 
may move their operations to countries with lower regulatory standards. What types of costs are 
relevant, and how they are measured, depends on the type cost under consideration, as mentioned 
above. 
In the case of ex-post closure obligations, oil companies are required to meet a set of 
standards determined by the regulatory agency. What is far more complicated is the process of 
deciding on those standards. Once standards are defined, the costs for achieving those standards 
are fairly simple to calculate, and will determine the amount that must be provided by the 
bonding mechanism. 
Intuitively, it would seem that the standard should be set so that there are no lingering 
damages (i.e. costs), environmental or otherwise, after closure operations. In the extreme case, 
this might require returning the site to the condition it was in prior to the start of the extractive 
activity. However, closure operations entail considerable costs, and the more stringent the 
standards set by the regulator, the higher these costs. In fact, it is likely that each step taken 
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towards site rehabilitation costs more than the previous one-eliminating the first 10% of the 
damages may be fairly inexpensive, the second I 0% may cost more, and the final 10% required 
to return the system to its pristine state may be very expensive indeed. A hypothetical marginal 
cost of closure operation curve is shown in Figure 2.2. In contrast, the benefits to restoration 
may be falling as the site approaches the 'pristine' state. Plugging a well is likely to have 
enormous benefits in terms of preventing pollution, environmental degradation, and accidents. 
Removing offshore infrastructures also has important benefits, though less than those of 
plugging the well. Keeping offshore platforms in place or transporting them to artificial reef 
locations raise a series of issues, including residual liability. However, the presence of offshore 
structures does improve ecosystem services. Besides, the decision regarding the complete 
removal of offshore structures should consider the internalization of all decommissioning costs 
including emissions, energy consumption, safety risks, etc. (see Appendix D - ecological 
impacts of decommissioning operations) As increasingly on-site contamination is cleaned up, 
marginal benefits are likely to fall even further. This is shown by the marginal benefits to 
closure operation curve in Figure 2.2. 
0 
marginal cost of 
decommissioning 
~ 
marginal benefit from 
decommissioning 
"--.. 
: ......... optimal 
: standard 
s 
Site degradation/ environmental costs 
Figure 2.2. Marginal costs and benefits of decommissioning operations. Intersection E indicates the point 
of optimum standard. Area OES indicates a low efficiency scenario, where costs ourweigh 
decommissioning benefits. 
19 
If the assumption is correct that the costs of restoration increase as we move towards 
recreating a pristine system, and the benefits decrease, then at some point the costs will outweigh 
the benefits (all points to the left of E in Figure 2.2). From the efficiency perspective, this is 
entirely undesirable. To achieve the most efficient allocation of society's resources, regulators 
should strive to set the standard at the point of intersection of the marginal cost and marginal 
benefit curves. This, of course, is much easier said than done, as it shall be explained below. 
On the other hand, what right does an oil company have to externalize costs transferring 
the financial burden to society? Shouldn't polluters have to pay for the pollution they cause? 
Even from the viewpoint of economics, efficient market outcomes require that producers pay all 
of the costs associated with their production. Consider tax deductions, which imply cost sharing 
between companies and government/taxpayers (FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2001). In Figure 
2.2, these costs are depicted by area OES, and are substantial. While Polluter Pay Principle 
(PPP) should apply, closure standards are not the most efficient way to achieve this goal. The 
resources that a petroleum company would require to completely restore a site are resources that 
would become unavailable for society to apply towards other desirable activities, such as 
plugging of orphan wells and sites that were negligently abandoned before bonds were required. 
To enforce PPP, one option could involve a 'degradation' fee (equal to area OES) added to the 
costs of meeting the ex -post enviromnental standard. Such a fee, if adjusted ex -post to reflect 
actual degradation, could greatly increase the extent to which financial assurance instruments 
help internalize externalities. 
Most types of ex-post bonding instruments are a hybrid of market mechanisms and 
command and control regulations. The ideal market mechanism would allow a firm flexibility in 
the extent to which it performs closure operations, but force it to pay for all social costs it 
imposes. Such a system takes advantage of the firm's internal knowledge of production costs, 
clean up costs and profits. When closure is more expensive than social costs, the firm pays its 
social costs. When closure is less expensive, the firm performs closure operations. Most 
important in the dynamic setting, there is always an incentive to seek new technologies and 
techniques that minimize environmental costs. In the case of bonds, the regulator must 
determine the closure standard and is therefore less able to rely on the firm's internal knowledge. 
However, in a number of ways, financial assurance does help improve market function. Bonds 
force all firms to pay for at least some of the enviromnental costs they impose on society, 
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without risk of bankruptcy or non-compliance. Bonds force firms to incorporate environmental 
liabilities directly into their cash flow accounting, and the costs are made explicit to 
shareholders. As careful management of all phases of a project can substantially reduce ex-post 
liabilities, firms have more incentive to minimize damage and avoid accidents throughout the life 
cycle of the investment. Perhaps most important, firms cannot avoid these liabilities through 
bankruptcy or refusal to comply. Firms have incentives to develop new technologies for 
reducing environmental costs as long as the regulator and/or third party insurers take these into 
account when determining bond requirements (consider that, in practice, regulatory agencies are 
not very open to unproven technologies, reducing the incentive for the development of 
technological innovations). Third party insurers are also likely to monitor projects, potentially 
reducing regulatory costs in this regard (APOGEE/-HAGLER BAILLY with D. R. A.l'IDERSON 
ASSOCIATES, 1998). 
A serious problem with this analysis is that while closure operation costs are fairly simple 
to estimate, the benefits of such operations are dramatically less so when the impacts include 
damage to environmental services. There are a number or economic methodologies for 
estimating the values of environmental services, including contingent valuation, hedonic pricing, 
travel cost methodology, replacement costs, and others (PEARCE and TUR.l'<'ER, 1990). All of 
these methodologies are inexact, and rely on a greater knowledge of ecosystem functions, the 
way those functions benefit humans, and the impacts human activities have on those functions 
than currently exists. Ecosystems are extremely complex systems, characterized by non-
linearity, emergent properties, and non-reversibility beyond often-unknown thresholds (ODUM, 
1997). The nascent science of complexity theory offers some insights into ecosystem function, 
but is still inadequate to explain it (KAUFMANN, 1995). Instead of the fine line depicted in 
Figure 2.2, marginal benefits of closure operations are better illustrated by a thick smear. With 
so much uncertainty, the industry will pressure regulators to make the standards as vague as 
possible, while the public may push for stricter standards. In keeping with the precautionary 
principle, it is safer to err on the side of caution, and standards should be set closer to complete 
restoration (COSTANZA, et al., 1997). 
Bonding may help reduce the difficulty for regulators to estimate closure costs. If 
standards are set for closure without bonding mechanisms to back them up, firms will have 
incentives to overestimate closure costs so that regulators will require less complete closure 
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operations. With bonds however, firms have to pay in advance for closure costs, and lose the 
incentive to overestimate. The question still remains whose costs should form the basis of the 
estimate. The firm is likely to be able to meet closure costs more cheaply than the regulator, 
because it will be able to use its own resources and avoid overhead. The government, in 
contrast, will have to hire outside contractors, possibly at higher cost. However, as it is the 
regulator that will have to bear the costs in the event of default, the more likely the firm is to 
default, the more appropriate it becomes to use government costs (usually, estimations are based 
on project plans provided by operators and confirmed by the regulator's database, and an 
additional amount is included, usually 15 to 30%, to internalize indirect costs such as overhead 
and third-party costs). 
Bonding Systems 
There are five main stakeholders involved in the bonding process: regulators, industry, 
society, project financing agents, and bonding agents/third party insurers. The focus of this paper 
is on regulators and the industry. Some key concerns associated with each stakeholder are 
summarized on Table 2.1. 
TABLE 2.1. MAIN STAKEHOLDERS 
Stakeholders 
Regulators (government agencies) 
Industry (oil companies) 
Society (public in general and interest groups) 
Project Financing Agents (investors, banks, international 
development institutions) 
Financial Assurance Agents (insurance and surety companies, 
banks, etc.) 
Main Concerns 
Financial and environmental liabilities 
Investment flow within the sector 
Profitability 
Corporate image 
Environmental protection 
Development 
Investment returns 
Image 
New business opportunities 
Risk reduction 
Bonds may reduce liability risks by (1) providing financial incentive for contractual 
compliance; (2) safeguarding government and taxpayers by attaining reasonable protection from 
default at a minimum increase in project costs; and (3) protecting the environment from potential 
harm resulting from failure to carry out proper closure operations in a timely fashion. Therefore, 
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oil companies wishing to explore and produce hydrocarbon resources would be required to post a 
bond in advance equal to the best estimate to cover all closure costs. 
As mentioned, setting the appropriate bond requirement may be one of the greatest 
predicaments within a bonding system. It is not always possible to calculate the total monetary 
value of complex non-market goods such as ecosystem functions and services, though many 
methodologies currently exist to calculate partial values (for instance, COST A.t'JZA, et al., 1997). 
Another predicament within bonding regimes is tax treatment. For most tax regimes, 
closure obligations are ordinary and necessary expenses. In general, closure expenditures are tax-
deductible only when services have been performed and payments have been made. The same 
rule applies when progressive closure (the phased approach) is adopted. 
Under most bonding regimes, there is no deduction available for companies allocating 
funds as collateral until the company loses ownership of funds. However, if a company pays fees 
or premiums to keep surety bonds or environmental insurance policies, expenditures would be 
amortized over the period covered by the bond. Tbe basic rule is that only an ordinary and 
necessary business expense is deductible; capital expenditure is not. Being contractually liable 
for closure operations and emitting bonds (in anticipation) to guarantee such operations, does not 
entitle companies to deduct cost of services before they are actually performed (FERREIRA and 
SUSLICK, 2000). 
Bonding Instruments 
Traditionally, bonding instruments have been used to provide different forms of 
guarantees as shown below (ROWE, 1987; JOHNSON, 1986; CORNWELL, 1997; MILLER, 
2000): fidelity bonds (guarantee honesty); fiduciary bonds (guarantee the proper management of 
assets); judicial bonds (guarantee the compliance with judicial decisions); and contractual bonds 
(guarantee the fulfillment of contractual obligations). The category "Contractual Bonds" 
includes several subcategories including: performance bonds; construction bonds; bid bonds; 
service and materials bonds; advanced payment bonds; retention bonds; maintenance bonds; 
transport bonds; government regulatory bonds; customs bonds; financial bonds; and license and 
authorization bonds. 
Within the Exploration and Production sector, two maJor bond categories can be 
identified in terms of specific purpose: (1) financial bond, a bond that guarantees the payment of 
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a specific amount determined by the agency in case of noncompliance; and (2) performance 
bond, a bond that guarantees the performance of a contractual obligation. 
Bonds may be used several times within a single contract. Under some regrmes, 
companies acquiring oil or gas leases are required to post a preliminary financial bond (a fixed 
and relatively small bond) guaranteeing fmancial aspects of the lease contract (regular payments 
of rents and royalties, civil penalties, fines, etc.). Usually, companies holding more than one 
lease may opt for an "Areawide Bond", or "Blanket Bond", in which case, a single bond would 
cover multiple leases. 
In addition to financial bonds, some regulatory agencies require a performance bond, 
which is usually based on the best-cost estimate for completing ex-post closure operations under 
the established lease contract. Performance bonds serve individual projects and individual wells. 
Multiple performance bonds may be found within a lease, but a single performance bond cannot 
be used to cover multiple projects. 
Performance bonds must be maintained until leases are terminated or transferred and until 
closure obligations are satisfactorily met. If closure activities are being conducted concomitantly 
during the life of the project, the phased approach, authorities may authorize proportional releases 
ofthe bond. 
A bond may be subject to forfeiture for different reasons: (I) if a well or installation has 
been abandoned or temporarily closed without initiating required procedures; (2) if a company 
fails to meet closure obligations in accordance with the approved plan; or (3) if a company fails 
to maintain the amount bonded. 
Financial instruments used to meet financial or performance bonding requirements may 
come in several forms with unique attributes and requirements: some are the pledged assets of a 
company (cash, securities, real estate, escrow accounts, salvage, etc.); others represent a 
guarantee for a company's performance, fulfillment of obligations (surety bonds), or the 
transferring of potential financial liabilities to other agents (e.g. insurance policies); others are 
securities issued by bonding or insurance companies, banks or other financial institutions; and 
still others are instruments that indicate the deposit of cash (certificates of deposit) or the 
existence of a line of credit (letters of credit) (BRYAN, 1998). 
Definitions and descriptions of currently used bonding instruments can be found in the 
following publications: BLM (1996), CORNWELL (1997), MILLER (1998), FERREIRA and 
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SUSLICK (2000), OSM (2000b), }..'WF (2000), UNICAMP/CEPETRO (2001), FERREIRA and 
SUSLICK (2003a). 
Some complexities are involved in assessmg bonding instruments: (1) a specific 
instrument may be known by a variety of names; (2) a single instrument may comprise a number 
of significant variations and still carry tbe same name; and (3) some instruments can be 
personalized witb contractual clauses altering their behavior, but keeping the same name. 
Bonding instruments are classified in several ways, but a comprehensive classification 
that could systematically embrace most instruments was not found. Some authors use a general 
"soft" and "hard" classification (i.e. MILLER, 1998). "Hard" for instruments that cause 
significant direct costs5, and "soft" for instruments that cause less significant direct costs. 
Despite less significant direct costs, soft instruments may cause some indirect costs, which may 
include reduction of credit capacity and increase of loan costs. Table 2.2 shows some fmancial 
tools currently being used as bonding instruments to provide guarantee for end-of-leasing and 
reclamation operations. This classification was designed to facilitate the systematic evaluation 
and optimum applicability of each instrument. 
TABLE 2.2. INSTRUMENT OPTIONS 
2.4. DECISION MODEL 
Short Name 
SURE 
PIACC 
PPACC 
LOC 
SELF 
IGS 
RE 
INSP 
POOL 
SFUND 
Bonding Instrument Option 
Corporate Surety Bond 
Paid-in Cash Collateral Account 
Periodic Payment Collateral Account 
Letter of Credit 
Self Bond 
Investtnent Grade Security Bond 
Real Estate Collateral Bond 
Insurance Policy Bond 
Pool Guarantee Fund 
Designated State Fund 
This model is an attempt to explain tbe current instrument choice by both regulators and 
industry. It is also intended to systematize the decision-making process to assist in the selection 
an optimum portfolio of bonding instruments. Such portfolio should offer, at same time, 
adequate protection for regulators and an acceptable level of cost and flexibility for the industry. 
5 Direct costs usually refer to opportunity costs and liquidity constraints caused by the allocation of large amounts of money at 
"startup". 
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Due to public pressure, regulators must impose bonding requirements; however, such 
requirements generate significant negative impacts on the industry, which in turn, demands 
flexibility. Regulators must respond in order to keep the market competitive and maintain the 
investment flow in the sector. Closing the cycle, some of the flexibility allowed may increase the 
risk for regulators, triggering further pressure from taxpayers and interest groups, as 
demonstrated in Figure 2.3. 
For this comparison exercise, this paper simulates the application often different financial 
instruments identified by FERREIRA and SUSLICK (2001) that are commonly used in the oil 
and mining sectors: Corporate surety bonds, paid-in cash collateral accounts, periodic payment 
collateral accounts, letters of credit, self bonds, investment grade security bonds, real estate 
collateral bond, pool guarantee funds, designated state funds. These instruments were chosen 
based on a study done for ANP where several forms of bonding instruments were being 
considered to provide ex-post performance guarantee for petroleum projects 
(UNICAMP/CEPETRO, 2001). Currently, ANP requires financial bonds for the bidding process, 
where letters of credit and cash are accepted. Studies are on the way aimed at establishing sound 
performance bond requirements for all phases of Brazilian upstream petroleum projects. Among 
instruments being studied are collateral cash (paid-in and leasing specific accounts), ex-post 
insurance policies, and letters of credit. 
The methodology used in this process was the identification of the most significant 
attributes according to the perspective of key stakeholders. In addition, a questionnaire6 was 
prepared and sent to a number of bond specialists who were asked to rank several bonding 
instruments under several categories (attributes), according to their own experience. On 
Appendix 1, on the questionnaire table, the left column indicates some of the instruments used to 
guarantee or fund ex-post end-of-leasing, closure and reclamation obligations. The top row 
identifies some of the characteristics of these instruments. Based on the specialist's own 
6 This figure was not included in the original published paper. The information provided in this questionnaire was 
gathered in meetings with bond specialists from regulatory agencies, industry, financial institutions, and academia, 
all based on personal experiences with different financial assurance instruments. Regulatory agencies allow different 
fmancial instruments based on their own experiences, which oftentimes are not well documented in the academic 
literature. The information gathered in this questionnaire helped in the development of models that may assist in the 
decision-making process, anticipating economic impacts of different fmancial assurance instruments on regulators 
(regulatory cost, flow of investment, etc.) and on the industry (cost of money, cost of opportunity, tax treatment, 
etc.). 
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experience and judgment, he/she was asked score each instrument in the following manner: "5" 
most favorable through "I" least favorable. 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY 
Impact on Agency 
• Lower liquidity 
BONDING 
REQUIREMENTS 
• Difficulty in collecting the bond 
• Feesltax 
• Premiums 
• Up-front capital 
• Liquidity constraints 
,.; Opportunity costs 
• H.igher credit costs 
• Less loan availability ,_ "' 
o ... 
Wfl) 
a:o co 
FINANCIAL WEIGHT • Higher monitoring costs 
•' :Lower incetive level FLEXIBILITY 
·~ Reduction of system effectivenes;~ 
• Higher default risk 
•.• Higher risk of litigious battles 
Impact on Industry 
Figure 2.3. The dynamics of the bonding cycle: due to public pressure, bonding requirements are adopted. 
Bonds cause direct and indirect economic impacts on the industry, which pressures for flexibility. Flexibility 
may increase liability risk, forcing regulators to review requirements. 
Although subjective, personal experiences of bonding professionals have been particularly 
helpful to explain the current behavior and trends of regulatory systems. This process has also 
provided data for the decision model explained below. 
The Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) was used to balance the conflicting 
objectives in the decision model. The main steps can be defined as follows according to 
HWANG and YOON (1981), STAR and ZELENY (1977), and KEENEY (1992): (1) definition 
of the main problem; (2) definition of the main attributes/criteria; (3) establishment of the relative 
importance of each criteria; (4) identification of a set of available alternatives; (5) performance 
assessment of all alternatives according to each criteria; and ( 6) selection of best alternatives. 
This model was developed using the STELLA® software (Figure 2.4). Appendix D provides 

some conceptual information about economic modeling, decision models, forecasting, and about 
the Stella modeling tool. Appendix D also displays some of the mapping levels for this modef. 
Which of the identified financial instruments (Table 2.4) are more likely to be accepted as 
bonding tools for both regulators and the industry? In order to identify the instrument with the 
highest performance, a process consisting of three parts must be undertaken: part 1, definition of 
a preferable instrument alternative for regulators; part 2, definition of a preferable instrument 
alternative for the industry; and part 3, cross-evaluation of results from parts one and two, and the 
identification of a consensual best alternative. 
TABLE 2.4. INSTRUMENTS AND PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION 
PROPOSED 
CLASSIFICATION 
Credit Guarantees 
Negotiable 
Collateral 
Non-Negotiable 
Self Guarantees 
Liability Transfer 
Risk Spreading Consortiums 
(for low-rating participants) 
Risk Spreading Special Funds 
(for all participants) 
INSTRUMENTS 
Corporate Surety Bonds 
Certificates of Deposit, Cash Equivalents, Government-Issued Treasury 
Securities (T-bonds, Investment Grade Securities, etc.) 
Letters of Credit, Real Estate, Salvage, Cash Accounts, Escrow Accounts, 
Paid-In Trust Funds, Trust Funds with Periodic Payments, Standby Trust 
Funds, External Sinking Funds, Lines of Credit Bank, etc. 
Balance Sheet Tests, Corporate Guarantees, Third-party Guarantees, Set-
Aside Revenues and Self-Funding through Financial Reserves 
Environmental Insurance, Finite Insurance, Life Insurance, Annuities 
Pool Bonds 
State Funds 
Regulators and industry view the identified attributes with different degrees of importance 
(weight) (Table 2.5). A choice of a certain instruntent may be appealing for regulators, but may 
be severely opposed by the industry. In addition, the degree of flexibility demanded by the 
industry may pose unacceptable risks to regulators. Costs to meet technical and bonding 
requirements for closure obligations will impact companies differently. Usually large and 
7 Infonnation and illustrations provided in Appendix D were not included in the original publication of this article. 
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financially healthy companies are not significantly affected by bonding requirements, though 
marginal projects operated by any company (large or small) may be severely impacted. Small 
companies operating small and marginal fields tend to be the most affected parties. 
Figure 2.4. Diagram of the Stella Model, including the steps of the decision model: Ung. U,nd and Uwn.•· 
A comprehensive set of objectives that reflect all concerns relevant to the decision 
problem are defined at this point (definition of the main attributes). Regulators and the industry 
do not share the same priorities, but, at same time, do not necessarily have conflicting interests. 
Regulators are primarily interested in an efficient guarantee (protection), and the industry is 
primarily interested in reducing economic impacts of bonding regulations (flexibility). The 
measures for achieving these objectives are expressed in terms of key attributes identified by both 
regulators and industry. Two sets of attributes were suggested reflecting the needs and 
preoccupations of key stakeholders. Each set contains seven attributes. As illustrated in Table 
2.5, the degree to which objectives are met as measured by the attributes is the basis for 
comparing the sets of bond alternatives: Xreg = {xJ,X2, ... ,x7}; Xnd = {x8,X9, ... ,xJ4}. 
The decision maker's perception with respect to the evaluation criteria must be 
incorporated into the decision model. Each attribute has a certain degree of importance for a 
specific decision maker. Therefore, a weight, which reflects the relative degree of importance of 

criteria, is assigned to all evaluation attributes, as shown on Table 2.6. The derivation of weights 
is a central step in eliciting the decision maker's preference. Weights reflect the preferences of 
key stakeholders and hence depend on the choice of individuals. The importance of the attribute 
x, could be specified by the weight w,, where the sum of each set of weights should be equal to 1 
(one), as shown below: 
7 
I w' = 1 
i"" 1 
14 L w i = I 
i = 8 
{ ' ' ' .I Wcons= W J, W ], ... , W f4f, 
14 L w; = I 
i = 1 
TABLE 2.5. ATTRIBUTES/CRITERIA 
Rank X,., Short Name Regulator Perspective 
7 X 1 LIQUIDITY Level of liquidity offered by the instrument in case of bond forfeit 
6 X2 RISK Overall risk offered by the instrument 
5 X3 COLLECTION Level of difficulty in collecting funds in case of bond forfeit 
4 X4 INDIMP Regulator's concern with impact of instrument on the industry 
3 X5 MONITORING Level of monitoring required in order to ensure instrument integrity 
2 
Level of incentive for contractual compliance offered by the 
X6 INCENTNE instrument 
1 X7 ELIMINATOR Does the instrument target primarily risky parties? 
Xind Industry Perspective 
7 X 8 DIRECT Level of liquidity constraints and opportunity costs (Direct Costs) 
6 X 9 FLEXIBILITY Overall flexibility offered by the instrument 
5 X 10 FISCAL Level of fiscal advantages offered by the instrument 
4 Xu WAYOUT Level of opportunity for an easy way out (legal, etc.) 
3 X12 MONEY Level of money value protection for allocated funds offered 
2 X13 INDIRECT Impact on credit and loan capacity (Indirect Impact) 
1 Xu ACQUISITIONLevel of difficulty in instrument acquisition (underwriting process) 
0.225 0.113 
0.200 0.100 
0.175 0.088 
0.125 0.063 
0.100 0.050 
0.100 0.050 
0.075 0.038 
Total 0.500 
0.275 0.138 
0.200 0.100 
0.175 0.088 
0.150 0.075 
0.100 0.050 
0.050 0.025 
0.050 0.025 
Total 0.500 
In order to assess all alternatives according to each attribute, a finite set of possible bond 
options Aj={A~oAJ, ... ,A1o} is provided, as indicated in Table 2.2. This selection corresponds to the 
group of most common financial instruments currently being used as bonding instruments in the 
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United States, Canada, and the UK. The process of evaluating the bond alternatives is based on 
the value structure and related to the set of evaluation criteria. 
TABLE 2.6. MATRIX XIJ: PERFORMA.l'oiCE OF BONDING ALTERNATIVES ON ATTRIBUTES" 
Options Regulators Industry 
XI x, x, x4 x, x, x, x, x, x/0 Xu xl2 Xu Xu 
AI SURE 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 1 1 4 1 
A, PIACC 5 5 5 1 3 5 2 I I I I 3 4 4 
A, PPACC 4 4 4 3 2 4 2 2 3 I I 3 4 4 
A4 LOC 3 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 
As SELF I I I 5 I I 3 5 5 I 5 I I 3 
A, IGS 3 4 4 2 4 5 2 I I 2 I 4 4 4 
A, RE I I I 5 I 2 I 5 4 2 5 I 2 5 
A, INSP 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 5 3 I 5 3 
A, POOL 3 I 2 4 I I I 3 4 I 3 I 4 5 
Aw SFUND 3 2 3 3 2 I I 3 4 I 2 I 4 4 
a Scores: (1) Least Favorable through (5) Most Favorable. 
This process is intended to specify the performance of each alternative for every 
evaluation criteria, allowing the identification of the best options. The performance of the bond 
alternative Aj on attribute x; is indicated by xu. The values xu reflect the performance of 
alternative Aj according to the criteria x;. Thus, an alternative is completely specified by its 
performance score profile, as seen on Table 2.6. These scores also reflect the personal opinion of 
key stakeholders from the industry, regulatory agencies, financial institutions and members of the 
academia involved in the research of bonding mechanisms. 
A decision-making rule provides an ordering of all bond alternatives according to their 
performance with respect to the set of attributes. Choosing the most favorable bonding 
instruments depends on the selection of the best outcome and the identification of the decision 
alternative yielding this outcome. The performance of alternative Aj on the set of attributes 
(x1,x2, .. xn) is associated with vector (x1j,X2j···Xnj) where a component of the vector xu gives the 
numerical value of the performance of alternative Aj on criteria x;. 
The multiattribute value function provides an integrated performance score for each bond 
alternative taking into account all attributes. In the simplest case, value functions can be 
combined with an additive weighed. Thus the overall value attached to a bond alternative is the 
weighted sum of its attribute values: v(aj) = WJXIj + w2x2j + ... WnXnj· The components w 1, 
w2, ... , wn are the weights which indicate the overall importance of each attribute. Since the current 
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problem involves three sub-problems, three different functions will provide the means for the 
selection of the best alternatives for regulators, the industry, and for a consensual decision. The 
three parts of the performance evaluation are shown below (Equations 1, 2 and 3): 
a. Performance of bond alternative GJ for regulators: 
7 
uReg(a) = L w1xu 
i=l 
b. Performance of bond alternative aJ for industry: 
14 
u1nd(a) = L w1xu 
i=8 
c. Consensus for decision rule: 
2.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Table 2.7 indicates the results of the decision rule (Equations 1, 2 and 3). Colurrm II and 
I indicate the final scores for the preferences of regulators and industry, respectively, UReg and 
U1nd· Colurrm III results from the sum of colurrms II and I (Ucons)· Higher scores indicate 
instruments with agreeable feedback from both parties. Colurrm IV indicates the positive 
difference between colurrms I and II (!Liul). High Ucons values must be compared against l.dul 
values, which indicate high degree of antagonism between the two parties. The combination high 
Ucons and low !Liul indicates the preferable scenario, where the instrument encounters less 
resistance from both regulators and the industry, allowing a smoother implementation of bonding 
requirements. 
TABLE 2.7. TOTAL UTILITY 
I II III IV Instruments (Consensus) ltl.ul a (Regulators) (Industry) 
AI SURE 2.200 1.775 3.975 0.425 
A2 PIACC 2.038 0.750 2.788 1.288 
A3 PPACC 1.763 1.088 2.850 0.675 
A, LOC 1.325 1.538 2.863 0.213 
As SELF 0.825 1.800 2.625 0.975 
A• IGS 1.738 0.888 2.625 0.850 
A, RE 0.800 1.863 2.663 1.063 
A, INSP 1.350 1.863 3.213 0.513 
Ag POOL 1.000 1.400 2.400 OAOO 
A1o SFUND 1.175 1.300 2.475 0.125 
a Llu is the difference between columns I and IL 
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Preliminary simulations suggest that surety bonds allow the highest Ucons· These results 
are in agreement with actual bonding regimes. Insurance policies also reach high scores, 
however, in actual scenarios; insurance policies are not well accepted by some regulators. It is 
claimed that insurance policies simply transfer liabilities from producers to third party insurers 
without generating reasonable incentives for compliance. In fact, agents from the insurance 
sector agree that insurance policies provide an easier way out for lessees when compared to 
surety bonds. Letters of credit also reach high Ucons values, but are not welcomed by some 
regulators who claim that the instrument is as good as its issuer. 
A set of new parameters should be included in the model in order to account for these 
discrepancies. In addition, since the preference of regulators overcomes the preference of the 
industry, a factor should be generated to account for this gain allowing a more realistic scenario. 
When stakeholders are analyzed separately, the simulations yield a more realistic set of 
outputs. According to the proposed model, the industry shows preference for insurance policies, 
self and surety bonds. The same model indicates that regulators tend towards surety bonds and 
cash collateral accounts. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
In the oil sector, bonds indenmify authorities against failure to comply with lease 
contractual obligations, safeguarding agencies against technical and financial failure, and 
premature or unplanned closure. Under an ideal bonding regime, the financial risk is shifted from 
the agency to the lessees. By internalizing ex-post damages and no compliance costs, oil 
companies are motivated to monitor the consequences of their decisions throughout the project. 
In case of default, funds necessary to complete all closure obligations would be promptly 
available avoiding complicated and costly legal processes. 
Though a hybrid of market mechanisms and command and control regulations, bonds are 
also likely to achieve noncompliance protection objectives far more cost efficiently than non-
market regulations. Bonds are best suited to cover ex -post environmental damages. The main 
factors include cost assessment and duration of mitigating operations. Some complications are 
expected in the near future as emerging issues are further considered. Preliminary results from 
the simulation model indicate that the surety bond is the most preferable financial instrument 
among regulators and the industry. 
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CHAPTER III- DECOMMISSIONING 
How to guarantee that oil and gas leasing areas will be returned in similar preexisting 
environmental conditions? Answer: establishing of sound ex-post requirements, including the 
decommissioning of offShore installations. 
In this chapter, some of the essential issues of offshore decommissioning are addressed. 
The most prevalent issues cope with potential impacts of decommissioning expenditures. The 
complexity of the theme increases due to the potential combination of: 
• Installation type; 
• Removal and disposal options; and 
• A wide variety of settings. 
In this chapter, the author does not attempt to discuss all these issues, but instead, defmes 
key parameters and offers a systematic approach for addressing decommissioning costs. 
3.1. END-OF-LEASING OBLIGATIONS AND PLATFORM DECOMMISSIONING 
Ex-post (or end-of-leasing) obligations involve different activities including: engineering 
analysis and planning; permitting and regulatory compliance; platform preparation; plugging, 
capping and abandonment of wells; conductor removal; mobilization and demobilization; 
platform and structural removal; pipeline and power cable decommissioning; transportation and 
disposal; and site clearance and verification (NPD, 1993; UNEP and E&P FORUM, 1997; GAO, 
1999; TOPE, 1999; MMS, 1999a; FERREIRA, 1999). Among the main objectives of ex-post 
requirements in the upstream offshore sector are: isolate subsurface contaminations sources, 
guarantee conditions of health and safety, and, if at all possible, return disturbed areas to their 
pristine conditions. 
Although embodying different meanings, the terms abandonment and decommissioning 
are often used interchangeably. Both terms are also frequently used to designate the entire chain 
of ex-post activities. Technically, the ex-post process includes several activities, including 
abandonment and decommissioning operations. Decommissioning has been defined by ANON 
(1999) as the activities related to bringing a platform from an operating condition to a cold, 
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hydrocarbon free condition (but excluding activities related to removal or other methods of 
disposal). The same author defmes disposal as the process and/or agreement that brings an 
installation to its final destination( s) (end-points), where it is reused, recycled, or deposited. 
Most commonly, the term abandonment is used to denote the plugging and capping of a 
specific well and the term decommissioning, which refers to the facility itself, designates the 
process consisting of all activities involved in the removal and disposal of an offshore installation 
(the term also applies to pipelines). The term abandonment seems to imply a "politically 
incorrect" attitude for plugging and capping operations. The general public can easily 
misinterpret this term as implying a negligent abandonment. Both Norway and UK authorities 
have been using the term cessation to account for the entire end-of-leasing process (all ex-post 
activities). Henceforth, because of references and some citations, the terms decommissioning, 
abandonment, cessation, reclamation, closure, and end-of-leasing process may be used 
interchangeably to indicate ex-post obligations. 
Ex-post activities are identified and described bellow (from TY AGI, 1998; MMS, 1999b; 
FERREIRA, 1999; GARLAND, 2000b): 
1. Residual Value Appraisal: The starting point of the decommissioning process is a residual 
value appraisal. 
2. Engineering and Planning: When decommissioning has been firmly decided, pre-project 
can start with the analysis of a huge data collection including installations, waste, etc. This 
phase usually begins two to three years before production ceases. Within this phase, several 
activities may take place including contractual review, engineering analyses, contracting, and 
operational planning. Planning decommissioning operations ahead of time may significantly 
reduce ex -post costs. Since the availability of expertise and appropriate equipment is limited, 
early planning may be crucial. For example, the Norwegian legislation requires the 
submission of a decommissioning plan 2 to 5 years before the license expires, or when an 
installation or pipeline becomes redundant. 
3. Permitting and Regulatory Compliance: This phase includes analysis of legal constraints, 
contractual obligations, implicit obligations (meeting governmental and stakeholders 
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expectations), finances, fiscal regime, and safety and environmental issues. In addition, this 
phase involves activities such as obtaining permits and making installations and all future 
operations comply with local, State, and Federal rules. Usually during this phase, 
environmental consultancy firms are hired to assess environmental impacts. Companies may 
have to provide compensation to commercial fishing companies that are precluded from 
fishing in areas where decommissioning activities are taking place. Several issues rise 
regarding commercial fishing (i.e. exclusion areas, sanctuaries, etc.). This theme has 
attracted a passionate discussion between the oil and fishery industry, environmentalists, and 
several NGOs (MMS, 1987; MMS 1997a; OSMUNDSEN and TVETERAS (2000); 
SANCHIRICO, 2000; DAUTERIVE, 2000b). 
4. Platform Preparation: Platform preparation, also known as safeout operations, involves 
activities aimed at turning the installation safe and ready for dismantling, removal, transport, 
and disposal. This phase also includes structure and equipment cleaning. 
5. Well Plugging and Abandonment: Plugging all exploration8 and development wells, 
isolating subsurface hydrocarbon sources from other subsurface, surface, and freshwater 
aquifers zones, preventing contamination. This process involves placing a series of concrete 
and mechanical plugs, and testing their pressure, integrity, and durability (TYAGI, 1998). 
Following plugging, the well site must be cleared of all obstructions and cuttings. Wells can 
be shut-in or temporarily abandoned. Production may be interrupted by technical or 
economical reasons. If the interruption is only temporary, the well is shut-in, but if it is 
permanent, the well must be plugged and abandoned. Shut-ins involve simply closing the 
valves on the Christmas tree. Ifthe duration of the shut-in exceeds a predetermined allowable 
period (usually one year), permanent abandonment will be required. Once a well is 
permanently plugged and abandoned, it becomes mostly unfeasible to reach remammg 
reserves through that well. The MMS has been using Satellite Radar hnagery to detect leaks 
at abandoned wells on the US Outer Continental Shelf (MARTIN, 2000). Even though well 
plugging and abandonment is considered one of the more sensitive ex -post activities within 
8 Despite technological and research efforts, approximately 80% of all pioneer wells do not result in economic 
prospects. When a well does not indicate the presence of oil, it must be plugged and abandoned. 
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the decommissioning process, planning in advance may significantly reduce uncertainties 
(FIELDS and MARTIN, 1997). In the GOM Region, well plugging and abandonment may 
cost generally less than US$ 60,000/well and rule allow casing to be left in the hole bellow 
4.57 meters and tubing can be left in the hole bellow 91.44 meters. 
6. Conductor Removal: This process involves the severing, plugging, and offloading of casings. 
These activities require the use of a platform crane. 
7. Mobilization and Demobilization: It involves bringing a Heavy Lift Vessel (HL V) to the 
project site and returning the vessel to its point of origin. When there are no vessels with the 
capability to remove platforms within the productive area, the vessel has to be brought from 
other areas (usually from the GOM or NS). Total mobilization and demobilization time may 
vary greatly from the distances between locations (i.e. 100 to 200 days.). 
8. Platform and Structural Removal: This process includes the removal of the topside (or 
deck), and the removal of the platform (or structure). Pile severing denotes the method used 
to separate the platform's components (explosives, mechanical means, abrasive technology, 
or torches). Severing is currently a very controversial issue due to the potential danger posed 
to marine animals. Most legal regimes require the complete removal of all offshore 
installations. CULWELL (1997) and PASTHOFER (1997) discuss technical processes of 
deck and jacket decommissioning. 
9. Pipeline and Power Cable Decommissioning: Decommissioning of these components is a 
very complex issue. Knowledge of gradual degradation is limited, since model calculations 
may not be verified through observations. A rough estimate of total degradation period for 
steel pipelines is 300-500 years9• Removal methods are mainly based on costly reversed 
installation. Reuse experience for pipelines is limited and, under most regimes, in order to 
obtain a pipeline license, a company must demonstrate that specifications and quality of the 
material is adequate. Pipelines must be decommissioned in order to prevent seepage and to 
minimize potential safety hazards for the environment, marine and human lives, and 
9 Intact concrete caps may significantly delay degradation. 
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navigation activities. Submarine pipelines and cables are located at a variety of settings. 
Removal and disposal options are not included in international conventions and national 
authorities, which may decide on costly solutions, usually define the rules. Regardless of 
available options, pipelines should be pigged and flushed until they are clean to avoid future 
leakage. Some agencies (i.e. MMS) require pipelines to be cut at each end, filled with 
seawater or inhibited water, and caped. Each end should be buried (O'CONNOR, 2000). 
10. Transportation and Disposal: Process steel, marine growth, cement, mud, etc., are materials 
that must be removed and properly disposed of. There are three main disposal approaches: 
(I) refurbish for reuse, (2) scrap and recycle, and (3) disposal in designated landfills. 
Opportunities for refurbishing and reusing facilities depend of several corroborating factors 
such as structural integrity, additional project developments in the region, matching technical 
parameters, etc. Transportation and disposal of these materials can be costly. These and 
other options will be further discussed in this chapter. 
11. Site Clearance and Verification: All obstructions must be cleared from the site. This process 
may require dragging a trawl, diver search around the well bore, and even seafloor scanning. 
These activities will ensure that the site is free of obstructions (i.e. sunken helicopters have 
been found on the seafloor around platforms in the GOM). 
3.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
For being part of the global commons, oceans must be contemplated beyond domestic 
interests and expectations. Offshore ex -post requirements (including decommissioning 
operations) must follow the same rationale. International conventions and guidelines are 
primarily aimed at establishing legal trends, influencing national legislation, and allowing sound 
environmental attitudes where a domestic legal framework does not exist. Additionally, 
international laws impose accountability and constraints on national governments. National 
governments then legislate in conformity with the international legal framework. Before 1995, 
both international and domestic decommissioning requirements were flexible to some extent and 
allowed analysis on a case-by-case basis (UNEP and E&P FORUM, 1997; FERREIRA and 
SUSLICK, 1999, 2000). However, since the Brent Spar episode in 1995, interest groups have 
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been pressuring for changes m the regulatory framework by requesting the elimination of the 
case-by-case approach and calling for complete decommissioning (total removal) in all 
circumstances. Figure 3.1 summarizes this session. 
EU Moratorium2 
~ 
ActiYe! 
Decommissioning ~ 
... 
Future' I 
... 
1947 First platform out of sight ofland 
1958 Geneva Convention 
1972 
1973 
UN Conference on man & the Environment 
London Dumping Convention 
Oslo Convention 
Regional Seas Program 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL) 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards on Removal of Platforms 
1991 
1992 
Oslo Commission adopts Guidelines on Platform Disposal 
Oslo & Paris Conventions amalgamate 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the NE Atlantic 
1994 (OSPAR) 
1995 ····················································································· Brent Soar 
UK DTI Guidelines 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2003 
Law of Sea Convention enters into force 
LC 72 States agree new protocol 
OSP AR Portugal- Ban on sea disposal4 
DTI Re-issued Guidelines 
Figure 3.1. Main International and Regional regulations, treats and guidelines. 'Operations under the 
Guidelines of the UN International Maritime Organization. 2UK and Norway did not sign the moratorium 
and continued decommissioning activities following !MO. 'New issues may include drill cuttings. 
pipelines, and NORMs. 4Except on concrete, damaged and footing of jackets > 10,000 tons. 
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Probably due to the vague regulatory language employed in international conventions and 
guidelines, there is still considerable confusion in matters of interpretation. Different 
stakeholders present convincing arguments for their divergent demands, and it is not difficult to 
find contradictions and opposing views in different international conventions and guidelines. It is 
practically impossible to strictly observe all requirements simultaneously. 
There are other sources of predicaments. Since international legal provisions cannot 
specify ex -post procedures for internal waters, territorial seas, etc., guidelines and conventions 
can only be recommendatory in nature, and the nation is sovereign in regulating and enforcing 
their offshore oil projects. Usually, national authorities abide by international provisions. 
Nevertheless, due to high ex-post costs, in situations where a government has sovereignty over an 
area and public opinion is not a crucial parameter, authorities may disregard international 
conventions and guidelines. 
There are several international conventions and treaties dealing with offshore 
decommissioning. The most important are: 
1. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: The official implementation of the 
Geneva Convention carne only in 1964 when 56 countries signed it. The main provision of 
this convention, Article 5( 5), calls for complete removal of offshore installations but does not 
mention platform disposal. There is a vast literature record on the interpretation of this 
article, either favoring or going against the total removal concept. Great part of the industry 
favors the argument that the 1958 convention is no longer applicable, but the public and other 
key stakeholders have a different opinion. 
2. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
other Matter (the London Convention): An international treaty signed by 77 nations 
presenting provisions for all marine areas, except internal waters. The most important 
provision of this Convention is found in the Article ill (l)(a), which defines "dumping" as 
"any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures". 
3. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): The UNCLOS 
was ratified by 127 nations and came into force in 1994. It ensures acceptance of coastal 
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state control over offshore resources (sovereignty), while preserving freedoms of navigation 
and overflight. Article 60(3) permits the interpretation in favor of partial removal by stating: 
"Any installations or structures which are abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure 
safety of navigation, taking into account any generally accepted international standards 
established in this regard by the competent international organization. Such removal shall 
also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the marine environment and the rights and 
duties of other States. Appropriate publicity shall be given to the depth, position and 
dimensions of any installations or structures not entirely removed". As it was with the 1958 
Geneva Convention, dispute over the interpretation of this article has erupted. The German 
interpretation is that the only way to ensure safety and environmental protection is to 
completely remove offshore installations. The British interpretation is that complete/total 
removal is contrary to the provisions of Article 60(3). The US interpretation accepts the total 
removal interpretation but admits an "occasional limited exception" (PICTON-
TURBERVILL, 1998). 
4. The 1989 International Maritime Organization Guidelines and Standards for the Removal 
of Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf (the IMO Guidelines): 
The Il\1:0 Guidelines and Standards, which is basically an interpretation for the 1982 
UNCLOS and provides narrow exceptions to the policy of complete removal, sets the 
following standards for the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas installations (Il\1:0, 
1996): 
• Installations weighting less than 4,000 tons, located at places where the water depth 
is less than 100 m, must be completely removed from the site. 
• Installations located at water depths greater than 100 m must be either totally or 
partially removed to a depth allowing an unobstructed water colunm of 55 m above 
the remaining portions of the installation in order to avoid navigational hazards. 
• Total removal will not be required in the following circumstances: technical 
unfeasibility, unacceptable human or environmental risk involved in the total 
removal operations, and extreme costs. 
• All installations (after January 1, 1998) must be designed and built so that their 
complete removal is feasible ( decommissionable structures). 
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• A structure may be left partially or entirely in place if there is a justifiable and 
permitted new use or if the structure can be left in place without causing 
unjustifiable interference with other users of the sea. 
5. The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention: This protocol allows the dumping of offshore 
installations, consistent with guidelines being developed in the Scientific Group. 
6. The 1997 Waste Assessment Framework (Scientific Group- May 1997): It provides draft 
guidelines for decommissioning, a framework for governmental decision-making for the 
issuance of permits to dump using a case-by-case approach, and recommends the 
consideration of environmental effects. 
Currently the London Convention governs the disposal of waste and other material. This 
convention specifically addresses the disposal of offshore installations. Countries with no 
national decommissioning regulations generally proceed in accordance with IMO guidelines. 
Many producing areas are shared by different neighboring nations, as it is the case of the 
North Sea oil and gas province. In such cases, regional conventions are of great importance. 
Until 1998, as part of the UN Regional Seas Program, which began in the early 1970's, there 
were 15 regional conventions controlling pollution of the marine enviromnent (GRIFFIN, 
1998c). 
The Baltic Sea regional legal regime requires total removal for all offshore installations. 
Countries included in Northeastern Atlantic conventions may be going towards a complete ban 
on sea disposal. Greenpeace pushes for an international ban on partial decommissioning 
(GREENPEACE, 1998). South Pacific Conventions allows dumping by permit after 
consideration by other affected parties. Guidelines are being developed for offshore petroleum 
activities in the Arctic Region. Conventions in the Asia-Pacific Region tend to facilitate private-
public cooperation (W ALK.ER, 1998). The following is a brief description of some key regional 
agreements: 
1. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ship and 
Aircraft (the Oslo Convention): This regional agreement comprises the North East Atlantic, 
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the North Sea and portions of the Arctic Ocean. It prohibits dumping of materials from ships, 
aircraft, and platforms. 
2. The 1974 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land Based Sources 
(the Paris Convention): This regional convention controls discharges into the North East 
Atlantic. 
3. The 1991 Oslo Commission Guidelines for the Disposal of Installations at Sea (the 
OSCOM Guidelines): The OSCOM Guidelines is aimed at supplementing the 1989 IMO 
Guidelines by recognizing other alternatives for removal (partial removal). It also establishes 
a permit system which yields the evaluation of decommissioning project proposals in a case-
by-case basis, allowing the consideration of the "leaving-in-place" option, complete or partial 
removal for reuse, scrapping on land, disposal at sea (dumping) or elsewhere. 
4. The 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North East 
Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention): The OSPAR was adopted by the Oslo and Paris 
Commission in 1992. It establishes that no offshore structure, including pipelines, can be 
dumped, left wholly or partially in place at sea unless the competent authority, which will 
analyze it on a case-by-case basis, issues a special permit. 
5. The 1995 OSCOM Moratorium: After the Brent Spar episode, a ban on sea disposal was 
imposed at the Northeast Atlantic. The UK and Norway governments did not sign this 
moratorium and proceeded with decommissioning operations. 
6. The Barcelona Convention: This regional convention controls pollution on the 
Mediterranean Sea and requires removal of offshore installations, but allows the conversion 
of platforms to new alternative uses (GRIFFIN, 1998b; RAMPOLLI and FASCI, 1997). 
7. The Kuwait Protocol: This protocol controls pollution in the Persian Gulf and requires 
removal of offshore installations. 
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8. OSPAR Effective February 9, 1999: Anything installed after February 9, 1999, must be 
taken to shore unless it is reused or derogated for safety, environment, technical, or economic 
reasons. There is no date set for concrete based platforms, but its use is discouraged. This 
convention also bans sea disposal but provides exceptions (concrete, bottom bay over 10,000 
tons, and matters of safety, environment, technology, and economics). 
9. OSPAR Review in 2003: In the 2003-scheduled OSPAR Review, the subjects to be 
considered are: drill cuttings, hazardous chemicals, produced water, among others. 
Despite the effort of international organizations and the availability of regional and 
international legal models, only few countries have developed their own domestic offshore 
decommissioning legislation. Most countries provide only superficial or no provisions for 
decommissioning procedures. Presently, several developing countries have established or are in 
the process of establishing their own offshore ex-post rules (i.e. Brazil, Indonesia, Belize, 
Venezuela, Australia, etc.). 
Thus far, Australia has minimal decommissioning activity. A FPSO off Western 
Australia, the Sk:ua, was decommissioned in 1999 and all equipment and pipelines were 
recovered and reused at Elang/Kakatua. In 1994, the Talisman, also a FPSO, was 
decommissioned in Western Australia. The Talisman was sent to Singapore, and all other 
facilities were removed. The Australian legislation has adopted specific and general 
requirements. Specific requirements address the task of removing or abandoning facilities: 
Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act, 1981, that implements the 1972 London 
Convention, the 1972 London Convention guidelines, and the 1988 !MO. General requirements 
address the abandonment or removal approvals process: the 1967 Petroleum Act (Submerged 
Lands), and the 1999 Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act. The Federal 
Government is in the process of developing guidelines for decommissioning approvals process 
(SIIII\i'NERS, 2000). 
Canada's offshore sector is still in its infancy. Production has been initiated in the early 
1990's, and only now few projects are reaching their maturity and exhaustion stages. 
Decommissioning has been addressed in Canadian legislation and early in project lives, but it is 
only now becoming a focal issue within government and industry (ABRAHAM, 2001). 
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Brazil has passed the Law number 9.966 of April 20, 2000 that deals with the prevention, 
control, and enforcement of pollution caused by oil spills and other polluting and hazardous 
substances in waters under national jurisdiction (DOU, 2000). This Law is based on the 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the related 
Protocol of 1978 known as Marpol 73/78. In addition, Law no. 6,938/81 (National 
Environmental Policy) has created a national database system, the National Environmental 
Information System (SINAMA), and the National Environmental Council (CONAMA) (RUIVO 
and MOROOKA, 2001). The CONAMA is responsible for the environmental licensing process 
required for all E&P activities. The Brazilian Environmental and Nonrenewable Natural 
Resources Institute (IBAMA) is responsible for processing E&P environmental licenses for all 
offshore petroleum projects. In 2000, ANP and IBAMA initiated a review of procedures aimed 
at harmonizing the licensing process with environmental requirements. Nevertheless, specific 
decommissioning regulations are yet to be developed. 
Most national provisions are derived from international conventions and guidelines. 
Local legislators work on establishing requirements that may satisfY domestic and international 
environmental demands, and, at the same time, that are economically feasible. The main 
concerns are the public demand for environmental preservation and government interest in 
maintaining the flow of investments in the sector. 
Regulators may vary proposed rules according to their capacity to review and approve 
decommissioning plans, and enforce ex-post requirements. For instance, bonding requirements 
tend to motivate the development of alternative technologies. If authorities were to oversee 
directly all decommissioning operations, including evaluate new technologies, the information 
burden and enforcement expenditure would be excessive. By requiring total corporate liability 
and transparency (allowing public information access), authorities may be freed of such burden. 
Changes in international conventions and domestic legislation have a great impact in the 
cash flow of oil companies. Solutions must take into consideration technical, environmental, and 
economic parameters, avoiding unfounded and ineffective restrictive policies that can affect the 
continuation of long-term investment commitments in the sector. 
One of the issues being currently considered by regulators is the concern over the 
financial capability of buyers; the exit of majors or transference of leases from large operating 
companies to smaller ones. When leases are marginally funded, the risk of non-compliance 
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mcreases. One solution would be that both the original assignor of the lease and the new lease 
owner would be co-responsible for ex-post compliance associated with the original facilities. 
Regulatory trends points to some very complex issues including pipeline flushing and 
decommissioning, shell mounds (drill cuttings, mud, covered by mussel shells), time limit 
enforcement for decommissioning operations, tightening of bonding requirements to guarantee 
decommissioning funding, ban on explosives, recycling, re-utilization (recommissioning), and 
commercialization of redundant facilities. 
For internal waters, the closest maritime zone to the land, including waters between shore 
and Territorial Sea (bays, rivers, lakes, lagoons, channels, archipelagic waters, seabed and 
subsoil), international treaties and conventions are only recommendatory in nature and the 
discretion of the coastal nation is considerable. Therefore, costal nations are completely 
sovereign in regulating the decommissioning of redundant offshore installations within their 
internal waters. 
3.3. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The first important international acknowledgement of potential problems related to the 
abandonment of offshore installations occurred in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf The first offshore decommissioning record encountered in the literature comes 
from GOM in 1973 (GRIFFIN, 1998a). The Phillips Petroleum (Norway) has conducted studies 
of potential decommissioning costs in 1975 and 1979 (PHILLIPS, 1999b; NPD, 1999). 
Although decommissioning operations have been occurring for almost 30 years (specially 
in the GOM), arising interest on this issue was only triggered during the development of the 
Brent Spar decommissioning episode (Figure 3.2). This notorious episode started in 1995 with 
the Royal Dutch Shell's decision to dump a redundant buoy in the North Sea. Thirteen options 
were reviewed and after four years of studies, Shell decided to sink Brent Spar in deep waters 
(around 1,830 meters). The onshore disposal of the buoy was considered too risky, and would 
cost 400% more than dumping it. 
At that time, Greenpeace used the media very efficiently. As a result, protesters attacked 
gas stations in Germany and a very effective boycott was launched (it spoiled 30% of retail in 
Germany). At the same time, Greenpeace activists occupied Brent Spar. The aftermath of this 
campaign was that the great majority of European Governments were against dumping Brent 
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Figure 3.2. Brent Spar and the stained Shell's 
logo (Shell, 1995; Greenpeace, 1995) 
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Spar. Brent Spar was sent to Norway where it was 
dismantled and disposed of on land10• The 
decommissioning of Brent Spar cost Shell 
approximately US$ 77.4 million, not including the 
economic impacts of the boycott (FERREIRA, 
1999). Greenpeace strategy was indeed successful; 
a milestone in time was established and its 
consequences changed the path of the industry 
(GROVE-WHITE, 1997). It was the first large ex-
post operation in the North Sea Province and there 
were over 70 large facilities to be decommissioned 
in the following years (Figure 3.3). Brent Spar set 
an unsettling precedent for the oil industry and 
several lessons can be learned from this event: 
Figure 3.3. North Sea Decommissioning Timetable (GRIFFIN, 2000a). 
10 The Shell Oil Company had to go far beyond regulatory requirements to satisfY public and interest groups 
demands. The buoy was completely removed, transported to shore, and cut into ring sections. Part ofthe rings was 
used in the construction of a pier in the Norwegian coast (SHELL, 1998). 
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• Shell should have trained a crisis management team to anticipate potential societal 
problems and promptly act to prevent ex-post damages to its image. 
• Shell should have invited to the decision-making process all interested stakeholders, 
including the general public; 
• People's emotional reactions should have been treated as a crucial parameter; 
• Shell should have communicated with the public more efficiently and, before crisis 
erupted, provided education on the subject to all key stakeholders, mainly the media; 
• Compliance with all international, regional, and domestic policies might not 
necessarily satisfy the expectations of public and interest groups. When oil companies are 
pressured by public opinion, they will be compelled to surpass current regulations and 
even scientific recommendations, despite significant economic impacts. 
Brent Spar cannot be blamed alone for such abrupt public interest on decommissioning 
activities. The first major round of important decommissioning operations involving large 
installations was expected for the end of the 1990s and interest groups may have seen the Brent 
Spar Buoy as an ideal opportunity to state their case. Besides, increasingly public involvement 
had made government economics more transparent and decommissioning costs, which are 
usually tax-deductible, became public. In addition, as mentioned, this chain of events coincided 
with the climax of the international sustainable development agenda (NERC, 1996, 1998). 
3.4. DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS 
According to MARTIN (2000), "all platforms are not created equal". Offshore platforms 
can be designed for a variety of needs, environments, and purposes (drilling, production, storage, 
utilities, accommodation, etc.). Parameters such as water depth, distance from shore, 
environment setting, and climate, prescribe the appropriate type of installation and make them 
unique and site-specific (GRIFFIN, 2000a). The most common types are: steel jacketed platform 
for shallow waters; mini-jacket (for marginal-field development); concrete gravity structure; steel 
gravity structure (jack-up); steel jacketed platform for deep waters; tension leg platform (TLP); 
compliant tower; semi-submersible platform; spar buoy; and floating production system (FPSO, 
FSO, etc.) (Figure 3.4). 
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The steel jacketed (frame-shaped) platform is the most common platform type comprising 
approximately 80% to 95% of all installations in place worldwide. Steel jacket structures weight 
between 400 and 77,000 tons, including both superstructure and substructure. Steel jackets are 
usually installed in waters with depths ranging from 10 to 200 meters. 
Gravity base platforms are typically used in depths ranging between 70 and 200 meters, 
but there are exceptions. Their superstructures can weight from 11,000 to 54,000 tons and their 
substructure between 130,000 and 800,000 tons (POREMSKI, 1998). According to NORSKE 
SHELL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION (1999), the world's tallest gravity base concrete 
production platform, the Troll A platform, is located at the giant Troll Field, Europe's largest 
offshore gas field. Troll A's gravity base structure weights 656,000 tons. Its total height is 472 
meters (from top to bottom) and its total weight is 1,050,000 tons. Troll A is located 65 km from 
shore in 303 meters of water column. The construction contract including mechanical outfitting 
was awarded to Norwegian Contractors in March of 1991. The value of the contract was US$ 
475.35 million (NORSKE SHELL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION, 1999). The platform 
is sited 80 km NW of Bergen, Norway OCS (Figure 3.5). 
The largest semi-submersible platform, the P-36, was operating at Campos Basin in Brazil 
until it sunk in 2001 killing 11 Petrobras employees (Figure 3.6). It weighted 32,000 tons and 
was 120 meters high. Two world records were expected to be broken with P-36: production 
volume (180,000 bbl!day of oil and 7.2 million cubic meters/day of natural gas) and completion 
in deep waters (1,360 meters). Twenty-one wells were connected to P-36 comprising 15% of the 
total Brazilian production until 2000 (ANP, 2000b). Unfortunately, P-36 cannot be recovered, 
recommissioned, or be used as an artificial reef. At the present depth, 1,360 meters, the 
ecosystem cannot be improved by P-36's presence. Other legal issues have emerged from the 
episode. A Norwegian insurance company has made an agreement with the family of most 
victims in a much-criticized deal where each family should receive approximately US$ 29,000 (0 
GLOBO, 2003). This episode should call the attention for issues related to accidental damages 
and instruments that are more efficient and fair. 
Usually, offshore installations are planned for approximately 20-year projects but most 
platforms can have a functional life that ranges from 30 to 40 years. At the end of this period, 
after production ends, unless the platform is reused in situ or relocated, it must be 
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decommissioned. The main predicament is that most offshore structures were not designed to be 
removed. 
The number of installations going into decommissioning varies greatly according to the 
life of the reservoir, time of installation, oil price, and other economic factors, making it difficult 
to forecast a precise decommissioning schedule. The present scenario is that many aging 
offshore fields around the world, mainly in GOM and in the North Sea, are near the end of their 
productive lives. Many of them have already economically depleted their resources 
(COLEMAN, 1998). In the United States Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), platform 
decommissioning rate is increasing and, in some instances, going beyond the installation rate. 
Over 35% of all offshore projects in the US are over 25-year old (MMS, 1999a). According to 
PERRY ill eta!. (1998), approximately 620 wells are plugged and abandoned every year in the 
US. WATSON (1998) indicates that 120 to 150 p1atfonns are removed every year only in the 
GOM. The Minerals Management Service (MMS) confinns this information and forecasts that 
100 to 200 structures will be decommissioned each year (BUFFINGTON, 1996; MARTIN, 
2000). Figure 3.7 shows GOM's average platform installations and removals from 1987 to 1999, 
Figure 3.8 projects future GOM's decommissioning activities up until 2020, and Figure 3.9 
indicates the average decommissioning cost per ton. 
3.5. DECOMMISSIONING OPTIONS 
Establishing a single decommissioning solution for all offshore installations would be 
unrealistic. The variety of possible combinations of installations and settings, the number of 
possible combinations of decommissioning options, and, most importantly, large amounts of 
money involved, make this subject a very complex and politicized matter. Figure 3.10 indicates 
the main removal and disposal options for offshore installations. 
Most national legal provisions allow oil companies to suggest a decommissioning plan, 
being the applicable authority responsible for making the final decision, accepting, rejecting, or 
requiring modifications to the original plan. The decommissioning plan presented by a company 
usually details all considered options stating the basis for the recommendation. Figure 3.11 
indicates some detailed removal and disposal options for some offshore facilities and 
components. 
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Figure 3.4. Platform types. (I) Steel jacketed platform (shallow water); (2) concrete gravity structure; (3) 
steel gravity structure; (4) floating production system; (5) steel jacketed platform (deep water); (6) compliant 
tower; and (7) tension leg platform (GRIFFIN, 2000a). 
Figure 3.5. Artist's impression of the Troll A 
platform superimposed on a photograph of Paris 
(NORSKE SHELL EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION. 1999). 
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Figure 3.6. Sinking Petrobras' P-36 (FOLHA 
ONLINE, 2001). 

Under strict deconnnissioning rules, items located towards the bottom of the illustration 
tend to be more complex and costly. Ex-post environmental remediation costs for these items are 
expected to rise in the future due to new rules and more rigorous clean-up standards 
(JOHNSTONE et al., 1995). Some items, such as concrete gravity, in addition to complex and 
expensive operations, may pose serious safety risks. As mentioned, new guidelines and rules for 
pipeline and drill cuttings removal and disposal are currently being discussed (CAMPBELL, 
2000). 
According to GRIFFIN ( 1998c ), only some 600 large installations, less than 10% of total 
World platform population, have a greater potential to prompt major controversies. In order to 
exemplify this controversy, PITTARD (1997) suggests that only around 3% of the word's 
installations should be candidates for partial removal. The spotlight of the dispute is certainly 
expected to be on large fixed platforms. Figure 3.12 depicts a comparative illustration of small 
and large platforms. 
The main argument used by interest groups to call for a ban on partial removal is the 
potential environmental impact generated by this option. This position has been questioned by 
the industry, which claims that environmental impacts resulting from different deconnnissioning 
options are negligible. Structures are cleaned before they are deconnnissioned and little 
environmental impact is expected from substructures. According to the industry, parameters such 
as cost, safety of personnel involved, and technical practicability, should preponderate in the 
decision-making process (UKOOA, 1995). As previously mentioned, the adoption of high cost 
solutions offers only marginal or debatable environmental benefits. 
Interest groups challenge industry's reasoning by evoking the Precautionary Principle: 
"preventative measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that 
substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, will bring about hazards to human health, 
harm living resources and ecosystems, or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even 
when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects" 
(GREEJ\'PEACE, 1995). 
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Figure 3.10. Decommissioning options and endpoints for topsides and substructures (sources: 
PRASTHOFER., 1998; UKOOA, 1995; ATHANASSOPOULOS et al., 1999 and ODCP, 1998). 
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OPTIONS 
1 Piecesmall dismantle, onshore disposal 
2 Modular dismantle, onshore disposal 
... 
3 Modular dismantle, strip onshore and dispose, stripped module to CS 
TOPSIDES r 4 Modular dismantle, strip onshore and dispose, stripped module to reef 
5 Modular dismantle, strip onsh:>re and dispose, stripped module to deep sea 
6 Modular dismantle, strip offshore, deposit stripped in-situ, waste to land 
7 Strip offshore, waste to land, topple stripped modules in-situ 
8 Modular dismantle, strip offshore, deposit stripped on CS, waste to land 
9 Modular dismantle, strip offshore, deposit stripped at reef, Waste to land 
10 Modular dismantle, strip offshore, deposit stripped in deep sea, waste to land 
11 Topple modules in-situ, no stripping 
12 Modular dismantle, deposit unstripped at reef 
13 Modular dismantle, deposit unstripped in deep sea 
1 Tcpple in-situ in absence of cuttings 
2 Topple in-situ in presence of cuttings 
STEEL JACKET I 3 Partially remove and lay beside stump 
4 Partially remove and deposit on CS 
5 Partially remove and deposit at reef 
6 Partially remove and deep sea dump 
7 Partially remove, dismantle and dispose onshore 
8 Totally remove in absence of cuttings and deposit on CS 
• 9 Totally remove in absence of cuttings and deposit at reef 1J1 
E-< 10 Totally remove in absence of cuttings and deep sea dump 
1J1 11 Totally remove in absence of cuttings, dismantle and dispose onshore 
0 12 Totally remove in presence of cuttings and deposit on CS u 13 Totally remove in presence of cuttings and deposit at reef 
14 Totally remove in presence of cuttings and deep sea dump 
15 Totally remove in presence of cuttings, dismantle and dispose onshore 
1 Leave in-situ 
CONCRETE GRAVITY l 2 Refloat in absence of cuttings and deep sea dump 
3 Refloat in absence of cuttings, dismantle inshore, dispose waste onshore 
4 Refloat in presence of cuttings and deep sea dump 
5 Refloat in presence of cuttings, dismantle inshore, dispose waste onshore 
1 Leave untreated in-situ 
2 Bury in pit in-situ 
3 Bury by rock dumping in-situ 
PILE OF DRILL 4 Cap with membrane in-situ 
CUTTINGS 5 Controlled spreading in-situ 6 Retrieve, treat and dispose onshore 
7 Retrieve and dispose onshore untreated 
8 Retrieve, treat onshore, deep sea dump treated material 
9 Retrieve, dump untreated in deep sea 
10 Retrieve, re~inject down wells 
1 Leave untreated in-situ 
• 
2 Treat internally, leave in-situ 
3 Plough and backfill in-situ 
PIPELINE 1 4 Rock dtunp in-situ 
5 Remove spans and dispose onshore, leave remainder in-situ 
6 Remove spans and deposit at reef, leave remainder in-situ 
7 Remove spans and deep sea dump, leave remainder in-situ 
8 Totally remove and dispose onshore 
9 Totally remove and deposit at reef 
10 Totally remove and deep sea dump 
Figure 3.11. Variants for removal and disposal alternatives for different structures and needs (UKOOA, 1995 
- modified). 
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The fact is that once public opinion is engaged in demanding total decommissioning, the 
matter becomes highly politicized and companies are forced to adopt economically unsound 
solutions, as it happened in the Brent Spar case. This scenario seems to indicate that two main 
aspects are fueling the total or partial decommissioning dilemma: the amount of money involved 
in the decommissioning process, and a feeling of "public mistrust" towards the oil industry. 
Indeed, the Brent Spar episode has brought the necessary attention to the matter and the public 
felt that oil companies should not be trusted. As a result, even though it can be argued that 
environmental benefits of "total removal" against "partial removal" are only marginal, and, in 
some cases, leaving the structure in place would increase the ecosystem value, public opinion 
tend to go in the opposite direction. According to ATHANASSOPOULOS et a!. (1999), the 
main public objection in regard to the presence of non-producing installations in California 
would be the perceived damage to the scenic ocean-views. 
An innovative approach used by Phillips/66 Norway to manage upcoming 
decommissioning operations has received the approval of Greenpeace. Recently, Phillips/66 
Norway invited all interested stakeholders to present their opinion during the decision-making 
process for the decommissioning of oil platforms from the North Sea Ekofisk I field (public 
involvement plus transparency). As a result, Greenpeace welcomed Phillips/66 Norway's 
proposal for the decommissioning of all fourteen steel oil platforms from Ekofisk I. According to 
Greenpeace, since it will be by far the largest upcoming decommissioning project in the North 
Sea, these operations should boost the development of the onshore decommissioning industry. 
Over the next few years, fourteen steel platforms and one concrete offshore installation will be 
decommissioned, dismantled, and taken onshore (PHILLIPS, 1999a, 1999d). 
Greenpeace has still criticized Phillips for its intention to leave drilling muds below the 
platforms on the seabed. According to the environmental organization, "this will be the next 
major issue where the oil companies will have to face their industrial responsibility to clean up 
their acts" (GREENPEACE, 1999). 
The attenuation of impacts caused by decommissioning expenditure depends on planning 
and proper project administration, allowing significant cost and liability reduction. To some 
specific segments, decommissioning has become a great market opportunity. Offshore structures 
and their components are being regarded as assets (scrap, resale or reuse) and economic impacts 
are being reduced. 
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Figure 3.12. Comparative scale indicating the size of small and large structures compared to a 20-story 
building (Griffin, 2001- modified). 
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Figure 3.13. Environmental character of the reutilization principle (TILLING, 2001 -
modified). 
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In the GOM Region, scrap credit is approximately US$ 100/ton (O'CONNOR, 2000). 
Independent contractors are also positioning themselves in the ex-post market including recycling 
centers, re-adaptation facilities, used platform brokers, etc. (THORTON, 1997). In addition, in 
the attempt to maximize investments by delaying ex -post costs as much as possible, maintenance 
and modifications services are increasingly being required. Clearly, this is boosting the sector. 
Regarding the reuse of offshore facilities, best practice in GOM suggests that 10% of 
facilities being reused at the end of field life would be an ambitious goal. In the majority of 
cases, there will be no alternative to scrapping, salvaging the high value components, and 
recycling the remaining materials (SILK, 2001 ). 
In most cases, the resale value of old offshore structures, equipment, and parts of it, will 
not be sufficient to generate enough revenue to cover decommissioning costs. Due to 
marketability and technical practicability, several companies are not motivated to pursue reuse 
options, also called recommissioning. The industry is joining forces with authorities searching 
for strategies to change this "culture", promoting the reutilization of components and 
recommissioning of facilities. 
On the other hand, TWACHTMAN (1997) points out that rising costs for fabrication of 
new decks, jackets, and pilings, are stimulating the commercialization of decommissioned 
platform components. Providing that not many modifications are required in the old platform, 
the use of decommissioned platforms will avoid costly fabrication costs, and even anticipate first-
oil. In fact, at least in GOM, the market for used platforms has increased. According to 
THORTON (2001), each year in GOM, around 100-120 platforms are salvaged (supply), and 
120-140 new platforms are installed (demand). Only 35% to 50% are suitable in age and 
conditions for recommissioning, but no more than 20% of the decks and 10% of the jackets are in 
fact reused. The first platform reutilization occurrence was recorded in 1967 when Humble Oil 
moved and reused South Pass 36A (O'CONNOR, 1999). 
Most modules contain equipment that are installation-specific and may not be readily 
reusable in other installations (i.e. equipment from power generator modules, wellhead modules, 
processing module, accommodation modules, and safety-related facilities). Adaptations of 
equipments from redundant facilities may incur discouraging costs. New installation 
requirements may expect features that cannot be accommodated by old installations or can imply 
unacceptable expenditure (WATSON, 1998). PRASTHOFER (1998) indicates the difficulty in 
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ensuring the integrity of structures that may be 20 to 30 years old. Additionally, there is the issue 
of meeting new decommissioning requirements. 
WATSON (1998) indicates that parameters that might benefit the reuse market are: (!) 
high-value; (2) long delivery period for new installations11 ; (3) good match between what is 
offered and future needs; (4) an age of less than 10 years; and (5) an engineering mindset and 
reuse culture. Equipment such as power generators, water injection devices, and other items not 
affected by corrosion, have high potential reuse value; at least when a good match is found. Used 
equipment should offer competitive prices, cost-effectiveness, and acceptable safety levels. In 
addition, reused equipment may offer cost, schedule and image benefits. Those in the market are 
challenged with an extremely conservative industry that requires proven technology, risk evasion, 
and are extremely sensitive to oil spills. Table 3.1, as proposed by WATSON (I 998), indicates a 
comparison between costs associated with getting a new installation and a refurbished one. 
TilLING (200 1) proposes a nonexclusive criterion for evaluating the possibility of 
reusing platforms and "who" would be best handling each criterion among stakeholders. 
Appendix 2 suggests a similar approach in order to evaluate the possibility of recommissioning. 
Each criterion has 50-50 chances to succeed. A perfect match is indeed very improbable. Figure 
3.13 illustrates the environmental character of the reutilization principle related to the degree of 
difficulty. 
TABLE 3.1. COST COMPARISON: REFURBISHED vs. NEW 
Refurbished New 
Engineering & Management 200,000 240,000 
Jacket & Piles 650,000 1,225,000 
Deck 365,000 965,000 
Installation 600,000 600,000 
Miscellaneous 100,000 700,000 
Total 1,915,000 3,730,000 
WATSON (1998)- modified 
If reuse is a real option, timing must also be adjusted (Figure 3.14). Other important 
factors for a successful reutilization project include matching oftechnical requirements, sufficient 
time to match market parties, detailed intelligence network, full technical and maintenance 
records, a set of guidelines12, and an extremely knowledgeable project team (RIK, 2001; BECK, 
11 The availability of marginal fields requires the reduction of the time between the decision to develop and the first 
oil flow. 
12 Several large oil corporations have join together to develop guidelines for platform reutilization (BECK, 2001). 
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2001 ). In addition, liability conditions must be clearly defined. Table 3.2 illustrates a successful 
case history. 
TABLE 3.2. CASE HISTORY- EI300 A- GOM 
Drilling/Production 
OD Piles 
Installed 
Removed 
Deck Sold 
Removal preparation cost 
Removal cost 
Site clearance 
PM!Engineering 
Gross Cost 
Deck Sale 
Net Cost 
Source: BECK (2001) 
60.5 meters (water depth) 
1.5 - 14.5 meters 
1981 
1996 
1997 
Costs in $MM 
0.057 
1.121 
0.020 
0.144 
1.342 
0.635 
0.707 
If leaving the platform fully in place is an option, maintenance and surveillance will be 
required. In certain circumstances, a company may decide to leave an installation in place for a 
period (stand by) or even give it an alternative use (meteorological, geologic, oceanographic and 
seismologic offshore research facilities, lighthouses, monitoring stations, field laboratories, 
commercial enterprises such as marine culture and tourism, etc.). In all circumstances, the 
installation must be completely cleaned, monitored, and, eventually, decommissioned. 
As mentioned above, reutilization alternatives may include non-petroleum considerations 
(in situ or relocated). Two very interesting alternative uses given to offshore platforms are: (1) 
the Sea Launch Co., a partnership between Boeing Commercial Space Co., Kvaerner Maritime 
A.S. (a vessel builder from Norway), RSC Energia of Moscow, the Russian Government, and the 
KB Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash of Ukraine (SEA LAUNCH CO., 1999). The Sea Launch Co. 
provides marine-based commercial satellite launches from a converted Norwegian oil-floating 
platform in the equatorial Pacific Ocean (Figure 3.15); and (2) economic feasibility studies are 
underway to test the viability of reusing offshore installations as platforms to generate eolic 
electricity using Wind Energy Converters (OWEC) and other renewable energy systems in the 
North Sea. The main motivation is to offer an alternative to near term decommissioning. 
The comparison between several decommissioning options (toppling, partial removal and 
total removal) is strongly influenced by the energy cost of replacing material that is lost in the 
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process. This is an externalized cost not borne by companies that if ignored may turn options 
such as toppling more attractive in this respect (UKOOA, 1995). 
The industry needs comprehensive region-specific studies on the socio-economic impacts 
of available decommissioning options in order to internalize decommissioning costs more 
accurately into its decision-making process. The internalization is complete when the fees equal 
the marginal external damages (CARRARO, 1999). Additionally, the elaboration of complex 
models that can embrace most relevant issues (environmental and societal) would be an 
alternative approach for obtaining balanced results that could be more efficiently communicated 
to stakeholders. 
In order to identify the preferred decommissioning options, HUGHES and FISH (1999) 
suggests a technique based on the methodology developed by KEPNER and TREGOE (1981), 
often used to evaluate bid proposals. This methodology consists in assigning scores to each 
option based on predetermined selection criteria for objectives in order to arrive at a ranking for 
the options. When all legal requirements have been met and all legal options have been 
identified, the oil company would consider the following objectives: Environmental, safety, 
technical feasibility, cost, and public acceptability. The Kepner-Tregoe analysis method13 ts 
outlined bellow in steps, as described by HUGHES and FISH (1999): 
• Establishment of objectives, which each of the decommissioning options is to be 
evaluated against. 
• Classification of objectives into two categories: "mandatory" and "desirable". 
• Attribution of weighting (ranking) to each "desirable" objective, indicating its relative 
importance, assigning the highest weighting to the most important objective. 
• Selection of all options that will be considered. 
• Identification of all options that satisfy "mandatory" objectives. The remaining 
options are discarded. 
• For each "desirable" objective, a score to each decommissioning option should be 
assigned. Judgments can be based on qualitative or quantitative considerations, but 
are best arrived at as a team, rather than individual effort. 
13 This approach described by KEPNER and TREGOE (1981) dates from the 1970s. This method is widely known 
and allows it to act as a shared language amongst its users. 
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• For each decommissioning option, calculate the weighted score for each "desirable" 
objective. Then calculate the total weighted score for each option. 
• The preferred decommissioning option(s) are the ones having the highest weighted 
score. 
• Analyze the sensitivity of the ranking to the weightings. 
• For the decommissioning options having the highest scores, consider potential 
problems including option not feasible at the time of decommissioning and problems 
occurring during the actual decommissioning. Score the probability of failure for each 
decommissioning option (high, medium or low). Use Table 3.3 to evaluate if the 
possibilities of failure are acceptable. 
• Decide on the preferred option. 
• Table 3.4 shows, according to HUGHES and FISH (1999), a summarization of the 
results of the application of Kepner-Tregoe analysis. 
TABLE 3.3. RISK ASSESSMENT BASED ON PROBABILITY OF 
OCCURRENCE AND CONSEQUENCES 
Probabili!Y of occurrence Conseguences 
High High 
High Moderate 
High Low 
Moderate High 
Moderate Moderate 
Moderate Low 
Low High 
Low Moderate 
Low Low 
HUGHES and FISH (1999) modified. 
TABLE 3.4. SELECTED DISPOSAL ROUTE 
Jackets 
Topsides 
Subsea Structures 
Highest Score 
Alternative Use 
Alternative Use 
Remove and Reuse 
Pipelines Leave in Place 
Umbilicals & Flexible Pipelines Leave in Place 
HUGHES and FISH (1999) modified. 
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Is failure acce(!table 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Recommended 
Recycle Onshore 
Recycle Onshore 
Recycle Onshore 
Leave in Place 
Leave in Place 
Production Begins 
Anticipate or Delay Recovery Operations("'} 
====--=-=-~-------------=========~ 
I' }Exploration! ~0-eve'r~'Pmeilt" 
'-'£?;;&:v '' 'v V 
(On Going Project) 
t 
: 
I <*I 
!Oil Price Variation 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
+ 
(New Project) 
Production 'ec~_fn'in_ ost Decommissioning 
~-=----~-------~ Anticipate or Delay Decommissioning Operations("') 
~:) 
Figure 3.14. Reuse timing adjustment. When a match is achieved for the reuse of a platform, 
timing also has to be matched. Recovery and decommissioning must be adjusted. Oil price is, 
most ofthe times, the main variable. 
Figure 3.15. Sea Launch Lift (courtesy of SEA LAUNCH CO.). 
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3.6. THE US RIGS-TO-REEF PROGRAM 
Offshore facilities attract a variety of marine creatures to their reef-like structure (DITTY 
et al., 1997) (Figure 3.16). Marine organisms are not the only wildlife attracted to offshore 
facilities. Every spring and fall, several species of neotropical migrating birds use GOM 
platforms as resting places during adverse weather conditions. Thousands of Monarch butterflies 
also use GOM platforms as resting spots during their migration across the gulf (MMS, 2000b, 
2000c). 
Productive offshore oil and gas structures form one of the world's most extensive defacto 
artificial reef systems (DAUTERNE, 2000a). Removal of redundant facilities is not only a 
financial liability for the petroleum industry but can be a loss of productive marine habitat 
(KASPRZAK, 2000). 
The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, in the United States, manages one of 
the most active artificial reefs program in the world. One of the reasons for this is that through 
December 1999 over 1835 rigs were removed from the GOM. This program was designed to 
take advantage of fishing habitat opportunities offered by these obsolete platforms (KASPRZAK, 
2000). Other materials have been tested as substrate for artificial reefs including aircrafts, war 
tanks, subway cars, etc. 
In 1977, Mobil Oil requested permission of the US government to modifY and abandon in 
situ the accidental wreckage of the drilling rig Topper Ill as an artificial reef at 143 Km from the 
coast of Texas (REGGIO, 1989). After a number of success histories, US authorities established 
programs allowing the use of abandoned offshore structures in the construction of artificial reefs. 
Offshore structures are the ideal substrate form marine life because of their weight and durability. 
US legislation enabled oil companies to donate offshore structures to entities such as the 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD). Along with structure donation, companies are 
required to pay a fee equivalent to half of the total decommissioning cost saved (removal and 
cleanup), or negotiate an alternative "contribution" with the applicable authority (MMS, 1987, 
1997a, 2000b, 2000c; DAUTERNE, 2000a, 2000b). These fees provide the means to the 
implementation and maintenance of a controversial artificial reef program called Rigs to Reefs. 
Sometimes contingencies may anticipate decommissioning, as it is the case of several 
platforms destroyed by hurricanes in GOM. When such accidents occur, platforms are left in 
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situ. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew destroyed or damaged over 181 active platforms and caissons, 
five of which subsequently entered the Louisiana Artificial Reef Program (KASPRZAK, 1998). 
By the end of 1998, approximately 
125 offShore structures (around 10% of ail 
decommissioned structures) had been placed 
on tbe seabed at disposal sites as permanent 
artificial reefs. The states of Louisiana and 
Texas have received over US$ 15 million 
from projects they have sponsored 
(REGGIO, 1998). Table 3.5 shows an 
estimate of potential opportunities to reduce 
decommissioning costs by implementing the 
Rigs-to-ReelS program. In California, the 
Rigs-to-Reefs Bill has been resubmitted to 
the State Senate and Assembly in 200 I. 
Since this bill has been withdrawn before, 
the industry is teaming up with non-industry 
Figure 3.16. Islands of Life. Marine organisms attach supporters (non-profit public benefit 
themselves onto the hard substrate of offshore structures 
initializing the food chain which leads to the creation of a organizations, sport fisherman, divers, 
unique ecosystem that ends when platforms are removed. 
environmentalists and conservationists) in This areas work as a fish recharge area helping our 
overfished oceans (Photo: MMS, 2000c). order to establish an active advocacy through 
communications and presentations (STEINBACH, 2000). All the uncertainty involving potential 
ecological benefits of California artificial reefs and residual liabilities that would be ultimately 
transferred to government entities seems to be a unsurpassable roadblock in the negotiating 
process (ATHANASSOPOULOS et al., 1999). Other issues concerning the ecology of 
decommissioning options can be found in MCGINNIS (2001). 
TABLE 3.5. RIGS-TO-REEF OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE COSTS IN CALIFORNIA 
Full Removal Cost Estimate 
Rigs-to-ReelS Cost Estimate 
Savings (Before Donations) 
Source: STEINBACH (2000) 
65 
(US$ million) 
1,253 
595 
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The MMS maintains a partnership with state agencies for the establishment of these 
artificial reefs. Before being sent to a designated location, structnres are cleaned. Then, the 
company donates the structnre to the State, transports, and places them in a designated area. The 
State assumes all residual liabilities. 
Artificial reefs not only improve certain ecosystems but also create new business 
opportunities. The artificial reef program has: 
• Established a market for sport fishing; 
• Created recharge cells for the overfished GOM, improving conditions for the 
commercial fishing industry; 
• Provided research material for universities; and 
• Generated valuable resources. 
Technical requirements include: 
• Maintenance of at least 25 meters of water colunm clearance; and 
• Reef areas are designated in zones having depth between 60 and 90 meters, where the 
ecosystem can be improved by the presence of structnres. 
The artificial reef concept for offshore structnre disposal has not been accepted 
unanimously. For instance, North Sea producing nations and the State of California are still 
debating the issue. Authorities and the industry agree that there is very little to gain in 
establishing artificial reefs in the North Sea environment (deep, cold and cloudy waters), and 
artificial reefs programs would be just a convenient way of "dumping" offshore facilities. 
0 'LEARY et al. (200 I) has comprehensively discussed the feasibility of artificial reefs in the 
North Sea, and TAKAGI (1998) has conducted similar studies for Japan. Despite all ecological 
and societal aspects, probably the most unsurpassable predicament lies on "residual liabilities". 
Most governments are not willing to accept the uncertainties of artificial reef programs. 
Existing artificial reef programs in Louisiana, Texas, and Italy are, undeniably, very 
successful. However, success stories are associated to a combination of ideal environmental 
conditions (where ecosystem services can be improved), available redundant offshore structnres, 
and a favorable legal scenario. 
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3.7. ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, SAFETY, AND SOCIETAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Usually, before an installation is decommissioned, authorities require a detailed safety 
analysis. Operations involved in the decommissioning process comprise several potentially 
hazardous operations that offer safety concerns towards workers involved in the process (divers, 
mechanics, welders, etc.). Even recycling has its own safety and pollution risks. 
The ODCP14 Research and Technology Assessment Program Report shows that safety 
risks are approximately 50% higher for the total-removal alternative compared to partial-removal 
alternatives. Consequently, reducing offshore decommissioning activities is a determinant factor 
in reducing risks (PRASTHOFER, 1998). 
In analyzing the environmental impacts generated by tlte several decommissioning 
options available today, some considerations should be made: 
• Thus far, a great number of ships, railway wagons, war tanks, etc., have been sunk around 
the world offering a much greater potential for environmental damage. 
• Natural occurring heavy metals are present in mid-oceanic ridges and thermal vents. 
• Organic matters, heavy metals, and halogen organic compounds are present in large 
amounts in effluent discharges by rivers, ducts and occur in natural seepage under the 
seabed. 
Those occurrences, botlt natural and previously man induced, should be used to provide 
scientific data for further decommissioning studies, but not as an excuse for irresponsible 
disposal of offshore installations. 
The geographical extent of impacts from the deep-sea disposal will depend on a number of 
factors such as topography, sediment characteristics, dispersion and transport patterns, etc. 
Considering that structures are prepared in such way that only a limited amount of harmful 
substances remains, no severe enviromnental damage is anticipated during decommissioning 
operations. Besides, enviromnental impact resulted from several decommissioning options seems 
to be not significant (PROGNOS, 1997). 
14 The Offshore Decommissioning and Communications Project (ODCP) was disbanded in September 1998. The 
ODCP operated for two years under tbe sponsorship of tbe OGP (then tbe E&P Forum), UKOOA (UK Offshore 
Operators Association), and OLF (tbe Norwegian Oil Industry Association). The OGP Decommissioning 
Committee was established in October 1998 to take over tbe work oftbe ODCP. 
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A recent study conducted by LINDEBOOM (2000) of tbe Dutch Institute for Marine 
Research (NIOZ), on Texel, compares environmental effects of trawler fishing, sand extraction, 
and oil and gas drilling in the Dutch part of tbe Continental Shelf, in the North Sea. The study 
concludes that fishing has tbe most disturbing effects on biodiversity. Plowing the top layer of 
the soil with heavy nets is very harmful to crabs, shrimps and starfish, favoring only certain 
worms on which flatfish feed. Offshore platforms, according to this study, even have a 
beneficiary effect on the ecosystem. Part of it is because fishing within 500 meters of a platform 
is prohibited. This interdiction is questioned by NGOs connected to the fishery industry. 
Commercial fishing is also not allowed on the proximities of artificial reefs. This issue tends to 
get very emotional since it provides an "easy way out" for oil companies, and, at same time, a 
way to restrain the abuses of commercial fishing in overfished areas. FERREIRA and 
BOUMANS (200 1) (Figure D.5) presents a carbon model where ecological impacts of offshore 
platform removal are accessed. Several other issues concerning the fishery industry are raised by 
OSMUNDSEN and TVETERAS (2000). 
There are topics tbat are not comprehensively addressed by international legal provisions. 
Sea-floor sediment pollution by discarded drilling muds such as barite (BaSo4) used for specific 
gravity control may contain significant quantities of heavy metals sulphides (e.g. PbS, ZnS, 
FeS2), among other compounds and additives (UAFSE, 1999; PEREZ, 1997). Health risks may 
also be involved during onshore dismantling and waste disposing activities. During tbe 1990's 
the presence of Natural-Occurring Radioactive Material (NORMs)15 in waste, fluids and gases 
brought to tbe surface from producing subsurface oil and gas formations, has become a great 
concern for the oil industry (MCFADDIN, 1996; RYGH and BONIFAY, 2000). 
Decommissioning plarming must consider specific handling of NORM-bearing waste, which are 
usually deposited onto the seabed, and NORM-contaminated material, such as drilling 
equipment, well tubing, pumps, etc. These procedures have not been adopted in the majority of 
producing nations. 
Dealing with the recovery and disposal of drill cuttings may be very complex. As in other 
issues, there are several technological, safeties, and economic challenges involved in tbese 
activities. Leaving drilling muds in situ would probably be the best available alternative. It 
15 Radioactive materials have spontaneous decays over time emitting ionizing radiation. Such radiation can cause 
biological dan!age to individuals who are exposed to it, increasing the risk of cancer and birth defects (MCFADDIN, 
1996). 
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should be noted though, that environmental impact might also occur as a result of long-term 
presence of endpoints16 on the seabed. 
This scenario does not seem any better when dealing with pipeline decommissioning. 
Potential environmental impacts from several disposal options may include emissions of heavy 
metals, emissions of oil/tars and softeners, emissions to air, water and land, impacts on habitats, 
and littering of the seabed (MUSAEUS, 2000). In this case, the best environmental solution, 
safest, and most cost effective option, may be leaving pipelines in place, but this issue will 
probably attract scores of emotional disputes. 
HUGHES and FISH (1999) indicate that all disposal options involve secondary C02 
emissions and other gases to the atmosphere. The author also points out that if installations were 
disposed of offshore (i.e. deep-sea dump), there would be a cost in replacing lost material. 
Marginal energy savings will result if total removal options are adopted. However, if the 
necessary precautions were taken, environmental impact would be at acceptable levels, regardless 
of the disposal option. 
An Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIA) can preclude many problems by 
suggesting mitigating measures to reduce negative impacts and enhance positive ones (NESSE, 
2000). An EIA can also provide basis for balanced decisions, better awareness of risks and 
knowledge oflegal requirements. 
Lately, regulators have been motivated to consider social impacts produced by offshore 
activities, and, principally, impacts emerged after the end of activities in nearby communities. 
For instance, a small costal village begins to change rapidly after the discovery of offshore oil in 
the region; establishment of field offices and support facilities, helicopter transport companies, 
hotels, supermarkets, etc. The great challenge is to avoid that at the end of activities, when the 
resources are depleted, communities that have become dependent on the benefits brought by 
nearby operations are disrupted. Oil companies are motivated to work with these communities 
establishing infrastructure and stimulating alternative productive activities that may substitute, or 
at least attenuate, the void expected after operations are concluded. Undoubtedly, social issues 
are significantly more complex tl!an environmental issues. 
16 Endpoints: remains, such as structures, concrete bases, drill cuttings, etc. an example of endpoint effects is the 
deterioration of steel left on the seabed. 
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3.8. TECHNOLOGIC AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Frequent periods of high oil and gas prices have been encouraging governments to offer 
fiscal incentives and royalty relief in order to turn small and marginal fields viable. Such projects 
attract the attention of independent and small operators. With the aim of optimizing profit, new 
approaches are being directed to technology and concepts that allow more attractiveness in the 
development of some shallow water fields. Economic incentives and the emergence of new 
concepts by minimal platform designers are yielding a renaissance in the technology and use of 
minimal facilities, as pointed out by ALBAUGH eta!. (2001). 
Old platform designs can add significant challenge to decommissioning operations. 
According to the MMS (1997b), current technology available for platform removal includes bulk 
explosives, shaped explosive charges, mechanical cutters, and underwater arc cutters. For the 
industry, explosives are the most commonly used, safest, most cost-efficient, and most reliable 
method for severing piles and conductors of platforms. Removal methods for GOM Region from 
1986 to 1997 were explosives (67%), mechanical (28%), abrasive (4%), and other (1 %) 
(O'CONNOR, 2000). However, because of the threat to marine animals, including turtles and 
dolphins, it remains a very sensitive topic among environmentalists and the general public. 
Probably, for this reason, related research sponsored by the MMS has intensified: (I) 
Overpressures developed by shaped explosive charges used to remove wellheads; (2) 
Environmental effects of wellhead removal by explosives; (3) Blast effects upon the environment 
from the removal of platform legs by explosives; (4) Development, testing and evaluation of an 
explosive shock wave focusing tool with minimum explosive weight; and (5) Effectiveness of 50 
pound bulk charges in cutting platform members (MARTIN, 2000). 
The industry has accumulated considerable decommissioning experience along the years, 
however removing large and heavy installations (steel and concrete) in deep waters and rough 
seas can still be particularly complex. Some of the challenges found in these operations involve 
underwater cutting of thick concrete and steel, lifting sections in excess of 4000 tons, diving in 
deep, cold, harsh waters, loading large and heavy structures onto barges in open sea, scarce 
equipment, and removing concrete structures where reflotation could be unpredictable. 
The most common risks involved in decommissioning operations in deep waters are 
potential equipment damage or Joss. Some other potential contingencies are: sinking of 
installations; dropped loads during marine operations; dropped loads during outcome/end-use 
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phase of the work; loss of a towline during severe adverse weather conditions; and diving (DNV, 
1995). Such risks are considered tolerable since the likelihood of that scenario and their 
consequences are considered low. 
Aiming at reducing decommissioning costs and minimizing capital and operational 
expenditures on marginal fields, the industry tends to avoid producing large structures. Since 
many structures were constructed with a fatigue life of 100 years, capable of withstanding winds 
in excess of 160 kilometers per hour and waves as high as 30 meters, companies are looking at 
ways of reusing offshore installations. 
New breeds of offshore structures are designed with economic and environmental 
advantages, weighting less, being more easily lifted and transported, and offering the opportunity 
for reuse on new development projects. The new trend goes in the direction of the "Minimum 
Facility Concept", involving usually unmamJed platforms, ranging from self-installing gravity 
platforms and twisted-base jacket structures to 3-legged tension leg platforms, offering 
environmental features and partial or total reusability (ALBAUGH, et al., 2001; O'CONNOR 
and ROBINSON, 2001). Other concepts are also being pursued, such as the platformless17 
development in deep waters (Figure 3.17). 1n the near future, technology leaps may offer 
profound impact on developments. Common use of mechanisms such as seabed separation and 
extended wellstream transfer to onshore plants may become a standard approach to development 
projects. Platformless development may become tomorrow's main option, since it may provide 
ways of reducing both cost and implementation, and, additionally, reducing decommissioning 
costs. 
Other examples are the mini-jacket platforms used in the coast of West Africa and the 
Maureen platform, used at the North Sea. The Maureen platform is a large gravity base platform 
that has been used for oil production, processing, and storage in the North Sea since 1983. The 
platform is 235 meters tall and weights 110,000 tons. Three large ballast tanks form the base of 
the platform, which is held on the seabed by gravity (virtue of its weight). The Maureen can be 
completely refloated and reused in a different location (Figure 3.18). 
The number of innovative offshore technology becoming available since the Brent Spar 
episode has increased significantly. Most available technologies have only been tested in the 
GOM Region. Some of these technologies are mentioned by TW ACHTMAN (1997), and 
17 Platformless deepwater production systems. 
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HUGHES and FISH (1999): the Versatruss system, the master Marine Catamaran System, the 
RAMBIZ catamaran dual crane vessel used for bridge installations, the Norwegian Offshore 
Shuttle System, and the Controlled Variable Buoyancy System (CVBS) for refloating 
substructures. Most of these technologies are not yet available but in developing stages. Once 
again, the motivational fuel is cost reduction. 
3.9. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The two main decisions affecting ex -post costs are timing and decommissioning options. 
Decommissioning timing is based on production flows, economic criteria, and establishment of 
financial models. Decommissioning options depends on regulations, environmental, safety and 
economic criteria, and, frequently, public reaction. 
Regarding timing options for decommissioning operations, there are basically three 
possible scenarios: (1) remove installations progressively as each becomes redundant; (2) remove 
in contractual groups; and (3) remove all installations at the end of field life. According to 
HUGHES and FISH (1999), removing all installations at the end of field life often allows the 
lowest decommissioning cost18. This happens because of high costs involved in relocating the 
limited number of heavy derrick barges and rigs to offshore production areas. If a company can 
coordinate more than three decommissioning operations in the same region, limited and valuable 
ex-post capital will be saved. For this same reason, cooperation among different operators may 
allow significant savings, as demonstrated on Table 3.6. 
TABLE 3.6. JOINT INDUSTRY APPROACH TO REDUCE COSTS IN CALIFORNIA 
Components 
Wells 
Pipelines 
Platforms 
Onshore Disposal 
Source: STEINBACH (2000) 
Total 
Savings (US$ million) 
II 
16 
92 
31 
150 
18 Some regimes enforce a !-year period for decommissioning of installations once recovery activities cease. In such 
cases, production can be extended marginally in order to adequate end-of-production with neighboring platform 
schedules. 
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Figure 3.17. Platformless Field Development. Subsea to beach technological breakthrough. 
Field development costs are reduced in up to 30%. Source: Norske Shell (LEONARD. 2002 -
modified). 
Figure 3.18. Schematics of the Phillips Maureen (PHILLIPS, 1999c). 
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As indicated by HUGHES and FISH (1999), the most efficient way to determine optimum 
timing for ex-post activities is to examine the field production tail-down and cash flow forecast. 
This careful modeling process should produce charts indicating periods of uneconomical 
operations when OPEX exceeds revenues. This assessment would involve several studies 
including forecast analysis of future oil prices and corporate taxes. Sensitivity analyses would 
show different tail-downs for each scenario and decision-makers would decide on the optimum 
timing for ceasing production. 
Because of inherent uncertainties, estimating future decommissioning costs can be a very 
complex task. Currently, a wide range of decommissioning cost estimates for large heavy 
platforms were made available in the literature19• Inconsistent numbers can be blamed on the 
limited experience available. Regarding cost, the decommissioning process seems to be 
analogous to the development process: costs for decommissioning large installations in sensitive 
areas usually have the same order of magnitude as costs for developing the project. Platform 
removal and disposal costs are not the only disturbing aspect of offshore decommissioning 
projects. As indicated by GARLAND (2000b ), in some areas of the world, well plugging and 
abandonment operations may represent up to 50% of the total decommissioning cost. These 
operations involve great technological challenges and substantial uncertainties, such as 
complying with well plugging and abandonment requirements at great depths (i.e. over 2,000 
meters). Cost estimates will greatly depend on available technologies. This factor can certainly 
be used as a catalyst for technological research. 
Other signs for higher decommissioning costs are noticeable. For instance, 
TW ACHMAN (1997) calls attention to: (1) the limited number of derrick barges and rigs; (2) 
expanded exploration; (3) tough production requirements; (4) growing number of installations; 
(5) larger number of decommissioning projects; and (6) greater number of complex projects 
involving larger platforms in progressively more difficult places. Additional reasons includes: 
( 1) the advent of new production zones in developing countries (i.e. Brazil, Asian Pacific 
countries and West African countries), which tend to increase the demand for the already limited 
number of equipment and vessels; (2) stringent regulations; and (3) rigorous_clean-up standards. 
19 There are several studies providing cost evaluation for different decommissioning options; however, due to the 
dynamic character of technological development, such assessments must be frequently revised. 
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also provide substantial savings (DELLA, 1997). Unplanned delays may result in additional 
expenditure such as cost with maintenance, insurance, bond premiums, and fees that still have to 
be paid until the installation is removed. Although it may increase operation costs, maintenances 
will avoid contingency expenditures. Contractors specializing in different sorts of installation 
work (adaptations, maintenance, etc.), have an expanding market ahead. 
3.10. DECOMMISSIONING COSTS 
Table 3.7 indicates some recent estimate and actual decommissioning costs in different 
regions. According to HUGHES and FISH (1999), when a new field development is in the 
planning phase, decommissioning costs may look insignificant if examined by discounted cash 
flow methods. 
Indeed, towards the end of recovery, decommissioning expenditure becomes a 
considerable burden to projects. Welcoming signs of culture change are evident, but 
unfortunately, decommissioning expenditure is still viewed by some segments of the oil industry 
as a lost investment where "funds are allocated and no revenues are generated". 
According to COLEMAN (1998), between now and 2025, it should be expected that over 
6,500 installations would be decommissioned at an estimated cost of US$ 20-40 billion. Until 
recently, over 50% of the word industry expenditure with decommissioning was expected to 
come from only three countries where almost 70% of all offshore installations were concentrated: 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway. Depending on regulatory developments in 
some producing developing countries, this scenario may change. In some developing countries, 
offshore exploration and filed development are increasing significantly (i.e. South America, West 
Africa and Asian Pacific nations). 
The North Sea oil field is viewed as a mature province. The estimated cost for the total 
removal of all North Sea installations ranges from US$ 12 billion to 15 billion (GRIFFIN, 1998b; 
PROGNOS, 1997). According UKOOA's estimates (1995), the total decommissioning cost for 
offshore installations located at the UK section of the North Sea is approximately US$ 8.02 
billion. Over the next ten years, some 50 UK installations are expected to be decommissioned at 
an estimated cost of US$ 2.4 billion. 
76 

TABLE 3. 7. DECOMMISSIONING COSTS BY REGION, CATEGORY AND INSTALLATION TYPE 
Region Estimated Costs O(!tion Reference 
Australia 1.0 Total SHINNERS, 2000 
NS (UK+ Norway) 12.0-15.0 Total GRIFFIN, 1998b; PROGNOS, 1997 
NSUK 8.0 Total UKOOA, 1995 
CA 1.3' Total STEINBACH, 2000 
GOM 5.01 Total GRIFFIN, 1998b 
Southeast Asia 1.5-2.0 Total GRIFFIN, 1998b 
Total World 20-40 Total COLEMAN, 1998 
North Sea Numbers Estimated Costs OJ:!tion Reference 
Total Decomm. Cost 12.7 Total PROGNOS, 1997 
Total Decomm. Cost 7.7-11.7 Partial PROGNOS, 1997 
Annual Cost 0.9-1.4 Total PROGNOS, 1997 
Annual Cost 0.3-0.5 Partial PROGNOS, 1997 
Gov. Expenditure 4.9 Total PROGNOS, 1997 
Gov. Expenditure 2.7-4.6 Partial PROGNOS, 1997 
Revenue from decomm. 6.0 Total PROGNOS, 1997 
Revenue from decomm. 4.9-5.4 Partial PROGNOS, 1997 
Possible Recycling Earnings 0.5 Total PROGNOS, 1997 
Possible Reclclin!; Earnin!;S 0.4-0.5 Partial PROGNOS, 1997 
Site I Installation Type De(!th (m) Final Cost OJ:!tion Reference 
NS Brent Spar - shell Buoy na +1- 77.4 Total DNV, 1995 
NS Mime- Norsk na na 4.62 Total NPD, 1998 
NS Noroost Frigg- Elf na na 9.03 Total NPD, 1998 
NS Odin- Esso (1995) na na 11.24 Total NPD, 1998 
NS 0st Frigg- Elf (1993) na na 12.64 Total NPD, 1998 
NS Ekofisk5 I (1999) na na 1.0 Total PHILLIPS, 1999a, 2000 
NS Frigg (2000/01) na na na Total NESSE (2000) 
CA Exxon Belmont Island na 13.7 20.0 Total STEINBACH, 2000 
CA Mobil Seacliff Pier na 9 15.0 Total STEINBACH, 2000; BROOKS et al., 2000 
CA Chevron, Arco, Phillips, Texaco, 
na 20-83.5 72.0 Total STEINBACH, 2000 Unocal, Aera. Abn Rig Sharing SW ARS 
CA Chevron Platforms na 29-41.7 42.0 Total STEINBACH, 2000 
GOM West Delta 76 A 4-pile 55 0.4 RRR O'CONNOR, 1999 
GOM Eugene Island 300 A 4-pile 60 0.7 Reuse O'CONNOR, 1999 
GOM West Cameron 563 A 8-pile 58 1.4 RRR O'CONNOR, 1999 
GOM Jacket 0-6 0.05-0.5 na KASP~AK, 1998 
GOM Jacket 6.1-30.5 0.5-1.5 na KASP~AK, 1998 
GOM Jacket 30.6-61.0 1.0-2.5 na KASP~AK, 1998 
GOM Jacket 61.1-122.0 5.0-15.0 na KASP~AK, 1998 
GOM Jacket 122.1-610.0 15.0-100.0 na KASP~1998 
GOM Jacket < 15 +1- 3.2 Total MMS, 1999b 
GOM Jacket 15-61 +1- 3.9 Total MMS, l999b 
GOM Jacket 61-122 +1- 9.8 Total MMS, 1999b 
GOM Jacket > 122 Up to 94.0 Total MMS, 1999b 
OC ( 4 Chevron platforms) na 30.5-42.5 +/- 56.0 Total MMS, 1999b 
Indonesia na 38.1 7.2 Total DJALAL, 1998 
Indonesia (Java Sea) na na 1.0-4.0 N/A IDGOG, 1998 
1The US Rigs-to-Reef Program allows lower decommissioning costs; 2Estimated disposal cost; 3Disposal cost; 4Accrued disposal cost; 
srncludes decommissioning operations in 14 installations (different installation types and decommissioning procedures); NS =North 
Sea; GOM = Gulf of Mexico; OC = Offshore California; na = not available; RRR = Reuse and Rigs-to-Reef; 6 Assumes platfonns are 
removed in ![OUps of4 to 5. All values in$ billion. 
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Noteworthy is the fact that the number of platforms in the North Sea province comprises 
only about 7% of the total world platform population; but, as shown, it accounts for 
approximately 35% of the total worldwide decommissioning expenditure20• The main reasons for 
this discrepancy are the weight and structural complexity of the installations and the severe 
weather conditions common to that region (PRASTHOFER, 1998). In addition, Norway 
possesses a network of 7,500 kilometers of export pipelines (1/3 buried), and 2,000 kilometers of 
interfiled pipelines (80% buried) (MUSAEUS, 2000). Up until 1997, over 1,500 platforms were 
removed in the Gulf of Mexico and approximately 27 in the North Sea. Table 3.8 shows the 
approximate number of installations in the North Atlantic Region, which includes the North Sea 
Province, Table 3.9 indicates the estimated number of installations in the Mediterranean Sea 
Region, and Table 3.10 indicates the estimated number of offshore installations in West African 
Countries. 
TABLE 3.8. NORTH ATLANTIC PLATFORMS 
Settings UK NORWAY NETHERLANDS OTHERS 
Less than 10,000 210 72 106 12 Tons Jacket (Steel) 
Greater than 
10,000 Tons 27 6 0 0 
Jackets (Steel) 
Concrete 8 14 2 0 Installations 
Source: TILLING. (2001). 
TABLE 3.9. PLATFORMS IN THE MEDITERRANEA.c"! SEA REGION 
Countries Platforms % 
Croatia 4 2 
Egypt 18 9 
Greece 4 2 
Libya 2 1 
Italy 142 71 
Spain 6 3 
Tunisia 24 12 
Source: ONARGHI (2000). 
20 The Norwegian State carries the majority of disposal costs. 
78 
TABLE 3.10. WEST AFRICA OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS 
Country Shallow Deep Floating Total 
waters waters installations 
Nigeria 134 7 134 
Cameroon 54 54 
Gabon 71 3 71 
Congo 67 3 2 70 
Angola 220 2 220 
Total*: 549 
*Numbers do not include floating facilities. Source: GARLAND (2000a). 
There are approximately 53 of!Shore production facilities in Australia (18 SPJ platforms, 
16 Monotowers, 9 Subsea completions, 4 FPSO's, 3 CGS's, 3 minitowers, and associated 
pipeline network). Significant decommissioning activity is not anticipated before 2010, with 
most existing facilities removed by 2030. Current estimations indicate decommissioning costs in 
the order of US$ 1 billion (SHINNERS, 2000). Decommissioning of all platfurms in Southeast 
Asia is estimated to cost between US$ 1.5 and US$ 2.0 billion (GRlFFIN, 2000b). 
Figure 3.19 illustrates the dynamics of installation and removal costs in GOM. Cost 
estimates for decommissioning of Gulf structures are lower than one would expect. This is due 
to the success of the US Rigs-to-Reef Program, which brings down ex-post expenditure. 
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Figure 3.19. GOM Historical of Decommissioning Costs: Gross Cost Per Ton, Excluding Well P&A. 
Note: Gross Cost Per Ton considers all decommissioning costs except well P&A divided by total fucility 
weight, including jackets, piles, and topsides, based on 54 actual platform removals (TWACHTMAN 
SNYDER & BYRD, INC., 1999). 
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In the United States outer continental shelf, platform decormnissioning rate is increasing 
and, in some instances, going beyond the installation rate. As remarkable as it seems, 
approximately 620 wells are plugged and abandoned every year in GOM (PERRY ill et a!., 
1998). The number of platform decommissioned yearly in this same region is between 120 and 
150 (WATSON, 1998). The MMS forecasts that 100 to 200 of structures will be 
decormnissioned each year (BUFFINGTON, 1996). The estimated cost for completely 
decommissioning all Gulf structures is US$ 5 billion (GRIFFIN, 1998c ). 
Currently there are 105 offshore installations in Brazil (Table 3.11) (ANP, 2003). In 
1998, around 50% of all Brazilian offshore platforms in the OCS were installed in depths greater 
then 400 meters (ANP, 2002a). Since not many fixed platforms of this size have been removed 
around the world, expertise is limited and cost estimates vary greatly. Removing floating 
installations in the Brazilian OCS is significantly less costly than removing fixed ones. However, 
the cost of plugging and abandoning wells in Brazilian deep and ultra-deep waters (over 1,000 m) 
tends to pose additional complexities and costs. Complexities are also expected in site-clearance 
activities. 
TABLE 3.11. BRAZILIAl" OFFSHORE PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS 
Type oflnstallation 
Floating Production Systems (FPS) 
Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) 
Fixed Production Systems 
Fixed Production Systems (concrete) 
Semi-Submersible 
Source: ANP (2003) 
Total 
March/2003 
2 
8 
77 
3 
15 
105 
Brazil has only initiated its open market policy towards oil and gas exploration. 
Therefore, no estimates for future decommissioning expenditure were found in the literature. 
First decormnissioning activities are expected to take place in 2004 (RODRIGUEZ, 2000). Some 
of the issues being currently considered in the Brazilian scenario are: regulatory framework for 
decormnissioning, removal options, reutilization of structures and equipment, and establishment 
of an artificial reef program. No one seems to know for certain how many platforms have been 
removed (or toppled in situ) in Brazil, if any (A."IW, 2000). Most new offshore projects in Brazil 
are in ultra-deepwater sections of the OCS and involve floating installations. Currently (2003 ), 
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Brazil has 706 offshore producing wells (ANP, 2003). The estimated cost for plugging and 
abandoning deep-sea wells could not be found in the current literature. 
TABLE 3.12. ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR BRENT SPAR 
AMEC Civel Engineering: 
• Preparation: This proposal covers only the end use phase. A different contractor must assume the preceding phases. 
• Destination: Barge transportation of rings sections from dismantling site to the North Norfolk Coast. 
• Process: Artificial Reef construction (placing ring sections, sand filling and rock dumping). 
• End use: Coastal Protection 
Estimate: US $52,9 million 
Brown & Root Energy Services fBRESJ 
• Preparation: Repair damage tanks and pressure reduction (divers). Removal ofhelideck and turntable. 
• Operations: Reverse upending (horizontal) in Erfjord by deballasting with winchline assistance. 
• Destination: Towing to Nigg, Cromarty Firth. 
• Process: Mechanical dismantling in dry-dock. 
• End use: Scrap and recycle. 
Estimate: US $77 4 million. 
K vaerner Seawav Spar Alliance fKSSA) 
• Preparation: Repair of damaged tanks and installation of hoses. 
• Destination: Tow vertically to Haneytangen yard. 
• Operations: Vertical out of water by de ballasting only. 
• Process: Cut into ring sections and lift by crane vessel. 
• End use: Training Center, Fish Farm or scrape and recycle. 
• Alternative: Reverse upending to horizontal, with dismantling in dry-dock. 
Estimate: US $18 4 million and US $28 4 million 
McAlpine Doris Able CMCDAI 
• Preparation: Remove helideck and turntable. Pressurize with inert gas via vent lines. 
• Operations: Reversed upending to horizontal in Erfjord by deballasting only. 
• Destination: Repair tanks. Tow to TERRC. Teeside .. 
• Process: Mechanical dismantling in dry-dock. 
• End use: Quay extension in dry-dock. 
Estimate: US $31,6 million. 
Thvssen Aker Maritime CTHAMJ 
• Preparation: Pressurizing via vent lines for ballasting to 90m draft in Erfjord. 
• Destination: Tow vertically to Hinna, Stavanger. 
• Operations: Vertical out of water by deballasting and jacking with tension bars to a cradle under the installation. 
• Process: Cut into ring sections and lift onshore. 
• End use: Scrap and recycle. 
Estimate: US $34,4 million. 
Wood GMC CWOGMI 
• Preparation: All work in Erfjord. Assembly of catamaran with cross barge. 
• Operations: Deballasting and jacking with strand jacks to a cradle under the installation. 
• Process: Cut into ring sections and skid to a barge. 
• Destination: Transport of sections by barge to Melgarvik, Stavanger. 
• End use: Quay extension using the ring sections. Scrap topside. 
Estimate: US $34 7 million. 
Deep Sea Disposal CDSDI 
• Preparation: Removal of all accessible hydrocarbons. Installation of explosive charges. 
• Destination: Tow vertically to deep-disposal site. 
• Operations: Rupture Spar ballast tanks with explosives to get it to sink as one unit in a controlJed manner. 
• Process: Cut into ring sections and skid to a barge. 
• End use: None. 
Estimate: US $7 6 million. 
Source: DNV (1995)- Modified 
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Partial removals cover a great range of different alternatives and combinations, and, if it 
were a viable option in the North Sea Province, it would represent cumulative savings ranging 
between US$ 1 billion and US$ 5 billion up until 2020. (PROGNOS, 1997). Costs savings 
would range between 8% and 39%, depending on the variant (PROGNOS, 1997). During the 
Brent Spar episode, several decommissioning options were evaluated by Shell. Table 3.12 
shows an assessment of proposed options and respective costs for the disposal of the Brent Spar 
Buoy. 
Legal requirements and decisions from authorities will also play a decisive role in 
determining decommissioning costs. For instance, if the length of a pipeline were required to be 
removed rather than left in place, costs would increase substantially. 
3.11. COST DRIVERS IN DECOMMISSIONING OPERATIONS 
The method used to access decommissioning costs was the compilation of detailed 
information obtained from the available literature. Necessary information to develop a 
comprehensive list of decommissioning related activities for the Brazilian scenario was not 
available. The main reason is that information relative to decommissioning costs for specific 
projects are considered proprietary by the industry. 
One of the objectives of this chapter was to provide general guidelines for regulators so 
estimates for a range future decommissioning projects in the Brazilian OCS could be performed. 
This study does not cover compliance with specific AN"'P requirements. In addition, costs for 
specific projects will depend on several parameters, including planning and company's 
capability, which allow cost internalization. 
Firstly, several steps of the decommissioning process were identified in the literature and 
related costs are briefly described bellow. Figures used are derived from assessments from 
projects in offshore California, GOM, the North Sea, and according to MMS (1999b) estimates: 
1. Engineering and Planning - costs will depend greatly of the size of the project, type of 
structures and on the degree to which expenditures may be internalized. Basically, it will 
depend on the availability of in-house expertise. 
2. Permitting and Regulatory Compliance - it includes costs involved in obtaining the 
necessary permits to carry out decommissioning operations, including fees to comply with 
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ex -post environmental requirements. This will greatly vary according to the regulatory 
regtme. Estimating such costs for Brazilian projects is considerably complex. The 
requirements are not yet clear and uncertainties are high. 
3. Platform Preparation - costs are impacted mostly by size and complexity of installations. 
Removal procedures, transportation and disposal, and degree of required structural 
reinforcement, may offer a variety of price ranges. Internalization of expenditure is also an 
important parameter. Cutting methods may significantly impact final costs. 
4. Well Plugging and Abandonment- Costs for this phase will depend greatly from applicable 
regulatory requirements, number of wells, and mainly on the difficulty and eventual 
complications encountered. Well depth is a less significant factor compared to plugging 
difficulty. Plugging and abandonment involve one of the most costly activities within the 
decommissioning process. 
5. Conductor Removal - costs for the removal of conductors will also depend on regulatory 
requirements. The primary cost determining factor is water depth. Cutting methods may also 
significantly affect fmal costs. If platforms have derricks and cranes capable of performing 
the removal of conductor casing, the company may not need to contract a derrick barge, 
significantly reducing costs. 
6. Mobilization and Demobilization - It involves costs incurred to bring a HL V to the project 
site and return the vessel to its point of origin. When there are no vessels with the capability 
to remove platforms within the productive area, the vessel has to be brought from other areas 
(usually from the GOM or North Sea). Total mobilization and demobilization time may vary 
greatly according to distances between locations (i.e. 100 to 200 days.). Daily rates for HL V 
rages from US$ 25,000 to US$ 310,000 per day, depending of the lift capability of the HL V. 
It is important to notice that since there is a great demand for HL V's in the GOM for deep-
water development, firms owning HLV's would not commit them to distant areas unless there 
were at least five platforms scheduled to be removed. 
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7. Platform and Structural Removal - Removal costs will also depend greatly on the 
regulatory requirements. The main variables in estimating removal costs include: size and 
weight of the structures, the number of modules, the number of lifts, etc. Estimates for 
removal in depths greater than 366 meters are very speculative and require technological 
development. MMS estimations assume that it would take 8 hours to remove each platform 
skirt pile, 8 to 24 hours for the removal of the main piles (depending on the water depth), 2 
days per module, 2 to 5 days for sectional cuts and moves of the jacks. Contingency costs 
should be expected (delays, weather conditions, etc.). 
8. Pipeline and Power Cable Decommissioning - Cost estimates for the decommissioning of 
pipeline and power cable decommissioning will depend on regulatory requirements which 
will determine decommissioning procedures and disposal options. The main variables 
affecting price include: length, size, pipe coatings, etc. Table 3.13 shows cost estimates for 
different pipeline decommissioning options in Norway. 
TABLE 3.13. COST ESTIMATES FOR DISPOSAL OF PIPELINES IN NORWAY 
Total Burial 
Rock Dumping 
Removal 
Source: MASAEUS (2000) 
(US$ million) 
200-500 
2,500 
4,400 
9. Transportation and Disposal - Transportation and disposal of material (process steel, 
marine growth, cement, mud, etc.) may be very costly. Costs will depend on several factors 
such as distance between operation and disposal sites, etc. The MMS assumes costs of US$ 
350 per ton of steel, US$ 300,000 per small platform for marine growth, cement and mud, 
and US$ 700,000 per ultra-large platforms. 
10. Site Clearance and Verification- Costs associated with site clearance and verification will 
depend on regulatory requirements. The main variables involved are water depth; size of area 
to be cleared and verified; quantity, size and type of debris; and the weather conditions. 
Contingency costs should also be expected. 
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Due to the great range and combination of alternatives, estimating decommissioning costs 
should consider each case separately, on a case-by-case basis. Table 3.14 shows MMS 
estimations for most activities involved within the decommissioning process in offshore 
California. This table provides estimations for different platform sizes. Table 3.15 summarizes 
high and low decommissioning cost estimates for Table 3.14 and indicates the comparative 
breaking-down of decommissioning costs as indicated by HUGHES and FISH (1999). 
According to HUGHES and FISH (1999), the main "critical success factors" for any 
decommissioning plan are (Figure 3.20): 
• Maximize reservoir performance while minimizing decommissioning costs; 
• Evaluate alternative field management strategies (this review would normally 
include new prospects); 
• Comply with relevant government legislation and guidelines; 
• Develop contracting strategy to optimize overall field revenue and profitability; 
• Develop a plan to ensure that decommissioning activities are correctly phased with 
offshore removal operations so as to minimize unnecessary loss of production; 
• Establish safe and economical removal methods for the platforms that are not solely 
dependent on the use of any single methodology; 
• Adopt safe engineering procedures; 
• Minimize environmental impact; 
• Recommend reuse of facilities where shown to be technically and economically 
viable; and 
• Promote acceptable disposal methods where reuse or recycling is not the preferred 
option. 
3.12. SUGGESTION FOR DECOMMISSIONING COST ASSESSMENT 
Cost assessment of decommissioning operations still involves considerable uncertainties. 
A variety of issues require further investigation and data collection. A comprehensive 
assessment project is recommended for the development of a complex decision model that would 
assist in the identification and quantification of potential impacts of management decisions 
involved in the decommissioning process. Such model should consider the possibility of canying 
out decommissioning activities at the end of project, or concomitantly with production. Table 
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3.16 illustrates a hypothetical project schedule sheet where decommissioning activities are 
carried out parallel to recovery activities. It should also aid in the identification of an optimum 
time for beginning decommissioning operations. In this case, parameters such as field 
economics, technological innovations, logistics and market parameters, among others, should be 
included as variables. 
Appendix B.2. suggests an activity sheet to assist in the calculation of decommissioning 
costs in areas where decommissioning activities are non-existent or just beginning. 
Consulting Work Generate Economic Selecting Preferred 
- Mxlels - &reening r-& Identify Options (Taildo'Ml Scenarios) Tai!do'Ml. Scenario(s) 
I 
I 
Develop/ Select Best 
:l\.1ahodology 
I 
I I 
Develop I Select Best Develop I Select Con-
:l\.1ahodology tracting Strategy 
I I 
I 
Cost 
Figure 3.20. Decommissioning Study Execution Flowchart (HUGHES and FISH, I 999) -modified. 
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TABLE 3.14. US MMS DECOMMISSIONING ESTIMATES FOR OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA 
Platform Size 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Ultra-Lar e 
Location 
Offshore California 
Platform Size 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Ultra-Lar e 
Difficulty 
No complications 
Minor Complications 
Major Complications 
Water Depth (meters) 
< 121 
122-244 
245-366 
HLV Lift Capability (ton) 
500 (100 days) 
2,000 (200 days) 
4,000 (200 days) 
4,000- 5,000 (200 days) 
Water Depth (meters) 
61 
122 
213 
366 
Platform Size 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Ultra-Lar e 
Water Depth (meters) 
< 91 (+ 10% contingency) 
> 91 (+ 15% contingency) 
Source: MMS (1999b) 
Engineering and Planning 
Cost Estimation($) 
200,000 
400,000 
600,000 
1,400,000 
Permitting and Regnlatory Compliance 
Platform Preparation 
Cost Estimation ($) 
175,000 to 300,000 
Cost Estimation ($) 
300,000 
480,000 
900,000 
1,200,000 
Well Plngging and Abandonment 
Condnctor Removal 
Cost Estimation ($) 
63,300 
95,500 
192,400 
Cost Estimation ($) 
21,900 
34,400 
59,400 
Mobilization and Demobilization 
Cost Estimation ($) 
450,000 
5,400,000 
8,280,000 
11,160,000 
Platform and Strnctural Removal 
Transportation and Disposal 
Cost Estimation ($) 
3,960,000 
15,263,000 
21,450,000 
48,675,000 
Cost Estimation ($) 
2,050,000 
3,850,000 
11,000,000 
25,200,000 
Site Clearance and Verification 
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Cost Estimation ($) 
244,200-521,400 
590,700- 1,060,400 
TABLE 3.15. COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS: OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA & SOUTHERN NORTH 
SEA 
Decommissioning Cost estimates for offshore California 
Percentage breakdown1 
Decommissioning Activity 
Low Estimate High Estimate 
Cost % Cost 
Engineering and Planning $200,000 $1,400,000 
Pennitting $175,000 8% $300,000 
Platform Preparation $300,000 $1,200,000 
Site Clearance $244,000 $1,060,000 
Well Plugging and Abandonment $955,000 9% $6,016,000 
Conductor Removal $219,000 6% $3,802,000 
Pipelines and Power Cables $404,000 $5,482,000 
Mobilization and Demobilization $2,700,000 24% $11,160,000 
Decks and Jackets $3,960,000 35% $48,675,000 
Transportation and Disposal $2,050,000 18% $25,200,000 
Total $11,207,000 100% I 04,295,000 
Decommissioning Cost in the Southern North Sea Oil and Gas Province 
Percentage break down according to Foster Wheeler and Tecnomare 2 
Description 
Mobilization and Demobilization of Marine Vessels 
Plugging and Abandonment of Platform Wells 
Plugging and Abandonment of Subsea Wells 
Topsides Decommissioning and Preparation for Removal 
Topsides and Jacket Removal 
Pipeline abandonment in situ & otber subsea work 
Overall field decommissioning support 
Onshore Dismantling & salvage 
Main Contractor Engineering & design 
Owner costs 
Contingency 10% 
Source: MMS (1999b). 
Total 
% of Total Cost 
4.5% 
6.0% 
3.2% 
14.1% 
34.0% 
12.3% 
4.3% 
0.7% 
4.0% 
7.9% 
9.0% 
100% 
% 
4% 
6% 
9% 
II% 
46% 
24% 
100% 
2 Source: HUGHES and FISH (1999). This breakdown is specific to a particular gas field in tbe NS but 
proportions are considered reasonably typical for otber Southern NS fields 
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TABLE 3.16. GENERAL CHRONOGRAM FOR ONSHORE CLOSURE- THE PHASED APPROACH 
Activity 
3.13. DECOMMISSIONING DISCUSSION 
Since oil companies have a fair amount of time before decommissioning operations begin, 
considerable attention should be given to strategic planning in order to minimize liabilities and 
costs. Decommissioning should not be viewed as an isolated phase at the end of the project, but 
instead, planning should take place as oil recovery progresses. Decisions made during all phases 
of the project will, in some way, impact the decommissioning process. For this reason, planning 
must always be reviewed and updated. Although uncertainties are considerable, this approach 
should allow cost reduction, improved safety, and sound environmental decisions. 
Incentives should be provided to ensure ever-improving technologies, addressing needs 
and aspirations of all stakeholders, and, mainly, ensuring that the industry is able to comply with 
all ex-post obligations. As illustrated on Figure 3.21, aiming at reducing environmental costs, 
energy expenditure, and risk of contingencies, a 5 R's approach is proposed for the oil industry. 
This approach is analogous to the traditional 3 R's approach (reduce, reuse, and recycle). 
Accordingly, bonding mechanisms should be used to generate incentives for: 
• Reduction - lessen the number of needed installations through rethinking concepts and 
approaches (i.e. platformless field developments); 
• Reengineering - during project planning, set as a priority, tbe design of 
decommissionable facilities, the application of new concepts and approaches, testing new 
materials and technologies (i.e. minimal facility approach, Maureen Platform); 
• Reuse - consider the use of redundant installations and equipment, and stimulating the 
expansion and improvement of a reutilization economy (i.e. adaptations yards, brokers, 
etc.); 
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• Rigs-to-Reef - opening dialog with key stakeholders and academic institutions for the 
consideration of an artificial reefs program, allowing the reduction of decommissioning 
costs and creating artificial habitats to improve fish recharge in overfished areas; 
• Recycling - establishing academic partnerships and creating incentives for the expansion 
and improvement of the recycling industry, and the research of recycling technology and 
application of recycled materials. 
Decommissioning has become an all-inclusive, politicized, and costly issue. Experience 
shows that, mainly in stringent regimes, transparency and communication are crucial in dealing 
with the general public and interest groups, addressing the needs and aspirations of all key 
stakeholders (Figure 3.22). 
An ideal decommissioning assessment report must include effect of all possible 
decommissioning options including energy use, biological and ecological impact of discharges, 
secondary emissions to air, physical and habitat matters, fisheries, waste management, littering, 
drill cuttings deposits, free passage, safety of personnel, national services, employment, cost 
feasibility, and impact on local communities, including visual interference, noise, odor, and 
traffic. The "public relation environment" may be looked at before the "physical and legal 
environment". A company may strictly follow all regulations and scientific reports, and still be 
far from satisfYing public aspirations. 
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SCALE OF DECOMMISSIONING 
EXPENDITURE 
Figure 3.21. Environmental character of the proposed 5 R's Approach. 
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Figure 3.22. Pre-project decommissioning planning for stringent regimes. 

CHAPTER IV- FINANCIAL ASSURANCE SYSTEMS: BONDING MECHANISMS 
How to ensure that all ex-post obligations will be satisfactorily met, safeguarding public 
economic interests by maintaining investments in the sector and, at the same time, providing 
guarantees against negligent lessees and eventual economic and natural contingencies? Answer: 
Establishing a financial assurance regime (a peiformance bond regime). 
4.1. ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS 
Environmental cost is one of the many different forms of costs petroleum projects face as 
they provide oil and gas to supply society's needs. Today, environmental performance is 
essential for the success of a project and for the survival of oil companies. As indicated by EPA 
( 1995b ), Environmental costs and performance deserves management attention for the following 
reasons: 
• Business decisions may significantly reduce or eliminate environmental costs; 
• Environmental costs may be hidden in the overhead accounts or otherwise unnoticed; 
• For instance, oil companies have discovered that environmental costs can be offset by 
generating revenues through sale of equipment, waste by-products, recycling, and 
even redundant structures; 
• Improved management of environmental costs may result in enhanced environmental 
performance and significant benefits to human health, safety, and business success; 
• Understanding environmental costs and performance of processes and products may 
allow more accurate costing and pricing of products and can help companies in the 
design of more environmentally preferable operation alternatives, processes, products, 
and services; 
• Because of the new public environmental consciousness, competitive advantage with 
costumers can be obtained by oil companies that can demonstrate to be environmental 
referable; 
• Accounting for environmental costs and performance can support a company's 
development and operation of an overall environmental management system. Such a 
system is today a necessity for companies engaged in international trade due to the 
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establishment of the international consensus standard ISOs, developed by the 
International Organization for Standardization. 
EASIER TO 
MEASURE 
REGULATORY: i.e. BONDS 
UPFRONT: i.e. INSTALLATION 
BACK-END: i.e. DECOMMISSIONING 
VOLUNTARY: i.e. MONITORING 
MORE DIFFICULT 
TO MEASURE 
Figure 4.1. Cost Categories, deggree of difficulty, and examples of potentially hidden environmental costs. 
The definition of environmental cost will depend of bow a company intends to use the 
available information (i.e. cost allocation, capital budgeting, process/product design, other 
management decisions) and the scale and scope of the exercise. Figure 4.1 indicates several 
examples of environmental costs incurred by companies including the relative degree of 
difficulty in approaching each category. Figure 4.2 shows an additional classification criterion 
with respective examples of costs involved in projects. 
The main environmental cost categories, according to EPA (1995a), are described as 
follows: 
• Conventional costs: costs of using raw materials, utilities, capital goods, and supplies . 
Although not usually considered as environmental costs, they may sometimes be 
overlooked in business decision-making. 
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• Potentially Hidden Costs: costs that may be potentially hidden from managers (i.e. 
upfront environmental, regulatory, voluntary, and back-end costs). 
• Contingent Costs: costs that may or mat not be incurred in the future. Such costs may 
be illustrated in probabilistic terms (expected values, ranges, probability of exceeding 
some amount, etc.). 
• Intangible costs: costs incurred voluntarily for environmental activities and 
operations. The costs themselves are not "intangible", but the direct benefits often are. 
A discussion on environmental costs and damages is presented on Chapter II and three 
broad categories of environmental damages are proposed (accidental, continuous and ex-post). 
4.2. REGULATORY APPROACHES: COMMAND AND CONTROL VS. ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVE 
The sustainability concept asserts that oil and gas exploration and production activities 
should not compromise future environmental quality. There are two main approaches in 
regulating environmental issues: (!) command and control mechanism (command system), and 
(2) market-based economic incentives (incentive system or market mechanism). 
The present environmental scenario, a result of the continuous application of the 
command and control approach, shows the inefficiency of this approach in protecting the 
environment. The main causes are pointed out by CORNWELL and COSTANZA (1994) and 
adapted below to the oil sector: 
• The great uncertainties involved in calculating end-of-leasing costs (i.e. contingencies, 
liabilities, and future operation costs). 
• The costly and lengthy processes involved in trying to collect funds from liable 
companies through litigation. 
• It treats projects homogeneously not taking into consideration type of platforms, 
installation settings, company's records on environmental performance, financial history, 
regulatory compliance record, etc. 
• It places a great information burden on the regulatory agency (i.e. determining the best 
available technology for platform decommissioning and well abandonment, monitoring 
and enforcing penalties in cases of noncompliance, etc.). 
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• It defines the use of a particular technology for the removal and disposal of offshore 
installations, and for capping, plugging and abandonment of idle wells. If a specific 
technology is enforced, there is no incentive for the development of innovations that 
could result into improvements and cost reduction. 
• It motivates regulatory evasion rather than regulatory compliance. 
• It usually presents vague regulatory language, which offers companies the opportunity 
to build persuasive cases by showing, for instance, that certain decommissioning or 
abandonment requirements are unachievable. 
Governments, which are responsible for producing and implementing regulations, were 
forced to come up with mechanisms that would guarantee the availability of financial resources 
in case of contingencies and/or insolvencies; otherwise, government would cope with 
environmental ex-post costs. For this reason, authorities have been promoting alternative tools to 
control environmental damages (SHOGREN et. al., 1993; TIETENBERG, 1996; DIETZ and 
VOLLEBERGH, 1999). 
YOUNG et al. (1996) has indicated several benefits produced by market-based 
mechanisms for the general productive sector. Nevertheless, to the upstream petroleum sector, in 
theory, the merits of market-based mechanisms are their ability to: 
• Influence behavior through price signals without the need for direct intervention in the 
affairs of oil companies; 
• Encourage oil companies and operators to seek the most cost effective (and often 
innovative) solutions to environmental problems; 
• Decentralize decision making to companies and operators who often have better 
information on how to solve such problems than government or agency authorities; 
• Reduce agency's enforcement costs as well as the industry compliance costs; 
• Provide the upstream petroleum industry ongoing incentive to develop better 
environmental approaches. 
According to CORNWELL and COSTANZA (1994), the incentive approach encourages 
the distribution of responsibilities among all stakeholders, decentralizing the decision-making 
process on their own interest, in order to protect and rehabilitate the environment, while the 
95 
applicable authority would be responsible for providing economic incentives to encourage a 
determined behavior, defining performance objectives rather than a course of action. Figure 4.3 
indicates key stakeholders and their main interest in bonding mechanisms. 
MILLER (2000) indicates that, presently, many governments routinely require the use of 
enviromnental financial assurance instruments to guarantee environmental performance during 
different stages of the mining cycle (exploration, development, operations, closure and 
reclamation). 
Indeed, incentive mechanisms allow better economic efficiency than traditional command 
approaches leading to better results, as demonstrated in the US coal mining sector, US 
govermnent construction works, collection systems for beverage containers, lubricating oil, 
automobile batteries, and tires (CORNWELL and COSTANZA, 1994; ANDERSON and 
LOHOF, 1997). In the upstream offshore petroleum sector, the application of incentive 
mechanisms is relatively recent. 
The most cormnon incentive approach used in the oil sector is the financial assurance 
system (bonding system), which is designed to ensure compliance with all ex-post environmental 
obligations (abandomnent, clearance and decormnissioning requirements), providing and 
enforcing conditions of negligible health and safety risk to local inhabitants, and safety for 
navigation and the enviromnent. Worldwide, several countries are adopting, or in the process of 
adopting, financial assurance requirements. A number of natural resources agencies, petroleum 
and mining, have already established some form of bonding system aimed at ensuring the 
performance of ex-post environmental obligations (FERREIRA et al, 2003a). These systems can 
be found in operation in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, the 
Philippines, Fiji Islands, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka, among others (OSM, 1987, 2001; GAO, 
1994; YOUNG, et al. 1996; AEP, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b; CANADA, 1996; JAMES, 1997; 
ADB, 1997; RANASINGHE, 1998; NIUMATAIWALU, 1998; HORESH, 1998; FERREIRA 
and ALVES, 1998; AEP, 1998a, 1998b; RYAN, 1998; HESS, 1998; BRYAN, 1998; 
CORNWELL and COSTANZA, 1999; WEBSTER, 1999; MMS, 2000d; DTI, 2000a, 2000b; 
GERARD, 2000; FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2000; MIRABELLA, 2000; BAIER, 2000; 
STOKES, 2000; UNICAMP/CEPETRO, 2001; ANP, 2002a). Some countries such as the United 
States tend to move forward with new rules aimed at strengthening bonding requirements 
(BOYD, 2001). 
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Regnlatncy 
Notification 
Reporting 
Monitoring/testing 
Studies/modeling 
Remediation 
Record keeping 
Training 
Inspections 
Manifesting 
Labeling 
Preparedness 
Protective equipment 
Medical surveillance 
Environmental insurance 
Spill response 
Stormwater management 
Waste management 
Taxes/fues 
Corporate image 
Relationship w/ customers 
Relationship w/ investors 
Relationship w/ insurers 
Relationship w/ 
professional staff 
Ilpfmnt 
Site studies 
Site preparation 
Permitting 
Research & Development 
Engineering & procurement 
Installation 
Conyentjonal Costs 
Capital equipment 
Materials 
Labor 
Suppliers 
Utilities 
Structures 
Salvage value 
Back-End 
ClosurefDecommissioning/ 
abandonment 
Disposal of inventory 
Post-closure care 
Site survey 
Relationship w/ workers 
Relationship w/ suppliers 
Relationship w/lenders 
Relationship w/ host 
communities 
Figure 4.2. Examples of environmental costs (EPA, 1995 -modified). 
4.3. THE BONDING SYSTEM IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
Yolnntacy 
Community relations/ 
outreach 
Monitoring/testing 
Training 
Audits 
QualifYing suppliers 
Reports 
Insurance 
Planning 
Feasibility studies 
Research & Development 
Habitat protection 
Landscaping 
Other Environmental 
projects 
Financial support to 
environmental groups and/ 
or researchers 
Philanthropy 
Relationship w/ regulators 
Relationship w/ researchers 
Relationship w/ academic 
institutions 
The bonding system can be used to operationalize the sustainable development concept. 
Companies wishing to explore and produce hydrocarbon resources would be required to post a 
bond in advance equal to the best-cost estimate for ex-post operations. Therefore, before a 
company is granted licenses or permits to drill, deepen, or alter a well, and before a platform is 
installed at sea, a bond must be posted to cover all plugging, abandonment, and decommissioning 
obligations. 
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In practice, the merits of bonding systems in the upstream petroleum sector are difficult to 
be demonstrated, mainly due to lack of empirical evidence. According to W AELDE (1995), the 
difference between instruments of public policy is not always easy or clear and may often merely 
indicate the choice of a specific format rather than a difference in substantive policy. Most 
bonding systems used in the oil sector are not self-enforcing and may involve considerable 
control costs YOUNG et al. (1996). Bonding instruments used for guaranteeing the performance 
of ex-post obligations in the oil sector are a hybrid of market mechanisms and command and 
control regulations. As mentioned before, the ideal market mechanism would allow a firm 
flexibility in the extent to which it performs closure operations, but force it to pay for all social 
costs it imposes (including environmental costs). Such a system takes advantage of the firm's 
internal knowledge of production costs, clean up costs, and profits. When closure is more 
expensive than social costs, the firm pays its social costs. When closure is less expensive, the 
firm performs closure operations. Most important in the dynamic setting, there is always an 
incentive to seek new technologies and techniques that minimize environmental costs. In the 
case of bonds, the regulator must determine the closure standard and is therefore less able to rely 
on the firm's internal knowledge. However, in a number of ways, financial assurance does help 
improve market function (FERREIRA et al, 2003a). 
Even though obligations such as decommissioning operations may represent up to I 0% 
of a project's total investment, quantitative studies on the potential impacts of such policies are 
rare. The academic interest in such approach is relatively recent and available references in the 
literature are scarce. This is a rather interesting scenario, since the application of bonding 
mechanisms has a great potential to severely impact the profitability of offshore projects. Some 
instruments require the anticipation (upfront security requirements) of 100% of ex-post 
environmental costs, even before projects produce revenue. 
An evident change of attitude is corroborating to the worldwide implementation of 
incentive approaches. In a not so distant past, the industry in general, would view any obligation 
to provide financial securities to guarantee ex -post environmental obligations as "lost 
investment". Companies used to look primarily for immediate low cost solutions. Presently, the 
industry acknowledges that public image has a great value in today's economy. 
With increasing public awareness, pressure from interest groups and the politicization of 
ex-post environmental issues, it is becoming rare for an oil project to obtain leasing concession or 
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operating license without the provision of some means of financial security to indeiilllifY 
governments against ex-post environmental costs. Authorities are increasingly looking for ways 
of eliminating liabilities before licenses and permits are issued. It seems only reasonable to 
suggest that such trend may soon arrive in new developing frontiers. For instance, ANP is in the 
process of preparing a set of end-of-leasing regulations, which in the near future could include 
performance bond mechanisms. Currently, ANP requires a form of financial bond, an 
irrevocable stand-by letter of credit, in the bidding process (ANP, 2002a). 
ulators 
Industry 
Society 
lcFtnartcial & Environmental 
Liabilities 
Investment Flow 
Profitability 
Image 
Development 
Profitability 
Image 
New Business 
Risk Reduction 
Figure 4.3. Key Stakeholders involved in the bonding process. 
Bonds are financial instruments that can come in several forms with unique attributes and 
requirements, as descnbed in Chapter II. All forms of bonding instruments must be (I) pledged 
to the regulatory agency and (2) kept in good standing during the entire life of the project. 
A comprehensive description of financial instruments used as bonds in the upstream oil 
sector can be found in BLM (1995, 1996), MMS (2000d), and UNICAMP/CEPETRO (2001). 
Other key references are not directly aimed at the upstream petroleum sector, but do provide 
substantial infonnation on instruments used as financial guarantee (YOUNG et al., 1996; 
CORNWELL, 1997; EPA, 1997; BRYAN, 1998; MILLER, 1998; APOGEE/HAGLER BAILLY 
WITH D. R. ANDERSON ASSOCIATES, 1998; NWF, 2000; OSM, 2000b; NWF, 2000). 
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4.4. BONDING COSTS 
It is acknowledged that the cost to meet technical and bonding requirements for ex-post 
environmental obligations will impact companies differently. Such impacts can be direct 
(premiums, fees paid to surety companies, fees associated with third-party securities and 
requirements, interest earned in cash deposit in escrow accounts, etc.) and/or indirect (increase or 
reduction of government earnings trough corporate taxes and other participations, improvement 
of accumulated funds on savings-undersupplied economies, reduction of the company's 
borrowing capacity, increase in the cost of credit, etc.). MILLER (2000) indicates that the 
amount of capital tied up in security is enormous. 
Successful application of bonds will depend upon form of bonds, type of projects and 
companies, and scenarios. Usually large and fmancially healthy companies are not significantly 
affected by bonding requirements though marginal projects operated by large companies may be 
severely impacted. On the other hand, small companies operating small and marginal fields tend 
to be severely affected. 
Authorities must pursue flexible and optimum solutions; on the contrary, smaller 
companies will be driven out restricting the sector. It may be the intension of some regulatory 
environments to drive out companies that cannot provide adequate guarantee. Other regimes may 
be interested in improving the competition within the sector by offering flexible mechanisms and 
being more sensitive to financial impacts of bonding policies on small companies. Some 
agencies, with a longer bonding implementation history, have developed more complex bonding 
regimes allowing incentives for companies with good history of environmental compliance, 
credit record, decommissioning experience, etc. 
In Chapter II, two major bond categories were identified in terms of specific purpose: (1) 
fmancial bond, a bond that guarantees the payment of a specific amount determined by the 
agency in case of noncompliance; and (2) performance bond, a bond that guarantees the 
performance of a contractual obligation. Performance bonds indemnify authorities against 
operation costs, safeguarding agencies against both technical and financial failure, and premature 
or unplanned decommissioning (Figure 4.4). A financial bond does not guarantee the 
performance of an obligation. Instead, it can be compared to a token pledging, under the penalty 
of loosing no more than the amount bonded, the candidate's intention of keeping all fmancial 
commitments (e.g. timely payment of royalties and rents, honoring bids, etc.). 
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4.5. SETTING THE BOND AMOUNT AND DURATION 
Determining the amount to be bonded is probably one of the greatest predicaments 
involving the bonding system. Due to inadequate bonding estimation, many problems were 
caused in the past when mining companies became insolvent and the bond in place was not 
sufficient to cover abandonment/rehabilitation costs; for instance, the well known Uranium 
Mines Episode in Western USA (COLLINS, 1991). 
r 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
Figure 4.4. Typical cash flow for oil projects. Provisions for premature and unplunned decommissioning 
operations. Ex-post provisions brought up as up front costs making funds available even in case of technical. 
financial failure, or premature and unplanned decommissioning. 
The determination of the amount and duration of performance bonds is based on: (I) the 
nature, extent, and duration of the proposed project; and (2) the magnitude, type, and estimated 
closure cost. Bonds must be maintained in good standing for the duration of the project, 
remaining in effect until all ex-post obligations have been successfully completed. Authorities 
will then release the bond. 
Usually, authorities set the bond based upon the company's closure cost estimate plus 
profit and overhead, which represents the third party cost to complete operations in the event of 
forfeiture. Ideally, cost estimation should consider a worst -case damage scenario, or the highest 
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estimated operation cost to complete ex-post closure operations. In this case, if a company were 
able to demonstrate that the damages to the environment or costs to complete ex-post closure 
operations are less than previously estimated, the difference would be refunded to the company. 
In case of under-performance of ex-post operations or forfeiture (due to insolvency, 
negligence, etc.), the bond would include sufficient financial resources to repair, cover all 
damages, or complete operations. In any of these cases, there would be possibility for refunds. 
The practical result is that the motivation for properly completing ex -post obligations and 
investing in new technologies comes now from oil companies and not from authorities, public, or 
interest groups (FERREIRA, 1999). 
For US offshore projects, the required bond amount varies significantly from state to 
state. Public interest plays an important role in the definition of such amounts. Some states are 
more interested in safeguarding future investments than guaranteeing the proper abandonment of 
future wells. Other states will set very high bonds in other to lower the risk of environmental 
damage, and keep risky parties away, as it is the case in the State of Alaska (Table 4.1.). 
TABLE 4.1. US BOND REQUIREMENTS FOR ONSHORE PROJECTS 
State 
Alaska 
Arizona 
California 
Inactive well 
New Mexico 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Tennessee 
Bond starts at (US$) 
100,000 
10,000 
10,000 
5,000 
7,000 
5,000 
5,000 
2,000 
Source: MCFADDING (1996) 
Blanket bond starts at (US$) 
200,000 
25,000 
100,000 
100,000 
50,000 
15,000 
25,000 
10,000 
In reality, it is very unlikely that a disturbed area will be able to be truly restored. Most 
extractive activities produce and trigger irreversible damages, and users can only reduce impacts, 
mitigate problems, and rehabilitate the area for future uses or conservation. Rehabilitation 
objectives must be rigorous but, at same time, realistic. Two good reasons why regulators should 
not compromise are: 
• Future impacted communities will not spare the agency and litigious actions will be 
inevitable. 
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• Stringiness of regulations provides excellent incentive for technological innovations, 
allowing better environmental results and lower ex-post environmental costs. 
Regarding setting the appropriate bond amount, experience shows that lax requirements 
do not encourage compliance and strict requirements encourage evasion; lenient requirements are 
ignored and stringent are disobeyed. An optimum ground must be pursued. 
Ex -post standards and requirements should not be definite. The petroleum sector is 
extremely dynamic (new equipment, new technologies, new frontiers, etc.). Regulators must 
recognize the value of changes and be alert to identifY over-regulations. 
Ideally, bond requirement should be based on the cost for the rehabilitation of the entire 
lease area, applying the present value of all ex-post operation costs. There are three main 
methodologies for defining performance bond amounts for offshore projects: 
• 100% of ex-post costs+ (plus) indirect costs: 
• 100% of ex-post costs * (times) risk rate: 
• 100% of ex-post costs+ (plus) worst-case scenario: 
During the preparation of this present work, several approaches for calculating bonding 
requirements were identified. The following briefly describes some of the most common 
methodologies currently applied: 
1. By the lessee - the company defines all ex-post operation costs and the bond amount is based 
on this estimate. Accepting this approach provides low regulatory costs for the agency. 
However, regulators become susceptible to inaccuracies and deceitfulness. Most certainly, 
lessees will tend to underestimate ex-post costs and ignore indirect costs. Historically, it is 
possible to verifY that the liability (financial, environmental and legal) of successive 
misestimated projects is disastrous. To avoid this situation, contracting the services of 
independent specialists could be a short-term solution for the agency. In the long run, the 
agency should work at constructing a comprehensive database system. Some agencies try to 
minimize direct involvement and maximize public scrutiny. However, this approach is 
mostly suitable to societies that historically coexist with the extractive sector, knowing all 
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related socioeconomic benefits and burdens, and where a mature and transparent 
population/industry relation has been historically achieved. 
2. By the lessee and agency - the lessee submits a closure plan that is either approved or 
modified by the agency, which will establish a bond amount. In this case, the agency must 
rely on a group of ex -post operations experts in order to evaluate, and, if necessary, revise the 
proposed plan and define the bond requirement. 
3. By the agency - the agency owns a control system, usually a comprehensive database, and 
establishes bond requirements based upon its own knowledge of ex-post costs. 
4. By independent certified experts - in this case, independent and certified specialists would 
evaluate the ex-post plan along with cost estimation proposed by the lessee, and produce a 
teclmical report recommending a bond amount. Authorities must not presume that 
independent experts will share the experience being acquired. There is a strong financial 
motivation for not happening so. 
Some critics say that regulators have a possible tendency to overprotect themselves from 
all possible liabilities, even the more remote ones, leading to unreasonable high-cost bond 
requirements. Probably, the conciliatory attitude should be testing the sector, balancing the need 
for demonstrating financial capacity with the necessity for keeping a competitive and attractive 
sector. Excessive direct costs upon the industry may represent the redirection of important 
investments to regions that offer better profit margins. In this case, the agency walks on a very 
thin line between public pressure for stringentness and industry pressure for flexibility (Figure 
2.3). 
4.6. FORFEITURE AND BOND RELEASE 
A bond may be subject to forfeiture for different reasons: (!)if a well or installation has 
been abandoned or temporarily closed without initiating required procedures; (2) if a company 
fails to meet ex-post obligations in accordance with the approved plan; or (3) if a company fails 
to maintain the amount bonded (MCELFISH et al, 1996; FERREIRA et al, 2003). 
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After the successful completion of all closure requirements, authorities must provide 
release from all bonds. If ex-post-related activities are being conducted concomitantly during the 
life of the project and if activities are satisfactory completed, authorities may also authorize the 
proportional release of bonds. 
4.7. THE BONDING SYSTEM STEP-BY-STEP: 
1. Bonding system dynamics: 
• Submission of a detailed exploration plan to the regulatory agency. 
• Definition of the bond amount by the regulatory agency. 
• Fulfillment of bond requirements (providing the bond). 
• Exploration. 
• Submission of a detailed development, production, and decommissioning plan to the 
regulatory agency. 
• Reevaluation of the bond amount by the regulatory agency. 
• Fulfillment of new bond requirements (providing the bond). 
• Operation and ex -post obligations (i.e. decommissioning). 
• The bond is released and, if this is the case, refunded to the oil company. 
2. Main positive bond effects (Figure 4.5) 
• Decentralization of the decision process. 
• Performance objectives are defined rather than establishing a protocol of action to be 
strictly followed. 
• Incentive to the development of technological innovations with the objective of 
improving decommissioning results and reducing costs. 
• It guarantees the availability of funds to cover the costs of all ex -post obligations 
• It eliminates long and costly litigious battles. 
• It motivates the internalization of contingency costs, stimulating the monitoring of the 
consequences of each decision made. 
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• Companies begin to assume the ex -post burden in order to demonstrate that end-of-
leasing obligations will be met as contractually required, transferring the financial risk 
from the potential victims (government and taxpayers) to oil companies. 
• It safeguards authorities from techuical and financial risks, providing funds for eventual 
premature or unplanned closures. 
3. Some bond definitions: 
• Performance bonds: mechanism used to guarantee performance requirements. 
• Financial bonds: mechanism used to guarantee financial obligations. 
• Blanket bond (areawide): mechanism used to cover an area with several wells and 
installations. 
• Bond Pool: a consortium of small producers established to reduce and spread inherent risk 
in offshore oil projects. 
• General Bond: bonding general requirement for all companies, usually less significant 
bond amounts (financial bonds). 
• Supplemental Bond: additional bonding requirements based on a company's risk 
assessment model (environmental, techuical, financial and compliance risks). 
Supplemental bonds can comprise both fmancial and performance bonds. Figure 4.6 
indicates the risk evaluation of a candidate lessee. Figure 4. 7 shows the calculation 
matrix for the risk evaluation data obtained in Figure 4.6. 
4. Bond-calculation Parameters: 
• Estimated ex -post costs. 
• Estimated contingency costs (only related to ex-post operations). 
• Plarming and engineering costs. 
• Third-party profit and overhead costs. 
• Management, inspection, and supervision costs. 
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Environmental 
performance during 
the project 
(Continuous damages) 
Environmental 
Contingencies during 
the project 
(Accidental Damages) 
Environmental Obligations under a Leasing Contract 
INTERNALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS: 
(Environmental Performance Improvement) 
+ 
(Contingency Reduction: quantity and magnitude) 
= 
Lower Ex-post Damages 
Project Value 
Maximization 
Figure 4.5. The bond effect. Bonding requirements acting over the internalization process, assisting in the 
reduction of accidental and continuous environmental damages, and maximasing project value. 
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5. Reasons for Recalculating Bond Values (increment or reduction): 
• Changes in the parameters used to calculate the bond amount. 
• Changes in the economic scenario . 
• Signs suggesting problems in the operating company . 
• Changes in the technical and financial credibility of the oil company . 
• Changes in the fmancial capability of the oil company; its capacity to fulfill existing 
financial obligations is being questioned in the market. 
• Changes in the estimates of proven reserves within areas leased to the company. 
• Changes in the credit record ofthe company. 
• Changes in the compliance record of the company (moral risk). 
6. Main Bond Obligations: 
• All Bonds must be previously approved by the regulatory agency. 
• All bonds must be payable to the regulatory agency. 
• All bonds must be sufficient to guarantee all ex-post obligations. 
• All leased areas must be bonded. 
7. The Regulatory Agency is Responsible for: 
• Monitoring all bonding instruments. 
• Monitoring eventual market value variations of issued bonds (market value). 
• Monitoring institutions that issue notes, securities, collaterals, and other assurance 
instruments. 
8. A bond may be Forfeited due to: 
• Legal reasons. 
• Technical reasons. 
• Financial reasons. 
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NO 
SUPPLEMENTAL BOND 
REQUIRED 
OFFSHORE OIL PROJECT 
GENERAL BOND 
REQUIREMENT 
SUPPLEMENTAL BOND 
REQUIREMENT 
(Financial to Performance Bond) 
NO 
RISK 
LOW 
RISK 
RISK 
I 
I 
I 
I 
NoR~~---1---~!~--J 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
MATRIX 
BOND VALUE 
Step 1: 
Detennination of 
proposed project's risk 
Step 2: 
Scoring for 
environmental/financial/ 
technologic/compliance 
risk 
Step3: 
Plotting scores on matrix 
in order to detennine the 
percentage of estimated 
bond amount 
Figure 4.6. Risk Assessment Model. Based on AEP (1998a) proposal fur mining reclamation bonds, here adapted to 
the oil industry. In this case, the performance bond requirement is set based on risk offered by the candidate. 
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9. If a bond is forfeited, the agency will: 
• 
• 
• 
Collect the value of the forfeited bond . 
Use the bond to fund a third-party, a contractor, to update and/or correct the project in 
accordance to the proposed closure plan. 
Return funds in excess to the company . 
4.8. DIFFERENT FORMS OF BONDING INSTRUMENTS 
Traditionally, bonding instruments have been used to provide different forms of 
guarantees as shown below: fidelity bonds (guarantee of honesty); fiduciary bonds (guarantee the 
proper management of assets); judicial bonds (guarantee the compliance with judicial decisions); 
and contractual bonds (guarantee the fulfillment of contractual obligations) (ROWE, 1987; 
JOHNSON, 1986; YOUNG et al., 1996; CORNWELL, 1997; CORNWELL and COSTANZA, 
1999; MILLER, 2000, UNICAMP/CEPETRO, 2001). The category "Contractual Bonds" 
includes several subcategories including: performance bonds; construction bonds; bid bonds; 
service and materials bonds; advanced payment bonds; retention bonds; maintenance bonds; 
transport bonds; government regulatory bonds; customs bonds; financial bonds; and license and 
authorization bonds. 
As mentioned before, within the Exploration and Production sector, two major bond 
categories can be identified in terms of specific purpose: financial and performance bonds. Both 
fmancial and performance bonds may be used several times within a single contract. Under some 
regimes, companies acquiring oil or gas leases are required to post a preliminary financial bond 
(a fixed and relatively small bond) guaranteeing fmancial aspects of the lease contract (regular 
payments of rents and royalties, civil penalties, fines, etc.). Usually, companies holding more 
than one lease may opt for a mechanism called "Areawide Bond", or "Blanket Bond", in which 
case, a single bond would cover multiple leases. 
In addition to fmancial bonds, some regulatory agencies require a performance bond, 
which is usually based on the best-cost estimate for completing ex-post operations under the 
established lease contract. Performance bonds serve individual projects and individual wells. 
Multiple performance bonds may be found within a lease, but a single performance bond carmot 
be used to cover multiple projects. 
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Bonds must be maintained until leases are terminated or transferred and until ex-post 
obligations are satisfactorily met. If closure activities are being conducted concomitantly during 
the life of the project, the phased approach, authorities may authorize proportional releases of the 
bond. 
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Figure 4.7. Risk Assessment Matrix 
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Definitions and descriptions of currently used bonding instruments can be found in the 
following publications including CORNWELL (1997), FERREIRA and SUSLICK (2001), OSM 
(2000b), NWF (2000), ANP (2001), UNICAMP/CEPETRO (2001), and FERREIRA et a!. 
(2003a). As explained on Chapter II and illustrated on Table 2.4, a classification was proposed 
in to facilitate the systematic evaluation and optimum applicability of each financial instrument. 
The present study was able to identny the following financial instruments, which are briefly 
described below. Descriptions are based on information obtained on the following publications 
and interviews with specialists (MCELFISH, et a!, 1996; MCF ADDING, 1996; ISO, 1997; 
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BOLENDER, 1998; HORESH, 1998; AIG, 1998; BRYAN, 1999; BAIER, 2000; BRYAN, 2000; 
DIE, 2000; NWF, 2000; MILLER, 2000; STOKES, 2000; WILLIAMS, 2000; OSM, 2000b, 
2000c; MMS, 2000e; BLM, 2000; MIRABELLA, 2000; RADIGAN, 2000; CORNWELL, 2000; 
MPC, 2000; UNICAMP/CEPETRO, 2001): 
Corporate Surety Bonds (CSBs): 
A surety bond is a contract involving three parties, the surety company, the oil company 
or Jessee, and the regulatory agency. Sureties are issued (written) by certified financial 
institutions. The surety contract guarantees the payment of funds (not to exceed the penal sum) 
or the performance of ex -post activities in case oil companies fail to fulfill them. Sureties 
guarantee the credit of an oil company and both parties equally share contractual obligations. 
Surety companies do not expect a default scenario. However, if it occurs, the surety company 
pursues reimbursement from the principal. In case of default, authorities hire an independent 
contractor to perform ex-post operations. Sureties may provide extended guarantee for residual 
liabilities even after ex -post obligations are finished (evergreen clauses). In order to obtain 
sureties, candidates must go through a rigorous underwriting process, which will access their 
financial, technical and moral capacity. The underwriting process makes it difficult for small or 
newly formed companies to obtain surety bonds. In the United States, the US Treasury defines a 
maximum coverage amount (a form of government reinsurance) and monitors surety companies. 
Surety bonds are analogous to insurance policies in that companies pay annual premiums 
and fees to keep the bond in place. The main difference between sureties and insurance policies 
(and annuities) is that a surety guarantees the credit of an oil company, and an insurance policy 
transfers the liabilities to the insurer. 
Each surety company follows its own financial criteria to judge a company and determine 
premium rates (i.e. net worth level, credit rating, decommissioning experience, etc.). More 
commonly, premiums are defmed according to the fmancial risk and project characteristics. 
Currently within the oil sector, surety premiums are usually paid annually; for instance, $12.50 
per $1,000 per year, or 1.25%, but it may get up to 3.00%. Under most regimes, as it will be seen 
in Chapter V, premiums and fees are allowable against tax (deduction rates vary significantly). 
Because of such high stakes, some bonding companies will not write this class of instrument for 
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the oil industry, only larger broker houses or larger surety companies (BOLENDER, 1998; 
FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2000; DIE, 2000). 
Sureties are non-cancelable, even if the contracting company fails to pay premiums and/or 
in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency. One of the main advantages of this instrument is that 
no upfront funds are required. If companies remain solvent and conclude required operations, 
bonds are released and premium payments cease. The contracting company still has to disburse 
out-of-packet funds to cover ex-post operations. In case of forfeiture, the surety company will 
have to pay for all contractual obligations. In addition, under most legal regimes, further 
complications may incur, including civil and criminal penalties, loss of operating license, credit, 
and reputation damage, etc. (FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2000). 
Some surety companies offer a combination of sureties with a trust fund, but most of the 
times, sureties are sufficient to demonstrate fmancial guaranty. Since it may be difficult for some 
small and newly formed companies to obtain a surety bond, regulators some times offer different 
forms of escrow accounts so these companies are allowed to establish their credibility within the 
sector, acquire experience and build up their assets. Then, companies can substitute their escrow 
accounts for sureties. 
Another benefit provided by sureties is that they are irrevocable, and issuers are 
monitored by the Central Bank (US Treasury), reducing regulatory costs. In addition, surety 
companies have a great interest in monitoring the principals, the lessees. If there is margin for 
any litigious inquiry, it will be between the surety company and the principal; and regardless, 
the agency will promptly receive the penal sum. Some regulators, mostly in the mining and 
onshore oil sector, complain of having some difficulty in collecting money from surety 
compantes. 
A number of specialists defend that goverrunent should provide some form assistance so 
small and newly formed companies could obtain surety bonds more easily. The problem is that 
such mechanism would completely armul incentives for compliance, which is the whole point of 
requiring bonds. In addition, in case of default, since surety bonds are a guanmtee of credit, the 
government would be accountable for the absence of credit, and taxpayers would, once more, 
cope with liabilities. 
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Collateral Bond (CBs): 
Collateral offered by companies to provide guarantee for the completion of ex-post 
obligations include: company's assets, such as cash, real estate, treasuries, instruments indicating 
the presence of a line of credit or a funded account. Some collateral instruments offer interest 
earnings (cash, Investment Grade Securities, Treasury securities, etc.). Other instruments require 
payment of fees and premiums (Letters of Credit, etc.). 
Within this category, instruments have similar attributes and characteristics and, many 
times, their names are used invariably with the same meaning. Such accounts must be under the 
control, for administration purposes, of a trustee other than the agency and the lessee. In some 
circumstances, the agency may function as a trustee. 
Paid-In Collateral Accounts or Pre-Paid Collateral Accounts (PPCAs) 
There are several variations of PPCAs, but they usually work as a three-party irrevocable 
agreement, where an oil company transfers funds to a financial institution (trustee) to be managed 
in the name of a third party (the regulatory agency). The account must be supplied with the full 
bond amount, the required guarantee, before the project begins. Funds can only be released with 
the approval of the regulatory agency and the agreement cannot be altered or cancelled 
unilaterally. Interest revenues may be either added to the account and paid at the end of the 
project, or paid as they are earned. Allocation of cash in this manner causes significant direct 
costs. 
Companies cannot use the deposited collateral to fund ex -post activities. After the 
successful conclusion of all ex-post operations and the release of the bond, the deposited amount 
is reimbursed to the oil company. In case of forfeiture, the bond amount is used by the agency 
to contract an independent operator to perform the necessary ex -post obligations. In this case, 
other sanctions may be imposed. 
PPCAs pay interest, guaranteeing the value of money and this instrument category is 
promptly available in the market. The trustee has the power to manage the investments. An 
annual fee is charged and interest earnings can also be added to the account to reduce or 
eliminate future adjustments required by the agency. Currently, these accounts are rarely used 
due to the availability of a variety of other less costly options. 
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Allocating capital in large quantities in such way (upfront) cause considerable financial 
impacts on the Jessee, allowing significant opportunity costs. In order to offer some 
attractiveness, both the industry and the financial sector waits for some form of fiscal incentives 
for this form of instrument. Currently, PPCAs are not tax deductible and interests earned are 
taxable. 
As far as regulators are concerned, PPCAs are very efficient in guaranteeing ex -post 
performances, offer premium liquidity, and an excellent incentive for compliance. 
Unfortunately, PPCAs require complex contracts and close monitoring of financial institutions. 
This may cause some additional regulatory costs, mainly in long-term projects. In order to 
reduce risks, the agency must be the only beneficiary, making it possible to regulators to 
withdraw funds upon pre-established conditions. 
Escrow Collateral Accounts (Escrow Agreements) (ECAs) 
The difference between escrow accounts and other accounts is very tenuous, and, most 
of the times, these names are used interchangeably with the same meaning. ECAs must have the 
guarantee of central banks. For this reason, they must not surpass the maximum guaranteed 
value established by the Central Bank. The trustee would be responsible for buying Treasury 
Bonds every time the limit is reached. This mechanism may bring some form of fiscal 
incentives during certain periods. Usually CDs may substitute escrow accounts. 
Cash Collateral Accounts (CCAs) 
This instrument falls in the same category as escrow accounts. Some agencies allow 
small and independent lessees to use cash and cash equivalent (certified checks, savings 
accounts, etc.) to demonstrate financial guarantee. In such cases, the accounts must be certified 
by the Central Bank. In more competitive regimes, this is the only form of instrument that small 
and independent operators have available to demonstrate financial guarantee. Terms of account 
contract must state that funds cannot be withdrawn without the written permission of the 
agency. 
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External Sinking Funds (ESFs) 
ESFs work as any collateral account but allowing periodic payments. In addition, this 
form of instrument requires a combination of instrument guarantees. For this reason, ESFs may 
take the form of different instruments available in the market. Whatever the instrument used, it 
is intended to set aside resources and assets. The combination of guarantees must produce the 
total amount of the bond required. As the account is being funded and the real guarantee 
increased, the lessee may reduce, in the same proportion, the use of other instruments. When 
the account is completely funded and requirements are completely satisfied, the ESF may be 
transformed in other instruments. Advantages and disadvantages will depend on the form of 
instrument assumed by the ESF. This instrument integrates the financial benefits and attributes 
of interest earnings, the flexibility of periodic payments (the same as a LSCA), and the approval 
of the agency (the same as a PPCA). In some occasions, a well-prepared portfolio of 
instruments may offer a better scenario than a PPCA. Regulatory costs for ESFs are 
considerable and managing a variety of instruments at the same time can be very complex. 
Certificate of Deposit (CDs) 
CDs certify that a specific deposit has been made. Certificate of Deposits are known as 
debt-instruments that pay fixed interest and have a predetermined maturity (term). They can be 
used as collateral for loans and demand penalties for early withdrawn. CDs can also be attached 
to binding contracts between interested parties. Maturing periods vary significantly but can be 
renewed automatically. CDs may be negotiable and nonnegotiable. Nonnegotiable are usually of 
small face value. Negotiable CDs are usually of large denominations and can be traded in the 
financial market by corporations, governments, and central banks from other countries. This 
mechanism was developed throughout the history as a result of innovations within the financial 
market. 
CDs with variable rates, CDs rollover, and CDs that can extend the term of other CDs. 
CDs can also be time-deposit and demand-deposit. Time-deposit CDs are paid only in specific 
dates set by the instrument and penalizes if redeemed prematurely. Demand-deposit CDs allow 
withdraws at any time after a period defined by the instrument (30 to 90 days). All CDs must be 
payable or directed to the regulatory agency, and placed under the protection of the same agency 
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or an independent financial agency. In case of default, the agency is authorized to liquidate the 
instrument and use the funds to fulfill ex -post obligations. 
This category of instruments remunerates with interests, guaranteeing the value of money. 
After maturity, CDs may be redeemed by the principal value plus accumulated interests. This 
instrument is promptly available to the agency, as needed. Issuing and maintaining CDs generate 
direct and indirect costs to the lessee (legal fees, depreciation value, market, fluctuations, etc.). 
If the CD face value is at least the same value of the costs to complete ex-post obligations, 
the instrument offers an efficient form of guarantee to the agency. CDs are also efficient to 
guarantee long-term closure projects. In order to reduce inherent costs, the agency should 
contractually require that CDs are made payable to the agency. In such circumstances, the 
issuing party must renounce all rights to pledge the CD in other contracts. CDs must not be 
issued with face values higher than the amount guaranteed by the applicable Central Bank (in the 
US: US$ I 00,000). CDs must be issued with a limited maturity, so they can be periodically 
adjusted for inflation and submitted to revisions regarding ex -post obligation costs. CDs must be 
sufficient to cover ex -post obligations even if they have to be traded before the maturity period. 
If sold before maturity, CDs are traded bellow their face value. As an additional guarantee, the 
agency may require a "standby" or escrow account combined with the CD, especially for long-
term projects. 
Salvage Revenue Collateral Bonds (SRCBs) 
This category is similar to Self Guarantees. It is difficult to separate these two categories 
from each other. Under this scenario, the lessee would demonstrate that the estimated value of its 
salvage (platform, equipment, units, etc.) is sufficient or partially sufficient to cover ex-post 
obligations. 
SRCBs do not require allocation of capital, eliminating opportunity costs and direct costs. 
In addition, there are not premiums or fees involved. On the other hand, SRCBs do not offer 
adequate liquidity to the agency. Mostly for this reason, it is an inefficient and risky way of 
demonstrating financial guarantee for ex -post obligations. For instance, in case of contingencies 
such as sinking of the platform, the guarantee instrument is included in the physical losses. 
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Real Estate Collateral Bond (RECBs) 
This mechanism consists of placing a real estate property (of equal or higher value) as a 
collateral guarantee for the completion of contractual obligations. Real Estate guarantees can be 
secured for long periods. The market value must be payable to the regulatory agency under a 
Deed of Trust and must be sufficient to cover all ex-post obligations under the contract. 
In order to eliminate some of the risks involved in the acceptance of this instrument, a 
contract is drawn establishing the regulatory agency as the only beneficiary of the property in 
case of default or insolvency. In addition, the property must not be part of the area involved in 
the project and must be free of liens or loans. During the entire life of the project, an independent 
agent must monitor the market value of the property. If the property value falls bellow the value 
required by the bond, the regulatory agency must be notified and a new form of guarantee must 
be promptly provided. Real estate properties carry very low liquidity and create additional 
regulatory costs. Besides, in case of default, the selling process is complex and may be long. 
Often, the agency is forced to sell the property for a value significantly inferior, allowing 
additional costs to tax payers. Direct costs caused by this instrument are very low, however some 
other costs such as taxes, legal fees, depreciation, and market fluctuations, may incur. 
The acquisition of a real state property as a form of investment is not a good way to 
allocate capital, since there is no guarantee for the value of money. If the property already 
belongs to the lessee, it would reduce the total capital allocated as a collateral guarantee, reducing 
opportunity costs for the lessee. If pledged as a financial guarantee, the lessee is unable to use 
the same piece of real estate as collateral for other ventures, including obtaining loans. 
Treasury Bonds and Investment Grade Securities (T-Bonds and IGSs): 
Investment Grade Securities are instruments that offer annual interests and may come in 
several forms. They are generally bought with long maturing terms in order to avoid frequent 
substitutions and keep higher earnings. The most common IGS instrument used as collateral to 
demonstrate fmancial guarantee for ex-post obligations are bonds issued by various levels of 
government (debt instruments with fixed terms). Government-issued notes are usually kept until 
their maturity (term), but they can be negotiated in the market without penalties. When used in 
this context, government bonds are usually negotiable and transferable, so some additional care 
must be taken protecting the document. IGSs are as good as the institutions issuing them. IGS 
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bonds pay interest, guaranteeing the value of the money allocated. In order to avoid the volatility 
of the market, regulators tend to recommend US Treasury Notes. The regulatory agency has the 
right to sell the securities if the company does no meet ex-post obligations. Funds acquired will 
be used to complete all ex-post operations. After maturity, bonds are redeemed by the face value 
plus accumulated interest. This instrument category offers good efficiency even for long terms 
projects. 
Leasing-Specific Collateral Accounts, Leasing-Specific Abandonment Accounts, or Periodic-
payment Collateral Accounts (LSCCs, LSAAs, or PPCAs) 
This category works similarly to PPCAs; however, some flexibility is added in the way 
payments are made. There are several variations of this instrument. Payments must be 
completed within a pre-determined period according to a formula provided by the regulatory 
agency. The format adopted by the MMS requires a company to commit itself to fully fund the 
LSAA within four years or, by the beginning of the year in which the agency projects that the 
company will have cumulatively produced 80% of the originally recoverable reserves, whichever 
is first. 
The first payment is generally equal to or greater than 50% of the estimate of the 
cumulative potential lease abandonment and clearance liabilities (ex -post costs). The company 
will base the amount of the initial payment on the agency's analysis of rates of production from 
other leases, cash flow for similar projects, characteristics of the producing reservoir( s ), plugging 
and abandonment information available in the agency's databases, and/or other information 
provided to the agency. 
The objective of the MMS is to establish a time schedule for incremental payments that 
will ensure that the deposited amount in the LSAA will increase at a faster rate than the rate at 
which the originally recoverable hydrocarbons are being produced from the lease. In actual 
projects, the agency may require the submission of a risk insurance policy in order to cover 
residual liabilities21 in the event that a catastrophic failure or other contingencies may prevent the 
completion of the remaining payments. 
Table 6.8, on Chapter VI, is a demonstration of the time schedule for incremental 
payments of a LSAA bond. It indicates the time schedule adopted and the amount of each 
21 Some agencies require post closure fmancial assurance for a 30 years period after closure (GAO, 1994). 
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incremental payment to fund the account over a four-year period. The following example 
describes the situation on a hypothetical oil-producing field. A LSAA must be funded with 
$17.25 million, which is the value of the bond. The amount of the initial payment is 50% of the 
field's cumulative potential decommissioning costs, which is equal to $8,63 million. By the end 
of year 4, even if the company were not able to produce 80% of the recoverable reserves 
originally in place, the account would need to be funded with the full $17.25 million. Notice 
that, yearly payments of $2.16 million during the 4-year period increased the fund from $8.63 
million to $17.25 million by the end of year 4. Interests earned are transferred to the oil 
company. Even complying with all LSAA bonding requirements, companies still have to pay 
with out-of-packet funds to cover ex-post operations at the end of projects. Other examples are 
illustrated in Chapter VI. 
Instruments under this category discreetly eliminate opportunity costs from large upfront 
disbursements. However, these benefits are only possible with the transference of some risk to 
the agency. With periodic payments, there is no real guarantee that the total value of the bond 
will be available if the lessee defaults before the account is fully funded. This risk is being 
reduced by the requirement of the following mechanisms: (1) requirement of an insurance policy 
in the value of the owned amount; (2) requiring a short period for funding the account (usually 
four years); (3) establishing the agency as the only beneficiary of the account; and (4) making the 
contract irrevocable. The attractiveness of these instruments also depends significantly from 
fiscal incentives. The account management also generates some taxes and fees. In addition, 
these measures demand additional monitoring and regulatory costs. 
Letters of Credit (LOCs) 
Letters of Credit are documents issued by financial institutions authorizing the holder to 
receive a specific value. More specifically, a line of credit in the name of an oil company is 
issued to guarantee that the amount required to complete all ex-post obligations will be available 
in case of default. LOCs are negotiable instruments that specify the maximum amount of 
available credit. The fmancial institution will deduct annual premiums, taxes, interests, and other 
fees in order to maintain LOCs. LOCs can be negotiable or non-negotiable instruments (most 
commonly non-negotiable) and are usually issued for one-year terms with evergreen clausei2• 
22 Evergreen clauses allow automatic renewals or "rollovers". 
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However, renewals depend upon the approval of the financial institution, which may decide not 
to extend the instrument based on new developing factors that indicate increasing risk of default. 
In this case, what happens is the equivalent to a situation of noncompliance, and the beneficiary, 
the agency, may redeem the face value of the LOC. All three parts have great interest in avoiding 
this situation. 
Premiums and fees are often based on a credit evaluation of the candidate company. 
Under ideal conditions, only soft collaterals are required. In order to reduce the risk of non-
payment, regulators may require a letter of credit contract involving three parties (the issuing 
institution, the oil company, and the regulatory agency). Letters of credit preferably should be 
irrevocable and have the regulatory agency as the only beneficiary. The oil company will not be 
able to use the established credit or the involved collateral to fund ex -post obligations. 
LOCs, indeed, behave as nonnegotiable instruments. No institution would pay the face 
value of an LOC to a party other than the specified beneficiary. Any contract changes must be 
approved by all three parties (agency, principal and beneficiary). 
Contract terms for a LOC will have the same provisions involved in the end-of-leasing 
contract between the lessee and the agency. Some specific terms are included to govern over 
circumstances that will pennit the redeeming of the instrument by the beneficiary, including 
missed deadlines, negligence of specific operations, and unacceptable standards and levels of 
quality. 
Usually, premiums and fees for the maintenance of LOCs are very reasonable and 
negotiable, but costs will depend on the credit evaluation of the principal (usually a percent of 
the financial guarantee being required). Under most regimes, expenditures originated on the 
establishment of an LOC may be deducted from corporate taxes. Once the LOC is established, 
maintenance costs are low, but the principal is obligated to refund the LOC issuer all interest 
related to funds withdrawn by the beneficiary. Small, newly formed, and independent lessees 
may encounter some difficulty in obtaining a LOC, and probably would have to provide the 
issuer with the deposit of the entire instrument face value as collateral. 
LOCs will reflect the credibility of issuing institution. They are as good as the 
institution issuing them. If the financial institution is currently in trouble, the instrument offers 
great risk. If the financial institution becomes insolvent, the instrument is no longer a guarantee. 
In order to reduce risks, the agency must carefully monitor issuing institutions, what may 
121 
significantly increase regulatory costs. The agency may also require the establishment of a 
combination of LOC with a standby collateral account. 
Line of Credit Collateral Bonds (LCCB) 
A LCCB is not a negotiable instrument but behaves like a LOC. This instrument is 
essentially an agreement made between a financial agent, who lends the necessary funds, and the 
lessee. The fmancial agent becomes responsible to fund all ex -post operations in case of default. 
The maximum credit value must correspond to the costs of contractual ex -post obligations. 
LCCBs must not depend of possible fluctuations in the financial health of the lessee. On the 
contrary, the financial agent must disburse of the amount pledged without defiance. In case of 
default, funds are withdrawn as needed by the agency, until a maximum amount contractually 
approved. 
Financial agents usually require collaterals for the establishment of LCCBs. Direct and 
indirect costs may be significant. For regulators, high regulatory costs are also expected. A 
Standby trust fund may also be required in combination with a LCCB. 
Third-Party Bonds (TPBs) 
TPBs are common in the mining sector and some oil agencies may accept them under 
some circumstances. Requirements are significantly more severe and complex. Each agency has 
its own complex list of requirements involving formulas and specific questionnaires for both 
lessee and parent company. 
Self Bonds (S-BONDS) 
A self-bond is a form of waiver provided by the regulatory agency to companies that can 
provide some specific financial requirements (unencumbered net assets and net worth tests). 
There is a wide range of self-bond variations, also called financial tests. Some agencies are 
considerably rigorous in granting these instruments and others are not so rigorous. Self-bonds 
differ significantly from third-party guaranties and from other flexible collateral instruments such 
as set-aside revenues, salvage, and real estate. In general terms, self-bonds are based on the 
assessment of the assets and responsibilities of the lessee and its capacity of paying for and 
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performing ex -post obligations. Flexible self-bonding mechanisms can offer significant risks to 
regulators. 
Third parties do not back self-Bonds. In addition, the lessee is not under the obligation of 
providing collaterals or other guarantees. Usually, in order to benefit from this instrument, the 
lessee has to observe certain criteria determined by the agency. Self-bond criteria vary 
significantly; involving simple and complex formulas, net working capital and tangible net worth 
calculations, credit rating, ex-post operation experience, etc. Ideally, only major, experienced 
and historically competent companies should qualifY. 
S-bonds may benefit companies that have been established in the oil business for a long 
time, maintain a good financial health, sound environmental record, etc. S-bonds do not require 
premiums or fees, nor cause opportunity costs, eliminating all direct costs. Indirect costs do 
apply and reduce the company's capacity in obtaining loans and increase credit cost. 
This instrument category is very criticized by different groups that tend to expect more 
liquidity from bonding instruments. The mining sector has shown that large and historical 
companies can also default, become insolvent and bankrupt. The risk for large companies 
plunging into a crisis may be small, but catastrophic since most large companies are associated 
with several large projects with the potential of generating large and catastrophic ex-post 
environmental damage. In addition, if a lessee is a subsidiary from a large parent company, both 
should be financially responsible for all ex-post obligations. 
These past years have shown that a company's financial situation can be easily 
manipulated, stockholders can be deceived, and gigantic companies can pretend to be extremely 
lucrative on day, and go bankrupt next morning. Political manipulation of markets demonstrated 
in the Enron incident involving allegations of excessive political influence and manipulation 
among United States Representatives, involving even the current Bush administration, should be 
an opportunity to consider a more secure form of guarantee for large companies and projects. 
Future Revenue Commitments, Budget Set-Asides, Corporate Guarantees (FRCB, BSAB, 
CGB) 
These instruments are somewhat similar to self-bonds and, most of the times, it is 
difficult to differentiate them apart. Companies using this category of instruments have to fulfill 
armual criteria. Set-Asides, for instance, allow a company to use as guarantee the resources it 
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intends to gain. This can become very complex and controversial. For instance, what is the risk 
scenario involved in a marginal field being operated by a small company that uses one of these 
instruments as a performance bond? 
Direct impacts are nonexistent under this category. However, depending on the 
instrument, indirect costs may become very undesirable. For instance, the set-aside instrument 
will reduce drastically the capacity for acquiring loans and increase the cost of credit. This 
category offers great flexibilities to the industry; however, it comes with a considerable cost to 
the agency, including monitoring costs and high default risk. 
Pool Bonds (P-BONDS) 
A poll bond is a form of consortium of operators (usually small or newly formed 
companies) designed to provide flexibility by spreading the risk of non-compliance and 
minimizing bonding costs for associated parties. Associated companies become responsible for 
making payments towards a common fund, which will be available in case of default of one of 
the parties. Payments are usually based on a percent of the production, and are nomefundable 
and nondeductible. Associated lessees have no control over the fund, which is managed by an 
independent trustee. Some regulators argue that pool bonds only attract the interest of risky 
parties. Indeed, pool bonds spread risk among associated companies, and only lessees under 
extreme high-risk conditions would be interested in type of deal. In addition, monitoring and 
regulatory costs are significantly high for regulators. 
Insurance Policy Bonds (IPB) 
An insurance policy is a two-party contract transferring existing ex-post liabilities on an 
existing lease contract (up to the policy value) to an insurer. Insurance companies offer a wide 
variety of environmental insurance products; however, in order to be accepted by most regulators, 
a financial guarantee, policies must be irrevocable, free of liens and loans, have a pre-paid single 
premium, and have the regulatory agency as the only beneficiary of the policy. 
Annuities Policies (APs) 
An annuity works like a series of payments (or a single large payment), made by an 
insurance company (or another financial institution) in behalf of the principal, the Jessee, in 
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exchange by an upfront premium paid by the principal. When the instrument is bought, the 
insurer becomes contractually obligated to cover payments in favor of the principal, whenever 
required. These payments, or single payment, are equivalent to continuous and/or ex-post 
environmental obligations. Payment program must be defmed at the time the policy is signed. 
In some special circumstances, irregular payment fluxes are permitted. 
Since payments can be made periodically or at a single installment, the lessee may 
benefit from interest earnings, guaranteeing, at least, the value of money. In addition, lessees 
may also benefit from acquiring annuities at values significantly inferior to the required bond 
amount. Longer periods allow greater benefits, greater interest earnings, significantly reducing 
opportunity costs. Annuities do require the payment of premiums and some fees; however, this 
instrument offers one of the lowest direct costs among all instruments considered. 
The contract defining the payment schedule must coincide with environmental obligations 
being covered by the policy. Annuities offer an adequate guarantee for long-term projects, and as 
other insurance products, annuities may backfire on regulatory agencies. Since annuities behave 
like insurance policies, in case of default insurers may provide legal reasons to exonerate 
themselves from paying the bond. Collecting annuities may require long litigious battles. For 
this reason, some agencies will only accept annuities upon the presentation of collaterals (i.e. a 
standby trust), which, most of the times, eliminates all benefits provided by the policy. In order 
to reduce risks, the agency must be irrevocably established as the only beneficiary of the policy. 
Environmental Insurance Policies (EIPs) 
EIPs are contracts where the insurer promises to pay for all ex -post environmental 
obligations in behalf of the lessee to the beneficiary, the agency. The face value of the policy 
must be I 00% ex -post obligation costs. The policy must also guarantee that resources, up to the 
face value, will be promptly available when necessary. Policies must be kept active for the 
entire length of the project. EIPs must be irrevocable, except by default of premium payments. 
Until recently, insurance products for ex -post environmental obligations in the oil and mining 
sector were rare. The insurance sector now offers innovative and flexible products, which may 
be adjusted to fulfill specific regulatory needs. Some products may be directed to cover 
liabilities from personal damage or damage to third-party properties. 
Premiums are set based on the cost of potential loss and the probability of default. The 
insurer assumes the total liability. In order to provide optimum guarantee, agencies should 
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require single pre-paid prenuums, and irrevocable contracts (single premium whole-life 
policies). Unfortunately, in case of noncompliance, the insurer may, and they typically do, 
question judicially the payment of the policy, delaying the availability of funds to the agency. 
Finite Insurance Policies (FIPs) 
F!Ps cover known ex -post environmental obligations and losses associated with the 
discovery of new environmental obligations. This is a new and very interesting product offered 
by AIG (1998). F!Ps have a total aggregated value and multi-annual terms for log-term 
projects. Perhaps, the greatest innovation offered by F!Ps is the possibility of a personalized 
policy, which attends to all lessees needs, regulators desires, and to specific ex-post 
environmental demands of the sector. 
F!Ps are structured to allow the sharing out of costs and profit between the insurer and 
the lessee. Premiums are paid fully at the beginning of the policy and corresponds to the NPV 
of the estimate balance to complete the full payment of all ex -post environmental obligations. 
The premium will cover the required value and even a possible pre-established additional 
amount for ex-post eventualities. Great part of the premium is allocated into an account that 
will be rewarded with the same annual interests paid by US Treasury Notes (around 5.5%), and 
paying the losses during the length of the project, if any. The insurer will manage the account as 
it wishes. However, only revenues equivalent to interests paid by the US Treasury Notes will be 
deposited at the "Notional Commutation Account" (NCA). If investments allow better earnings, 
the balance will go to the insurer. If there are losses in the process, the insurer remains 
responsible for paying agreed interests into the NCA. If the total expenditure is less than 
previously estimated, the insurer must return the balance to the NCA to the lessee (Tables 4.2 
and 4.3). 
F!Ps reqmre significant upfront capital allocation, causing direct costs including 
opportunity costs. However, the NCA is rewarded with interests and profits, and shared 
between the insurer and the lessee (Figure 4.8). There are no annual premiums or fees. 
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TABLE 4.2. COMMUTATION ACCOUNT BALANCE- FINITE INSUR.Ai-.CE 
Optimistic scenario 
Year Comm. Account Investment Loss Comm. Account 
@) Beginning Income Pal:ment @)End Year 
1 9,918,463 545,515 200,000 10,263,979 
2 10,263,979 564,519 200,000 10,628,498 
3 10,628,498 584,567 200,000 11,013,065 
4 ll,013,065 605,719 200,000 11,418,784 
5 11,418,784 628,033 200,000 ll,846,817 
6 ll,846,817 651,575 2,500,000 9,998,392 
7 9,998,392 549,912 2,500,000 8,048,303 
8 8,048,303 442,657 500,000 7,990,960 
9 7,990,960 439,503 500,000 7,930,463 
10 7,930,463 436,175 500,000 7,866,638 
II 7,866,638 432,665 500,000 7,799,303 
12 7,799,303 428,962 500,000 7,728,265 
13 7,728,265 425,055 500,000 7,653,320 
14 7,653,320 420,933 500,000 7,574,252 
15 7,574,252 416,584 500,000 7,490,836 
Total 10,000,000 
Under this optimistic scenario, the insurer would pay out $10 million in losses and the insured 
would receive a profit of $7,490,836 at the end of the term. 84.8% of the premium paid went 
originally to the notional commutation account, which will be used to pay losses. 15.4 % of 
premium payment is used to pay expenses, taxes, and risk assumption charges. Source: 
RADIGAN (1996) 
TABLE 4.3. COMMUTATION ACCOUNT BALANCE- FINITE INSURANCE 
Pessimistic scenario 
Year Comm. Account Investment Loss 
@ Beginning Income Payment 
1 9,918,463 545,515 6,000,000 
2 4,463,979 553,519 6,000,000 
3 (1,290,502) 1,000,000 
4 (2,290,502) 1,000,000 
5 (3,290,502) 1,000,000 
6 (4,290,502) 1,000,000 
7 (5,290,502) 1,000,000 
8 (6,290,502) 1,000,000 
9 (7,290,502) 1,000,000 
10 (8,290,502) 1,000,000 
II (9,290,502) 1,000,000 
12 (10,290,502) 1,000,000 
13 (11,290,502) 1,000,000 
14 (12,290,502) 1,000,000 
15 (13,290,502) 1,000,000 
Total 25,000,000 
Comm. Account 
@End Year 
10,063,979 
10,217,498 
(2,290,502) 
(3,290,502) 
( 4,290,502) 
(5,290,502) 
(6,290,502) 
(7,290,502) 
(8,290,502) 
(9,290,502) 
(10,290,502) 
(II ,290,502) 
(12,290,502) 
(13,290,502) 
(14,290,502) 
Under this pessimistic scenario, the insurer would pay out $25 million in losses and the notional 
commutation account would be negative, but since the term sheet did not indicate any additional 
premiums, the insurer would not be obligated to pay this back. The insurer assumes this risk 
(underwriting and timing risks). Source: RADIGAN (1996) 
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FIPs have different applications. They could be used to protect ex-post processes and 
even post-closure processes of waste facilities, mine closures, end-of-leasing operations in the 
petroleum sector, including decommissioning of offshore facilities, decommissioning of nuclear 
power plants, etc. This product offers a great incentive, which is the opportunity to anticipate 
deduction from corporate taxes. 
The allocation of up front capital used to demonstrate financial guarantee (anticipating 
costs of ex-post operations as it occurs with collateral bonds, LSCAs, and other) cannot be 
deducted from corporate taxes until expenditure actually occurs. Most of the times, when this 
condition is fulfilled, there are no more revenues to be deducted from. Discount rates offered by 
insurance companies may be better than after tax investment rate of the insured. Usually, 
insurance companies that offer FIPs have great operational experience, and can provide 
auxiliary expertise to ensured companies, reducing risks and allowing better ex -post 
performances. 
FIPs offer an efficient guarantee for ex-post liabilities including some possible 
"overruns" on long-term projects. Policies carmot be used as collateral for other ventures or 
loans. FIPs offer a single pre-paid premium, a policy that is irrevocable and free of liens, 
collaterals, and, mainly, a policy that establishes the regulatory agency as the only beneficiary of 
the policy. 
The ensured transfers all liabilities to the insurer. For this reason, there is the need for 
monitoring the insurer, creating some additional regulatory costs. Most regimes have a sector to 
oversees insurance companies, avoiding monitoring costs to the agency. 
Insurance-Guarantee Policies (IGPs) 
This insurance product is being proposed to satisfy financial assurance requirements in 
Brazil. IGPs, as other insurance policy products, transfer liabilities from the lessee to the 
msurer. The face value of the policy may not surpass 1 00% of contractually defined ex -post 
obligations. The policy is active throughout the length of the project and is only released after 
the fulfillment of all ex-post obligations. Theoretically, when the ensured party defaults, the 
beneficiary has the right to request the face value of the policy to fulfill ex -post obligations after 
the refusal of the ensured to comply with an extra-judicial warning. After paying the policy, the 
insurer has the right to pursue reimbursement from the ensured. 
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Figure 4.8. Finite Insurance structure compared to traditional environmental insurance policies, and 
different methods of funding finite insurance. 
Insurance companies have a criterion to define premium rates and the maximum policy 
value. Depending of the ensured classification, collaterals and other guarantees may be 
required. When required, guarantees will correspond to a minimum of 130% of the policy. In 
many aspects, an IGP is similar to a surety bond. However, the basic principle of an insurance 
policy is the transference of liability from the ensured to the insurer, and the principle of a surety 
bond is the guarantee of credit (CORNWELL, 2001; UNICAMP/CEPETRO, 2001). 
This is a relatively new product and further studies are required in other to identizy 
impacts on the industry and on regulators. Insurance companies usually offer 8% of the 
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As it is the case of CCCPs, PLLPs have a specific application, but cannot be used alone 
to demonstrate financial assurance. These instruments are highly recommended as auxiliary 
instruments. 
State Funds (S-Funds) 
A State fund consists of a special account established to receive funds from all companies 
involved in the exploration or production of hydrocarbon resources in a specific region. 
Payments may be based on production, accumulated revenue, or in a percent of estimated ex -post 
costs. Most commonly, this mechanism is used as a state-managed account, providing funds for 
emergency actions (accidental environmental damages) in high-density exploration and 
production areas where it may be difficult to identify the responsible party for damages that 
require prompt mitigating response. Funds are nonrefundable. If the fund is withdrawn, the 
company found responsible for the damage must promptly refund the account. 
Several instruments may be used to provide guarantee for ex -post environmental 
obligations. Unfortunately, all instruments have limitations, which can, in certain circumstances, 
expose regulatory agencies to excessive financial liabilities. Even with the best of intentions, 
some lessees may not fulfill or may only partially fulfill their ex-post obligations. In addition, 
even well designed bonding systems eventually fail, leaving the financial liability to taxpayers. 
An advantageous strategy would be establishing a safety net to cover eventual financial assurance 
breaches or loopholes. Contingency funds fall into this category. They are auxiliary mechanisms 
to go along with financial assurance systems. S-Funds may also be used for emergency actions, 
including remediation of spills and other emergencies in offshore provinces. S-Funds have been 
used in the United States with several levels of success. 
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4.9. FINANCIAL ASSURAJ."'CE SYSTEMS 
Several versions of financial assurance systems were identified and examined during this 
study. What follows is a brief description and analyzes of four U.S. bonding regimes. The 
reason for choosing them is that these regimes are the oldest bonding system in operation 
identified and, for this reason, possess the longest uninterrupted experience. The systems are: 
• Office of Surface Mining (OSM)- Coal Mining 
• Bureau of Land Management (BLM) - Hardrock Mining 
• Bureau of Land Management (BLM) - Onshore Petroleum 
• Minerals Management Services (MMS)- Offshore Petroleum 
4.10. THE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE SYSTEM IN THE US COAL MINLJIIG INDUSTRY 
(US OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT) 
Within the coal-mining sector, performance bonds used to guarantee closure operations 
are know as reclamation bonds, closure bonds, and rehabilitation bonds. The following bonding 
regime description was obtained through interviews with OSM personnel (OSM, 2000c; 
STOKES, 2000; BRYAN, 2000). The OSM of the US Department of the Interior was created 
with the objective of protecting the enviromnent during coal mining and guaranteeing that the 
land is reclaimed when operations cease. The agency was created by former President Jimmy 
Carter with the signature of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 
The OSM has approximately 650 employees nationwide and works in partnership with 
producing states. The primary responsibility for regulating surface coalmine reclamation belongs 
to the states themselves. Twenty-four coal-producing states23 exercise this responsibility. For 
the remaining states (Tennessee and Washington), federal lands and Indian Reservations the 
OSM issues coal-mining permits, conducts the inspections, and manages enforcement 
responsibilities. 
The OSM's current annual budget is approximately US$ 273 million. With that sum, the 
agency assists states surface mining programs and pays 100% of the costs for restoring 
abandoned mine lands that were left unreclaimed before the present regulation. Financial 
23 The following states have adopted their own coal regulatory system: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentncky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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resources for reclaiming abandoned mines come from tonnage-based reclamation fees (royalties) 
paid by active coal mines. 
As a practical result of the current legislation, past abuses in coal mining operations 
ceased. Coalmine lands are reclaimed as operations advance and mined lands are no longer 
abandoned without proper reclamation. Current numbers show: 
• Over 76,9 million m2 of pre-1977 dangerous abandoned mine waste piles have been 
restored to productive use 76,9 million m2 (19,000 acres); 
• Over 823,000 linear meters of dangerous cliff-like highwalls have been eliminated; 
and 
• Over 20,000 dangerous abandoned portals and hazardous vertical openings have been 
sealed. 
Since it began (1977), the Abandoned Mine Land Trust Fund collected over US$ 5 billion. 
Since 1979, when states began receiving abandoned mine land reclamation grants, over $2 billion 
has been distributed from the fund. 
General description 
Most mining regulatory regimes around the world now require mining closure procedures. 
The ex -post process usually comprehends mine rehabilitation, site reclamation, and restoration 
(establishment of vegetation). Activities comprehend underground and surface structures and 
infrastructure, site reclamation, water management, re-vegetation (restoration), topographic 
restoration (when possible), etc. Mining closure processes are divided into two distinctive 
phases: (I) an active phase, and a (2) passive phase. The active phase comprehends the 
reclamation of the site, and the passive phase, the monitoring and the waiting period for the 
establishment of vegetation. 
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) states that, before a 
company obtains a coal mining permit, it must furnish a financial assurance in the form of a 
Reclamation Performance Bond24, to ensure that funds to reclaim the site will be available in case 
24 Reclamation bonding is a long term connnitment and is a normal cost of doing business for today's coal mining 
industry 
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the company fails to complete its reclamation obligations m accordance with the approved 
reclamation plan. 
The major goal of Federal and State coal regulatory programs is to ensure that the 
environment and citizens are protected during mining and that the mined land is reclaimed and 
restored to beneficial use following mining. 
Regulatory agencies have different requirements (Federal, State, and County). The 
instruments used are similar; but there are different reclamation and closure requirements in each 
State. The Federal government does not regulate the reclamation of hardrock mines. Each State 
has its own requirements for hardrock and oil extraction (see BLM and MMS Bonding System 
descriptions). 
Permit 
Before posting a bond and getting an operation permit, a mining company must have a 
closure plan approved by the OSM. The closure process involves not only reclamation activities, 
but it must also meet Revegetation Success Standards (RSS) that are either in the permit or in the 
regulatory program. 
Mining companies must provide bonding for 100% of what would be required to reclaim 
the mine at the point of maximum disturbance25 during a given 5-year term of the permit. 
Permits are renewed every 5 years. As mining progresses, bonds are adjusted to cover new 
projected disturbances. The only way to obtain the required bond amount reduced is to apply for 
full or partial bond release as reclamation progresses. 
After all the ex -post requirements and environmental performance standards have been 
met, the reclamation bond may be released. Nonetheless, even after all ex-post obligations are 
satisfactorily met, the agency requires a 5 to 1 0-year waiting period (based upon average 
precipitation) that represents the long-term liability period for the reestablishment of vegetation 
(all standards have to be met including diversity, cover and production). 
25 Such situations could be referred as the worst-case scenario, as suggested by COSTANZA (1992) and 
CORN'WELL (1994). 
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Forms of Bonds 
The OSM acknowledges three major categories of reclamation bonds: Corporate surety 
bonds; Collateral bonds (cash; certificates of deposit; first-lien interests in real estate; letters of 
credit; federal, state, or municipal bonds; and investment-grade securities); and Self-bonds 
(legally binding corporate promises without separate surety or collateral, available only to 
companies which meet OSM financial tests). State regulatory programs will vary somewhat, but 
in general, they will accept the above categories. Some States will not incorporate the self-bond 
option. 
All forms of bond must be made payable to, or pledged to, the regulatory authority (OSM 
and/or the applicable State regulatory authority). The OSM may allow the company to post a 
combination of acceptable bond forms. The total sum of the bonds furnished must equal to the 
required bond amount. 
Bond Amount 
The amount of the bond is based on estimated third-party costs to complete the 
reclamation plan in the event of forfeiture (including profit and overhead). The regulatory 
authority sets the bond amount based on the operator's cost estimate for reclamation. 
There are strict requirements for each form of bond. Bond providers or issuers (surety 
companies and other financial institutions) are subject to the Jaws of their regulators: State 
insurance commissioners, State banking examiners, and the Comptroller of the Currency. 
Reclamation bonds cover all operations during the term of the permit. Before a permit is 
issued, a bond must be posted to cover: (I) the entire permit area; (2) the initial area of! and to be 
affected under a cumulative bond schedule; or (3) the initial area of land to be affected under an 
incremental bond schedule. Under either cumulative or incremental bond schedules, the 
company must post additional bond before affecting lands in succeeding increments or additional 
lands in accordance with the approved cumulative schedule. 
Self-bonds could be explained as OSM's acceptance of a company's assets, current and 
forecasted financial health, and compliance record as the sufficient guarantee that the company 
will perform all its ex-post environmental obligations. In order to obtain and maintain 
qualification for self-bonds, companies must sustain a tangible net worth of at least $10 million, 
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maintain fixed assets in the U.S. of at least $20 million, and either meet certain financial ratios or 
have an "A" or higher bond rating. 
All collateral posted as bond must be owned solely by the applying company, free of all 
liens, and valued at current market value not face value. The regulatory authority reduces the 
market value of collateral by a margin sufficient to cover the regulatory authority's cost to 
liquidate the collateral in the event funds are needed for reclamation. Certificates of deposit are 
negotiable collateral instruments and need to be secured from loss and theft. 
There are bond forms that will generate interest earning. As interest is earned, it may be 
deposited into a separate account, or paid to the mining company by check periodically. 
Essentially, interest is available to the mining company as it is earned. 
Surety bonds and letters of credit require payment of annual premiums or fees. Annual 
premiums are based on a percentage of the sum of the bond (or the amount of the letter of credit). 
Premiums are not based on the risk of a claim being filed. When a surety company6 writes a 
surety bond it guarantees that the mining company will reclaim the property. In case of default, 
the surety company will pay the bond sum to the regulatory authority so it can perform the 
reclamation. If a surety company is qualified, it may perform the reclamation in lieu of paying 
the bond amount. However, the surety is held to the same level of compliance including the 
long-term liability period. Corporate surety and letters of credit used to bond reclamation 
operations in the coal mining industry must be noncancelable and irrevocable, even for the failure 
to pay premiums and/or in the event of bankruptcy of the mining operator. 
Surety companies charge according to the financial standing of the mining company (net 
worth level), credit rating, and experience in the mining industry, etc. There is no Government 
control over premium rates. The Surety Association of America (SAA) recommends premium 
rates and every surety company has its own financial criteria to judge mining company 
customers. Generally, the more net worth a mining company has, the smaller the premium will 
be. 
Mining companies that have used certificates of deposit as bonding collateral over the 
ye ·:shave seen the interest rate drop from double-digit numbers in the 1970's to the current 5.0. 
T principal amount of a certificate of deposit provides the reclamation guarantee (bond) and 
the mterest is retained by the mining company. 
26 A Surety company must be licensed in the State where the operation is located. 
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In some instances, fraudulent individuals posing as representatives of legitimate surety 
companies have issued surety bonds. In order to avoid fraud, the operator may check the Surety 
Association of America's (SAA) Obligee's Guide27 and the US Department of Treasury's 
Circular 57028 • Each form of bond has its own set of legal documents required by the regulatory 
authority. Providers of the bonds (surety companies and banks) are subject to the laws of the 
fmancial industry's regulators: State Insurance Commissioners, State Banking Examiners, and 
Comptroller of the Currency. 
Besides surety, collateral, and self-bond instruments, some States have OSM -approved 
alternative bonding systems in the form of Bond Pools where mining companies pay a regular 
fee based on tons of coal produced and/or acres permitted. The funds accumulate and are used to 
reclaim any site where a member of the consortium fails to reclaim (bond forfeiture). Bond pool 
systems are a combination of the conventional bonds (which guarantee the most costly part of 
reclamation), and bond pool funds (which cover only the final stages of reclamation). 
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) also provides a 
variety of financial instruments for a variety of area and staged systems for posting bonds. 
Mining companies may post bonds to cover the entire permit area for the term of permit up front, 
or post bond to cover the initial increment of land to be affected during the term of permit, or post 
bond to cover a discreet area of land within the permit area (incremental bonding). The OSM 
must pre-approve an incremental bonding scheme. Prior to affecting subsequent increments of 
disturbance, additional bond must be posted by the mining company. 
Up until 2000, approximately 75% of the bonds covering coal-mining operations were 
corporate surety bonds. Small operations with bond amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars 
tend to use certificates of deposit and other assets. Some individual bond amounts in excess of 
US$ I 00 million are typically in the form of corporate surety bonds, letters of credit or self-
bonds. Presently, there are approximately US$ 5 billion coal reclamation bonds in place in the 
United States. Each State has its own database of bonding information. These tend to be updated 
to show the current amounts but rarely keep historical records. 
One of the major public concerns when the bonding concept is first introduced involves 
the maintenance of bond and its provider's integrity during long periods (e.g. 30-year projects). 
27 Surety Association of America's Bond Authenticity Program Obligee's Guide: http://www.surety.org/obliguid.htm 
28 U.S. Department of the Treasury"s Approved Sureties Listing Treasury Circular 570: 
http://www.fins.treas.gov/c570/index.html 
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The Federal Government relies on the insurance/surety industry regulators (State Insurance 
Departments) to regulate the financial requirements so that surety companies are solvent, 
financially secure, for the duration of the bond. If an Insurance Department finds that a company 
no longer meets financial tests, the company may be closed/liquidated. In addition, only sureties 
that are listed in the U.S. Treasury as being financially qualified can issue surety bonds on 
Federal properties. The Treasury evaluates all listed sureties armually and armounces to the 
public if a surety company no longer qualifies to be listed. Mining companies must replace 
bonds written by surety companies that are liquidated or taken off this list. 
One of the worst foes of the coal mining industry is the formation Acid Mine Drainage 
(AMD) (STOKES, 2000). The necessary attention to this important issue is not yet on the 
official environmental agenda in Brazil, but it does not diminish the severity of such condition. 
Once generated, AMD triggers more AMD and it may continue for centuries. Mitigation 
operations may cost millions. The US and Canadian Governments and companies have directed 
significant resources on innovative technologies and treatment techniques. Canada has 
established a program named Mine Environment Neutral Drainage (MEND), in which a number 
of stakeholders gathered together to develop technologies to control acidity drainage from mines, 
allowing significant environmental and economic benefits (CANADA, 1996). 
What would be the OSM response upon the anticipation of AMD for a specific project? 
Would surety companies risk the possibility of assuming perpetual treatment for AMD? The 
OSM will not issue a permit for a coal mine site where AMD is anticipated. If unanticipated 
AMD occurs, the mining company must set up a trust fund, obtain insurance, or find a surety 
willing to issue a surety bond for long-term coverage. The OSM has a specific policy statement 
regarding AMD. 
Understandably, cash is rarely given to the OSM to hold as financial assurance. Cash is 
not an efficient way to finance long-term operations with high reclamation costs. One or more 
surety bonds would likely cover a long-term commitment, a trust fund where money is deposited 
armually in escrow, letters of credit, or perhaps some kind of environmental insurance. In 
situations where cash is used, it would either be placed in an earmarked State/Federal treasury 
account assigned to the applicable government agency or it could be placed in a bank in a 
federally insured account under an Escrow Agreement between the mining company, the bank, 
and the agency. Depending on where it is located, it would either be managed by the State's 
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fiscal staff if the money is in the State treasury (no interest would be earned), or the escrow agent 
at the bank would manage it. The escrow agreement would specify that the State or Federal 
agency have full control over the account until it is released after reclamation. 
Sometimes it is difficult for people having their first glance at bonding systems to 
understand that the resources set aside as performance bonds cannot be used to cover reclamation 
costs when reclamation operations begin. A mining company cannot use the deposited cash to 
fund the reclamation. The company has to pay for reclamation out of operating costs. After 
successful reclamation and release of the bond, the money is returned to the mining company. 
Bonds such as certificates of deposit, letters of credit, investment grade securities, and 
real estate collateral can all be held for long periods. Certificates of deposit are set up to be self-
renewing so that when they mature, they roll over for the next term( s ). Letters of credit are 
typically issued with a one-year term but may contain an evergreen clause that allows the Jetter of 
credit to roll over into the next term unless the bank gives the agency prior 90-days notice. If the 
bank does not roll it over, the mining company must replace it with something else before it 
expires, or stop mining and start reclaiming. 
Real Estate could also be held for the long term but the mining company would have to 
own the property in fee, free and clear of any liens. The mining company would have to provide 
the agency with annual market value appraisals and updated title certificates to assure the 
property is holding its value. The market value of pledged real estate (under a Deed of Trust) 
must always be enough to cover the reclamation amount and liquidation costs if there were a 
forfeiture of the bond. 
Investment-grade securities such as U.S. Treasury Bills/Notes would be purchased with a 
long maturity period to avoid the need for frequent substitution in order to keep earning the 
interest. 
Self-bonds are like the Financial Test arrangements under the EPA regulations. If a 
mining company can meet certain net worth, fixed asset level, certain financial ratios (like assets 
to liabilities), it may apply with the agency to self-guarantee its reclamation without a separate 
commercial surety. Self-bonding is discretionary with the regulatory agency. Accordingly, a 
company that meets all financial tests may be denied if it does not have a good compliance 
record, or if it has a threatening pending lawsuit, for instance. Self-bonding requires the signing 
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of a contract known as an Indemnity Agreement, which is a promise to either perform the 
reclamation or pay the amount to the regulatory authority. 
The OSM offers several options for companies allowing flexibility, meeting all applicant 
companies needs. According to the OSM, flexibility does not imply that anyone can get into the 
coal mining business: "if a company cannot provide the expected guarantee, it will not be 
welcome into the business". It is one way of eliminating environmental risk. Usually large and 
financially healthy companies will end-up paying smaller bond amounts, since they are able to 
meet financial tests required by self-bonds, but such companies have strong financial motives not 
to forfeit their bond. 
Analysis of the OSM bonding system 
The OSM is the branch of the U.S. Department of Interior that regulates coal exploration 
and production, and oversees the environmental protection during these activities, ensuring that 
affected areas are rehabilitated after closure according to standards adopted in 1977, when the 
agency was created. 
The OSM bonding system is clearly aimed at safeguarding the agency against costs 
related to the proliferation of abandoned areas (literary; with undefined ownership). A great 
portion of these areas presents AMD problems requiring onerous and costly rehabilitation 
operations, or perpetual treatment (indefinite control of produced acidity). 
In addition to AMD problems, the agency fights a permanent battle with a excessive 
number of litigious actions against the agency in which affected communities blame the OSM for 
problems inherited by insolvent and/or irresponsible operators. 
The OSM bonding system does not require financial bonds, only a performance bond in 
the value of I 00% of rehabilitation costs plus indirect costs such as third-party profit and 
overhead costs. 
Among the four systems emphasized in this study, at the Federal level, OSM's offers the 
widest level of instrument flexibility to participating companies, offering a generous portfolio of 
instruments, allowing a large spectrum of participants, from independent operators (small scale) 
to large corporations. Notwithstanding offering considerable flexibility, the level of success of 
the OSM bonding system is commendable. The main reason for this success is the methodology 
used to define the bond amount, which corresponds to the real costs of mine reclamation, offering 
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an adequate incentive for compliance. It has been observed throughout the preparation of the 
present work that, most of the times, the value of the bond is more important than the type of 
bonding instrument used. 
Bonds are required as prerequisites for licensing and will only be released by the agency 
upon the fulfillment of all ex -post obligations in accordance with the approved reclamation plan, 
and after the observance of a waiting period in which the agency determines if the risk of residual 
liabilities is acceptable and if the vegetation has been successfully reestablished. 
One of the advantageous characteristics of the sector is that reclamation operations can be 
performed concomitantly with mining activities (phased reclamation). Consequently, operators 
can plan for phased-production, reducing the values of bonds and the period capital is allocated. 
The accommodating portfolio of financial instruments acceptable as bonds by the OSM 
includes: corporate surety bonds, escrow accounts, cash, Certificates of Deposit, Letters of 
Credit, Treasury bonds, real estate, collateral of different assets, pool bonds, self bonds, among 
others. Though the efficiency of the OSM bonding system is evident, the pile of lawsuits remains 
bulky. A preliminary analysis indicates the following causes for the current scenario: 
• Coal production is an activity accessible to small and independent operators, attracting 
all sorts of participants, including high-risk ones. 
• Producing areas are usually easily accessible, allowing the uncomplicated extraction 
and transportation. However, these areas are in great part within inhabited areas, 
exposing communities to risks and allowing easy public scrutiny. 
• Coal is commonly associated with other mineral bodies with high tendency to produce 
AMD. 
• The US economy depends significantly on energy produced with coal. Consequently, 
there is a noticeable political pressure to keep the attractiveness and competitiveness 
of this sector, especially during times of high energy prices and international 
instability. 
• The OSM asserts that if, during the exploration and planning phase, the possibility of 
AMD formation is identified, the project license is rejected. However, OSM criteria 
seem considerably subjective and AMD problems are still common. Indeed, this is 
one of the main problems related to lawsuits, in which the agency is blamed by the 
public of negligence in allowing the licensing of high-risk projects. 
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• Another factor may be the excessive flexibility offered to small and independent 
operators. If a mechanism to reduce the participation of high-risk operators were in 
use, probably future lawsuits would be significantly reduced. 
4.11. BONDING SYSTEM FOR THE US OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 
DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAM (US MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICES) 
This item summarizes, describes and explains the MMS bonding system applied in the 
U.S. OCS oil and gas, and sulphur leases (MMS, 2000; MIRABELLA, 2000; MARTIN, 2000, 
WILLIAMS, 2000). Figure 4.9 shows the schematics of the MMS bonding system. 
The MMS is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Interior that manages the country's 
natural gas, oil, and mineral resources of the OCS, and collects, accounts for, and disburses about 
US$ 6 billion in revenues each year from offshore mineral leases and from onshore mineral 
leases on Federal and Indian Lands (MMS, 1999). The MMS regulates the offshore oil sector by 
overseeing drilling and production matters, pipeline operations, emergency shutdown systems, 
inspection and testing of production and drilling equipment, decommissioning platforms, and 
investigating oil pollution (OCS Lands Act). 
Throughout the regulatory-making process, the MMS accepted the participation of the 
industry and other stakeholders. Contributions that did not jeopardize public's best interest were 
accepted by the MMS. In addition, worthy of mentioning is that, the MMS effort to make rules 
accurate and comprehensible by providing online easy-to-read revisions that maintain technical 
accuracy, and do not alter the substance of the law. The result is an efficient regulation that 
provides adequate flexibility for companies to meet bond requirements and ensures that 
companies adequately fund their ex-post environmental obligations. 
Among the main objectives of the MMS are: 
• Ensuring that companies are financially capable of completing all ex -post obligations, 
safeguarding government and taxpayers by achieving a reasonable degree of protection 
from default by a company at a minimum increase in regulatory costs including, costs 
for lease, permit, or pipeline operations, and eventually, final cost to the public; 
• Protecting the environment from potential harm resulting from a company's failure to 
carryout proper ex -post environmental obligations in a timely fashion, including: well 
abandonment and site clearance operations; 
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MMS Bond Flowchart 
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• Requiring bond coverage for holders of Geological and Geophysical (G&G) permits 
(deep stratigraphic test well drilling) and authorizing a demand for supplemental bonds 
for holders of G&G permits or pipeline right-of-ways; and 
• Selecting a method for attaining such goals with fairness to all stakeholders 
guaranteeing that all ex-post operations are completed in a satisfactory manner. 
In the present MMS regulation, all co-lessees and operating rights owners are liable for 
compliance with all terms and conditions of their OCS leases. When large producing companies 
transfer OCS leases to smaller companies (some marginally financed), the risk of default and 
non-satisfactory completion of ex-post obligations usually increases. To avoid such risk, all 
parties involved in the negotiation (the assignor of the OCS lease and the new lessee) will be held 
responsible for the compliance of all ex -post obligations related to the facilities the original 
assignor installed. 
General Bonds 
The following falls under the main financial bond category, but are treated by the MMS 
as general bond requirements. General bond requirements are the same for all applicants: 
• Lease Bond: A US$ 50,000 single lease or US$ 300,000 areawide bond along 
with the submittal of an operational activity plan. A lessee does not need to provide 
this bond if an applicable lease or areawide bond is in place in accordance with one of 
the following, higher requirements. 
• Exploration Bond: A US$ 200,000 lease or US$ 1,000,000 areawide bond along 
with the submittal of a proposed Exploration Plan (EP). A lessee does not need to 
provide this bond if an applicable lease or areawide bond is in place in accordance 
with one of the following, higher requirements. 
• Development and Production Bond: A US$ 500,000 lease or US$ 3,000,000 
areawide bond along with a proposed Development and Production Plan (DPP), or a 
Development Operation Coordination Document (DOCD). 
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Supplemental Bonds 
Evidently, ex-post costs will be higher than the US$ 500,000 financial bond amount 
posted by the company. For this reason, the MMS may require additional security (a 
supplemental bond or bonds) whenever the cost to meet all potential present and future lease 
obligations surpass the amount of the general bond (US$ 500,000), except when the company, or 
one of the current lessees, demonstrate to the satisfaction of the MMS financial capability to meet 
the obligations. 
Some of this supplemental bond will not fall precisely under the category of performance 
bonds, for corresponding to an insufficient amount to guarantee the performance of all ex -post 
obligations. However, this waiver granted by the MMS to companies that are able to 
demonstrate financial capability, can be understood as a form of Self-bond. Companies required 
to post a supplemental bond correspondent to 0% to I 00% of estimate ex -post operation costs 
may be understood as a partial self-bond "supplemented" by the amount it was not able to 
demonstrate being capable of paying if ex-post operations were to be performed at that moment. 
In order to provide a more flexible and, at same time, efficient regulatory framework, the 
MMS has established rules for the acceptance of Lease-Specific Abandonment Accounts (LSAA) 
and third-party guarantees. In recent years, the MMS has set a higher and more realistic level of 
bond coverage to the holder of a Geological and Geophysical (G&G) exploration permit to drill 
deep stratigraphic test wells and also authorizes a demand for a supplemental bond from the 
holder of a G&G permit or pipeline right-of-way. All situations are analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis by the MMS. 
If a company decides to use third-party guarantees, the guarantor will not be required to 
qualify as a surety with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) but it must agree to fully 
perform all lease obligations without the dollar limitation permitted to sureties, as stated by the 
MMSrule. 
When a company is able to satisfactorily furnish evidence of its financial strength and that 
all ex-post obligations will be met, the MMS will not require additional bonds. If the financial 
strength of the company is considered not satisfactory to guarantee completion of all ex -post 
obligations, then the MMS will require the posting of additional bonds to cover all potential 
liabilities. All projects are susceptible to reviews. The supplemental bond amount may be 
increased if the company takes on new activities. Likewise, it may be decreased if the company 
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completes any part of its abandonment and/or decommissioning plan that reduces its potential ex-
post liability. There is a great incentive for the research of innovative technology in this area. If 
a company can provide evidence, for instance, that the cost for removal of a platform installation 
is much less than MMS previous stipulation, the requested supplemental bond amount may be 
reduced. Note that the general bond amount (US$ 500,000) must be maintained until the lease 
ends and all ex-post obligations have been successfully met, regardless of supplemental bond 
ISSUeS. 
The MMS will consider several parameters in order to estimate the total cost of ex -post 
obligations, including: 
• Financial (e.g. financial strength and credit rating); 
• Cost estimates (e.g. well plugging and abandonment, and platform removal and disposal); 
• Compliance parameters (e.g. decommissioning compliance record); 
• No abandonment/decommissioning reasons: possibility that the company may get behind 
in paying its due royalties. 
Supplemental Bond Procedures 
According to the MMS boding rule, a company will be required to provide additional 
securities, supplemental bonds, when the estimate expenditure to achieve all potential present and 
future lease obligations surpasses the general bond amount. 
If one of the current lessees can demonstrate financial capability to meet all financial 
obligations, including: rents, royalties, plugging and abandonment costs, and other necessary 
operations to ensure performance of regulatory requirements; the supplemental bond will not be 
required (waiver or self-bonding mechanism). 
Assessment of Financial Strength 
What follows is a summary of MMS procedures (applied to all OCS Regions) used in 
assessing the financial strength of OCS lessees in other to implement supplemental bond 
requirements. 
Additional security will be for an amount not more than the full amount of ex -post costs 
in cases when none of the lessees can demonstrate the fmancial capability and strength to carry 
out present and future obligations. 
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Reviews 
Reviews of Cumulative Potential Lease Abandonment Liabilities (CPLAL) are performed 
when requested or when necessary (at any time). The MMS will review all lessee's general and 
supplemental bonds, cumulative liabilities, and financial strength. 
a. Subsequent reviews may be conducted when a company requests approval for: 
• Assignment of the lease record title interest (lessee of record), or a portion of the 
record title interest in a lease; 
• Significant revision to an approved EP; 
• DPP or a significant revision to an approved DPP; 
• DOCD or a significant revision to an approved DOCD; 
• Application for a pipeline Right-Of-Way (ROW) or modification to an existing 
pipeline ROW; 
• Assignment of record title interest of an existing or approved pipeline ROW permit 
with platform amenities; and 
• Significant revision to an approved pipeline installation plan for a pipeline having 
platform amenities. 
b. At MMS 's discretion, it may conduct reviews: 
• Periodically; 
• When it becomes aware of information that indicates a change in the financial strength 
of the company or potential cumulative liability; 
• When it issues Notices of Incidents of Noncompliance (NIN) for incidents related to 
safety, environmental, non-payment of royalty, or other violations of MMS 
regulations; and/or 
• A lessee takes an action that causes the MMS to initiate a rev1ew and then the 
company withdraws the action. At MMS' s discretion, it may carry the review of the 
need for additional bonds to completion. 
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Evidence of Financial Strength and Reliability 
If a company meets all the following conditions, the MMS will not require supplemental 
bonds, unless it determines that the financial or operational history of the company justifies that a 
bond is needed to ensure that the company will meet all ex-post obligations: 
a. If the estimated cumulative potential ex-post liability is less than or equal to 25% of the 
most recently available and independently audited calculation of the company's net worth, the 
MMS will not require a supplemental bond if the company meets the additional criteria bellow (b 
or c) and shows adequate reliability as evidenced by the following: 
• Experience: number of years of successful operations and production of oil and gas 
(or sulphur) in the OCS or in the onshore oil and gas industry; 
• Financial: credit ratings, trade references, and verified published sources; 
• Moral/Compliance: record of compliance with the current and previous governing 
laws, regulations, and lease terms; and 
• Other: items that indicate fmancial strength or reliability. 
b. If a company produces fluid hydrocarbons in excess of an average of 20,000-barrel oil 
equivalents (BOE29) per day from its OCS leases, based on MMS's calculation of company's 
production for the most recent 12 months for which data and information are available. 
c. If a company can demonstrate financial strength to carry out present and future 
financial obligations. The company may exhibit financial capacity by providing audited financial 
statements, including an independent auditor's report, balance sheet, and profit and loss sheet. 
This audit must demonstrate that the lessee falls within one of the criteria identified below: 
• Stockholders equity or net worth has a minimum value of US$ 50 million but does not 
exceed US$ 100 million, the current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) is equal to or 
greater than 1.0, and the debt to equity ratio (total liabilities/net worth) is less than or 
equal to 2.5. 
• Stockholders equity or net worth has a minimum value of US$ 100 million but does 
not exceed US$ 150 million, the current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) is equal 
29 BOE for natural gas: 5.62 thousand cubic feet of natural gas= 1 barrel of oil equivalent (BOE), as measured fully 
saturated at 14.73 psi and 15.6° Celsius (30 CFR 250.1203-b). 
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to or greater than 0.75, and the debt to equity ratio (total liabilities/net worth) is less 
than or equal to 3.0. 
• Stockholders equity or net worth has a minimum value of US$ 150 million, the 
current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) is greater than 0.50, and the debt to equity 
ratio (total liabilities/net worth) is less than or equal to 3.0. 
d. The determination of financial strength is valid for one year, but it can be extended for 
one year at a time if: 
• An independent accountant submits verification of the company's current financial 
capacity at least 60 days prior to the expiration of the current determination; and 
• The company continues to meet the previous criteria. 
Determination of the Cumulative Ex-Post Liabilities 
The required supplemental bond will be equal to the cost of meeting all potential present 
and future lease obligations including rents, royalties, and amount of plugging and abandonment 
costs necessary to ensure performance of regulatory requirements, as mentioned before. 
a. The MMS will estimate the amount of cumulative abandomnent liability including the 
lessee's obligations to plug and abandon wells, remove platforms and other facilities, and restore 
the lease to its original condition by clearing the obstructions from wells, platform sites, and 
ROWs. The estimate is based on the assumption that all facilities will be removed and 
abandoned onshore (total decommissioning). 
b. Estimates are based on available historical costs (MMS database). The company may 
provide additional information in order to assist estimate ex-post costs. When providing 
additional data, the company should explain the basis for the data. The MMS will estimate costs 
as follows: 
• Plugging and abandoning a borehole will cost US$ 100,00030 per borehole for all 
water depths. 
• Costs for dismantling and abandoning a platform will vary with water depth 
according to Table 4.4. 
• Costs for clearing a lease will vary with water depth according to Table 4.4. 
30 Estimate provided by both the MMS and Byrd and Twatchem (1999) 
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TABLE 4.4. MMS ESTIMATED EX-POST COSTS ACCORDING TO WATER DEPTH 
Water depth of 46 meters 
or less 
US$ 400,000 
Water depths of 46 meters 
or less 
$300,000 
Estimated decommissioning 
Water depth between 46 Water depth between 70 and Water depth of90 meters 
and 70 meters 90 meters or more 
US$ 600,000 US$ 1,250,000 
Estimated cost of site clearance 
Water depths between 46 
and 7 6 meters 
$400,000 
US$ 2,000,000 + 
Water depths of76 meters 
or more 
$500,000 + 
Since developments in the continental shelf of many petroleum provinces have reached the 2,000 meters mark, the 
concept of deep waters has been somewhat altered and the terminology ultra-deep waters has been frequently 
used. Source of data: MMS (2000d) 
c. The MMS will use the following procedure to estimate the need for and amount of 
supplemental bonds: 
• IdentifY all leases being held by the company. 
• Apply lease specific bonds (i.e., lease specific general bonds, lease specific 
supplemental bonds, and lease specific guarantees) to identified leases. 
• Exclude from the company's lease abandonment and clearance liability calculation, 
for the purpose of supplemental bond determination, up to the full amount of the 
clearance liability for any leases for which the MMS has determined that one or more 
co-lessees have such financial strength that it is not necessary to require submission of 
a supplemental bond. The MMS will exclude less than the full amount in cases where 
it is determined that additional security is needed as a result of previous financial or 
operational record. 
• Deduct a reserve account for the Royalty Management Program (RMP) from the 
general bonds on file. The MMS will credit this account $50,000 per lease or 
$300,000 per area-wide bond on file. 
• Apply the remaining general area-wide bonds, or blanket bonds, to leases m 
chronological order beginning with the lowest lease numbers on file. 
• After calculating the remaining potential liability, the MMS will evaluate the 
financial strength and reliability of the company and the need for supplemental bonds 
and the amounts will be determined. 
• Request lease-specific supplemental bonds from the company. 
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d. The company may provide detailed information on existing leasehold facilities in order 
to assist the agency's evaluation. The company may also provide evidence to support an 
adjustment in MMS's estimate of company's cumulative potential abandonment and clearance 
costs. That evidence may include: 
• The itemized data and information by lease used as a basis for company's estimate 
of the cumulative potential abandonment and clearance costs represented by wells 
and facilities on company's leases. 
• The itemized data and information by lease on which a third-party bases its estimate 
of company's cumulative potential lease abandonment and clearance costs. 
e. When conducting a subsequent review of the need for a supplemental bond, the MMS 
analysis will consider the number of wells drilled or plugged and abandoned in the time that has 
elapsed since the last review of company's cumulative potential liabilities, the number of platform 
installations or removals since the last review, changes in the amount and value of hydrocarbons 
being produced, the projected rates of oil and gas production, inflation, and other changes in the 
market conditions. The objective of the MMS review and analysis is to ensure that supplemental 
bond coverage or alternate form of security provided is adequate to cover potential lease 
abandomnent and clearance liabilities. 
Compliance with Requirements to Provide a Supplemental Bond 
A company may submit and maintain supplemental bonds in the following ways: 
a. Submitting LSAA supplemental bonds, U.S. Treasury Securities, or an alternate form 
of supplemental security approved by the MMS (MMS, 2000). If the value of the company's 
security falls below the level of the supplemental bond required, or if the U. S. Treasury no 
longer certifies the issuer, the company must notifY the MMS within 15 days. 
b. Submitting, with MMS's prior approval, a LSAA funding plan according to 30 CFR 
256.56. The plan must include the following: 
• An initial payment into the LSAA that is generally equal to or greater than 50% of 
MMS's estimate of the cumulative potential lease abandomnent and clearance liabilities. 
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• A prescribed time schedule for making specified incremental payments (e.g., monthly 
payments) in amounts that will ensure that the amount in the LSAA will increase at a 
faster rate than the rate at which the originally recoverable reserves are being produced. 
• Commitment by the financial institution in which the Jessee established the LSAA to 
notif'y the agency of the date and amount of the initial deposit and of each subsequent 
incremental payment. 
• Submitting a risk insurance policy to the agency covering residual liabilities in the 
event of any catastrophic failure that prevented the completion of remaining payments. 
c. The company must immediately submit, and maintain, a supplemental bond in an 
amount equal to the remaining portion of MMS's estimate of the amount of company's 
cumulative potential lease ex-post liabilities in the event the company fails to: 
• Make the initial payment into the LSAA; or 
• Timely deposit into the LSAA the amount agreed. 
LSAA Steps (example) 
• Total Supplemental Bond Payment= US$ 5,000,000. 
• Initial payment = 50% of required bond. Since 50% is greater than the percentage 
of the recoverable hydrocarbons originally in place that MMS projects will be 
produced by the end of Year 1. 
• By the end of year 3, the company will have produced 60% of the original 
recoverable reserves. The fund will need to have not Jess than 60% of the total 
supplemental bond (US$ 3,000,000 = 60% x US$ 5,000,000) by the start of year 3. 
• By the end of year 4, the company will have produced over 80% of the recoverable 
reserves originally in place. The LSAA will need to have the full US$ 5,000,000 by 
the end of year 4. Quarterly payments of US$ 156,250 during the 4-year period will 
increase the fund to US$ 5,000,000 by the end of year 4. 
Using Third-Party Guarantees Instead of Supplemental Bonds 
The company may submit a third party guarantee in lieu of a supplemental bond. The 
guarantee must be provided by a third party (guarantor) who will guarantee compliance with all 
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lease obligations. There are severe regulations involving the acceptance of third-party guarantees. 
The Agency will accept third-party guarantees if the guarantor and the indemnity agreement are 
considered satisfactory. 
Termination of Bond, Guarantee, or Determination that a Supplemental Bond is Not 
Necessary 
The Agency has the right to deny a company's request for finding that submission and 
maintenance of a supplemental bond is not necessary, the agency has knowledge that recent or 
anticipated future events may adversely affect the Iessee's/lessees' ability to comply with current 
and/or future lease obligations. The MMS may also require supplemental bonds on any leases, 
regardless of any prior determination, if it is determined that the operator has not fully and 
consistently complied with regulations. 
a. When any of the following occur, the company needs to immediately take necessary 
action to meet these requirements. If the company does not, the MMS may issue a civil penalty, 
stop operations on the lease, or take any other action authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (OCSLA) or the implementing regulations. 
• Supplemental bonds are required when the MMS had previously determined that 
company's financial strength was sufficient that the MMS did not require a bond. In 
such cases, the MMS will give the company a minimum of 20 days notice before 
requiring a supplemental bond. 
• The third party guarantor ends the period of the guarantee. 
• The bonding company ends the period of bond protection. 
• The value of company's security falls below the level of the required bond. 
• The U. S. Treasury no longer certifies that the issuing company. 
b. If the company chooses to provide a LSAA instead of providing a bond, the MMS may 
allow the company with 70 additional days to prepare and allow the MMS to review a plan for 
incremental payments and to add funds to the account, according to the plan. 
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Analysis of the MMS bonding system 
The MMS is a Branch of the U.S. Department of Interior and regulates exploration, 
development, and production of oil and gas in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (where the costal 
State jurisdiction ends, approximately three miles from state coastlines). Just in the GOM OCS, 
the MMS is responsible for over 6,000 concessions. The current MMS bonding system was 
established between 1989 and 1991, after an administrative separation of the BLM. This bonding 
system has its roots in the very same BLM system. During 1989 and 1991, a comprehensive 
alteration of the former BLM system was made aimed at adjusting the old rules to the current 
offshore sector. The establishment of the supplemental bonding rules (performance bonds) was 
prepared in 1993. 
The MMS bonding system consists of bond requirements in all project phases. An 
estimation of ex -post costs in the concession area determines the value of the bond required. 
Instruments accepted by the MMS are corporate surety bonds, U.S. Treasury Bonds that may be 
negotiable at any time with a cash value that corresponds to the value of the guarantee. 
The MMS asserts that will analyze any proposal for the acceptance of alternative financial 
instruments, but assumes that, so far, no exceptions to the small list of acceptable instruments 
were made. The MMS also reserves the right to require additional coverage in the form of 
supplemental bonds at its own criteria. 
4.12. THE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE SYSTEM IN THE US HARDROCK MINING 
INDUSTRY (US BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT) 
The BLM (Hardrock Mining) is a Branch of the U.S. Department of Interior and regulates 
mining exploration and production. Bonding regulations vary greatly from state to state, but 
generally, bonds are required per area used. At the National level, bonds have been used since 
1994, but with poor results, according to observations made during the present study. The BLM 
is under intense criticism from society and NGOs (NWF, 2000; MPC, 2000). The environmental 
liability is significantly high. Rehabilitation costs estimates at national level are many times 
superior to the amount currently secured in the form of bonds. 
Undeniably, the most problematic situation concerning the application of bonding 
mechanisms among the four bonding systems studied is the BLM - Hardrock Mining. The 
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current regulatory system is complex and allows excessive confusion among jurisdictions and 
state and federal regulations. 
Hardrock mining operations have the potential of causing extensive environmental and 
social impacts. The BLM bonding system suffers throughout the sector, from small-scale 
operations, which cause elevated damage but are not included in the bonding regulation, to large 
operations which generate a great deal of rock burden, AMD, suspended particles, deforestation, 
visual impacts, among other impacts. 
In most cases, bond requirements are insufficient to cover all ex-post environmental 
obligations, and, for this reason, do not generate any incentive for compliance. As a result, the 
environmental liability in the sector is high and companies that profit from the activity can easily 
exonerate themselves from their responsibilities, imposing costs on the agency. Closure costs in 
mining areas vary significantly from state to state ($ 1,000 to $20,000 per each 4,046.931 m2 
affected). However, if the agency is obligated to perform closure operations, or subcontract a 
private operator, costs may be 50% to 500% higher. This happens mainly because state agencies, 
without any kind of verification mechanism, accept the estimates offered by operating 
companies. In addition, state authorities accept virtually any form of bonding instrument, and, in 
some cases, even projected revenue from the project being bonded. 
The BLM bonding system is under severe criticism and faces several litigious actions. 
Other problems faced by the agency include political pressure against proposals for higher bonds, 
excessive flexibility offered to operators, high monitoring costs (areas of difficult access), and a 
historical legacy of abandoned mines. 
4.13. THE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE SYSTEM IN THE US ONSHORE PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY (US BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT) 
The BLM (Onshore Petroleum), is a Branch of the U.S. Department of Interior and 
regulates exploration, development, and production of oil and gas in Federal and indigenous land. 
The agency is responsible for the inspection of over 112,000 oil and gas wells (BLM, 1992). 
This branch of the BLM is a very old agency. Preliminary studies indicate that the term "aged" is 
probably a suitable definition for the agency. Financial assurance has been required since early 
1920's and very few alterations have been made since then. The system is based on requiring 
31 1 US Acre. 
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only symbolic financial bonds, although higher bonds can be legally required. The historic BLM 
policy has been of requiring bonds only to safeguard the agency against companies getting 
behind in paying, or exonerating themselves of paying, their due royalties. 
Currently the most complex problem faced by this branch of the BLM involves orphan 
wells32. These wells were not capped, plugged, nor adequately abandoned. Other issues involve 
the great number of shut-ini3, in which production may resume depending on market conditions. 
The BLM bonding system is a textbook example of a financial assurance system based 
solely on financial bonds, in which the only objective of the mechanism is to ensure proper and 
timely payment of royalties, or, in other words, a token or symbolic value, indicating the 
intention of the candidate company in complying with royalty obligations. Incentives for ex-post 
environmental compliance are not provided by BLM requirements. 
Bonds have been required by the BLM since 1920 (US$ 5,000 per well), when the 
regulation was inaugurated. A revision of the bond amount was made in 1960 (to US$ 10,000 
per well), and it remains since then. A movement for increasing this value to $20,000 was 
launched around 1999. During interviews and conversations with BLM staff, it was apparent that 
there is an interest of the agency in reevaluating this bond amount. However, it was also evident 
that fierce opposition was encountered. Although higher bonds can be required under the current 
rule, adequate performance bonds are nonexistent. It is important to emphasize that the agency 
assumes an interest in higher financial bonds, but not in requiring performance bonds, which 
would represent the full value of ex-post costs. 
Regulators recognize that small operators often choose to default the bond instead of 
assuming ex-post costs; and, with no iocentives, the irregular interruption of projects is frequent. 
For this reason, the BLM also faces substantial litigious actions. Interesting enough is the fact 
that the agency is aware of potential environmental complications from various forms of 
contaminations caused by improper abandonment or noncompliance with ex -post obligations, 
includiog mercury contamination from old manometers used to measure gas pressure, which in 
the past have been largely abandoned in situ. 
The BLM does not offer much flexibility in what financial instruments are concerned. 
Instruments accepted are: corporate surety bonds, Certificates of Deposit, Letters of Credit, Cash, 
32 Orphan wells: wells where a responsible party cannot be identified. 
33 Shut-in wells: temporarily abandoned wells. 
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and Bonds issued by the Government (Treasury Notes). As mentioned, according to the current 
review conducted during this study, the major BLM problem is not excess of flexibility given by 
the number and forms of instruments, but lax bonding requirements (no incentive for 
compliance). The number of contractual default also confirms this. 
4.14. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR U.S. BONDING SYSTEM 
Although based in the very same 1920-regulation, the MMS regulation has been more 
realistic and objective than the rule applied by the onshore branch of the BLM. For instance, 
under the MMS bonding system: 
• The lessee that cannot demonstrate capacity to fulfill all ex-post obligations, will not 
obtain an operating license; 
• Bonding instruments accepted are few, offering a limited flexibility for small and 
independent operators. As a practical result, the participation of high-risk companies 
was drastically reduced; and 
• The bonding requirement, bond amount, may be reduced or increased, depending on 
the risk offered by the candidate. 
During the relatively short time the MMS bonding rule has been in place (since 1989-
1993), the very first case of ex-post noncompliance case occurred in 200 I. In addition, due to the 
dynamic character of the offshore sector, the agency promotes some form of adjustments in the 
regulation every two or three years, reflecting corrections of any forms of evasion opportunity 
(loopholes) identified in the system throughout that period. With this approach, the MMS has 
very little problems and regulatory costs are low. At the beginning, lessees resisted, but the 
agency persevered firmly and companies adapted themselves to the stringentness of the new 
requirements. During all this time, there has been only one litigious action against the MMS 
(2000e). 
The onshore branch of the BLM, in contrast to the MMS, bears significant liabilities that 
were inherited from very old operations; in addition, the BLM has to deal with very complex 
issues of leases in Federal and Indigenous lands. A great part of the BLM concessions are 
marginal fields and in the hands of small and independent operators. There are some very unique 
situations involving onshore projects. For instance, there are cases where a project owner (a 
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single project owner) contracts three or four workers and starts producing onshore petroleum 
(BLM, 2000). With a very generous regulation, which motivates evasion and a strong lobbying 
of producers, the BLM problems are significant, such as: 
• A large number of orphan wells34 in which no responsible parties can be identified, 
and idle wells35, which are inactive but not properly plugged and abandoned. 
• When oil prices are low, companies refuse to abandon wells (plugging) arguing that 
there is no capital left to do so. When prices are high, lessees argue that they cannot 
plug the wells because there are possibilities of returning to old reservoirs. 
Consequently, there are plentiful idle wells. 
• The BLM suffers with a number of litigious actions impetrated by lessees, 
municipalities, and the public. Preliminaries analysis indicates that the BLM is in a 
lose-lose situation: In order to avoid additional litigating actions and further evasions, 
the agency must yield for bargaining proposals. 
• Backed by a strong lobbying, any attempt to improve the current BLM legislation is 
frustrated. 
• Evasion of royalty payments, lack of funds for monitoring ex -post operations, and 
currently, the opposition of the executive administration36 to any requirement that 
might suggest "environmental costs" to oil producers. 
For practical purposes, studies were concentrated on more mature bonding systems, 
which could provide hands on the job information. Four American agencies were able to fulfill 
this criterion and Table 4.5 identifies their main characteristics allowing an item-by-item 
comparison. 
Observations during this preliminary assessment indicates that among the bonding 
systems studied, the MMS' s is the most efficient one. It is important to emphasize that the 
offshore oil sector presents different and more favorable characteristics than the remaining 
agencies and the areas under their jurisdictions. 
34 1992 BLM estimations indicated around 16,384 orphan wells under the jurisdiction of the agency. A general 
estimation for all state jurisdiction indicated 51,043 (Source: BLM, 1995). 
35 1992 BLM estimations indicated around 114,896 idle wells under the jurisdiction of the agency. A general 
estimation for all state jurisdiction indicated 214,894 (Source: BLM, 1995). 
36 The current President of the United States, Mr. George W. Bush, is a former independent oil producer with a lax 
environmental record. 
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The MMS deals with a scenario where monetary values are usually greater than in other 
sectors such as hardrock mining, onshore petroleum, and coal mining. Even dealing with greater 
financial responsibilities, non-compliance risks are significantly lower. These circumstances do 
not take away merits from the MMS, since the agency has established and maintained an efficient 
and viable bonding regulation. For instance, during the last 9 months of 200 I, the MMS branch 
office in the GOM region, handled 123 decommissioning applications. During 2002, 196 new 
structures were approved and placed in production areas. The same branch oversees over 6,000 
concessions and around 5,000 installations. Any modification (engineering, logistic, etc.) must 
be approved by the agency, and usually this process takes only two or three working days. The 
most interesting aspect is that a single MMS employee is responsible for the entire 
decommissioning sector (new structure approvals, shallow areas, and decommissioning) for the 
entire GOM Region. A small group handles pipelines (plugging and decommissioning) and a 
third group handles well plugging and abandonment. This allows very lean regulatory costs. 
4.15. REGULATORY ISSUES 
Do bonding requirements discriminate against small, newly-formed, and independent 
lessees? In order to obtain permission (or license), to explore, develop, and produce within 
public areas, a lessee (or operator) must sign a comprehensive contract acknowledging all ex-post 
environmental obligations. If a candidate company, a potential lessee, cannot demonstrate its 
capacity to fulfill such clauses, the regulatory agency as the designated keeper of this public 
good, is responsible for stopping this company from obtaining the lease. Allowing high-risk 
lessees would be negligence and, in countries where this criterion is not being applied, 
governments have been inheriting huge financial liabilities. Otherwise, oil companies would be 
risking precious natural resources in exchange for a profit opportunity. Bonds are aimed at 
guaranteeing the performance of operations that the lessee has already agreed on completing, as a 
basic condition for operating in this sector. If an oil company cannot demonstrate its financial 
capability to cover pre-established contractual obligations, it would not be financially equipped 
prevent, mitigate, remediate or fmancially compensate damages that may occur during the length 
of the project, consequently, it would be demonstrating that it would not be able to comply with 
contractual obligations. 
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The efficiency of a bonding system also depends on the costs required to maintain the 
regulatory role. In order to obtain some forms of bond, financial institutions will submit 
candidate companies to stringent underwriting processes. These instruments allow significant 
regulatory cost savings. Bond-issuing fmancial institutions have a direct interest in monitoring 
the financial health of their clients, operating companies; and, in case lessees default, financial 
institutions will have to assume all their client's ex -post obligations. 
Instruments offering superior flexibility and low direct costs, most of the times, will cause 
high indirect costs or higher risk to the regulatory agency. Regarding regulatory costs, gathering 
information maybe one of the most costly activities forregulators (the "information burden"): 
• Establishment of a database system to assist in the estimation and comparison of 
operations costs; 
• Assessment of new technologies and practices within the sector; 
• Hiring or forming experts in the areas of interest (i.e. bonds, decommissioning, 
insurance policies, etc.); 
• Assessing and monitoring the financial health of lessees and bond-issuing institutions 
during the length of the project. 
The applicability of bonding system must consider ongoing projects and projects near the 
end of their lives. For instance, how to enforce bonding requirements from a lessee operating a 
marginal project? What would be this lessee's capacity to fulfill recently established ex-post 
obligations? What to do if funds necessary to fulfill ex,post obligations are higher than potential 
revenue? Should a different approach or a case-by-case evaluation be applied under these 
scenarios? 
Some argue that an oil company that has been acquiring financial resources throughout its 
life must have available capital to fund even newly enforced ex-post obligations, whatever they 
maybe. 
Idle wells can be a source of great problems within the sector. Usually, agencies establish 
a period in which a well can be temporary inactive before permanent plugging and abandonment 
is required. A possible solution for this scenario would be offering incentives such as tax 
reduction and royalty relief for marginal producing projects, allowing them to be active even 
under unfavorable market conditions. This approach would extend the life of fields, reduce 
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impacts of ex-post operations, increase total oil output, and leverage investments within the 
sector. 
In the specific case of Brazil, some public construction projects reqmre bidding 
participants to contract insurance policies to guarantee the performance of projects. It is 
probably possible to use the same legal basis to promote the requirement of environmental 
insurance to be used as performance bond, although, as stated previously, there are instruments 
more efficient than insurance policies. Instruments under the escrow accounts category may 
pose a problem, since the legislation forbids governmental institutions of owning joint accounts 
with individuals. This same principle would limit the application of other instruments such as 
some pool bonds categories. Other forms of financial guarantee instruments currently in use in 
Brazil are LOCs and CDs. 
This study has identified a VIew in which some sectors of the industry believe that 
performance bonds are aimed at super compensate the regulatory agency in the event of default. 
Experience shows that regulatory agencies require bond liquidations as a very last alternative. 
The liquidation of a bond brings excessive complexity to regulators, who will have to assume a 
problematic project and fmd a subcontractor willing to undertake an unfmished and uncertain 
project. 
Another legal argument against the application of bonding instrunients is that it deprives 
the lessee of a basic universal legal principle, which is: innocence is presumed and guilt requires 
proof However, in the case of economic activities such as upstream petroleum projects, the 
probability of ex -post damage, or guilt, is 100%. Ex -post damages are indeed expected as a 
natural outcome of the activity, and then, before such activities are permitted and licenses are 
granted, a guarantee for the availability of funds to cover ex -post damages must also be of I 00%. 
Any environmental problems erupting after ex-post obligations are met should be 
denominated "residual responsibilities". Lessees surely will require from regulators some form 
of guarantee that once ex-post obligations are met, there will be an endpoint, a ticket out, to 
liabilities, and, mainly, there will be no post-closure liabilities. 
For society, oil companies will always be responsible for environmental problems, direct 
or indirect, and during or post-production. The legal debate involving residual liabilities is very 
complex and divisive. Large and historical transnational companies have intangible cost 
incentives to prompt and voluntarily deal with residual liabilities. Currently, a negative public 
162 
perception may cause considerable cash flow impacts for these large corporations. On the other 
hand, small and marginal companies would not have the same incentive, and the agency would 
probably have to fund post-closure mitigating operations. 
The oil industry has been seriously affected by environmental problems. Legislators have 
heard the public outcry and transferred their stress to regulations. Contacts made with 
representatives from large oil companies, do not feel they need bonding requirements to be 
motivated to fulfill ex-post environmental obligations, although agree that bonds are necessary to 
protect government and taxpayers from future liabilities left by other class of operators. 
Under stringent regimes, the industry complains that lessees with proven financial 
capacity should be authorized to use soft bonds, and only more vulnerable lessees would be 
obligated to provide hard bonds. The financial sector in the United States indicates that in well-
elaborated regulations, such requirements would not offer great problems to large historical 
companies. However, agencies that offer excessive flexibility accumulate a great number of 
litigious processes in which the public requires to know why sufficient resources were not 
available to guarantee the performance of ex-post operations. 
Some smaller companies prefer to allocate a certain amount of capital in collateral 
accounts receiving interest revenues rather than buying a product that requires the payment of 
nonrefundable premiums and fees. A large company undertaking a large project would prefer to 
acquire an insurance policy or a surety bond in order to receive fiscal advantages and face less 
significant opportunity costs. 
There is a common feeling among most experts, and also some regulators, that an 
accurate method of estimating ex -post operation costs and establishing bonding requirements, is 
of greater importance than defining the ultimate bonding instrument. Amongst large oil 
companies, there is also a general belief that term and conditions of licenses are more important 
than bonding requirements. Nevertheless, regulators must demonstrate to society that an 
adequate financial protection is available to safeguard taxpayers from future liabilities. 
163 
CHAPTER V- FISCAL TREATMENT- DECOMMISSIONING & BONDS 
Are ex-post expenditures tax-deductible? What kind of fiscal incentives are available to 
improve investments on innovative technologies and processes aimed at improving environmental 
performance of end-of-leasing activities and reducing ex-post expenditure? 
Are there fiscal incentives for bonding instruments? Should forther incentives be 
provided to instruments in order to reduce financial impacts on project cash flows? Is fiscal 
planning an important issue for decision makers considering bonding options? 
5.1. DECOMMISSIONING FISCAL TREATMENT- DISCUSSION 
Fiscal planning becomes more important as economic incentive mechanisms are 
increasingly being adopted by regulatory agencies around the world. As competition increases, 
environmental regulations toughen, and projects get marginal, companies are increasingly 
expected to reduce, as much as legally possible, government earnings in projects. According to 
YOUNG and MCMICHAEL (1998), the most significant negotiable factor that affects the 
performance of the project is income tax. 
Future liabilities, such as costs to meet decommissioning obligations, must be carefully 
considered in company's fmancial statements. Companies must consider how to anticipate such 
expenditures and how, whenever possible, to apply them in each year's accounts. Lower 
estimations of cost to meet ex-post obligations may provide better 1\'PVs (cash flow results). 
Lower tangible ex -post costs may provide better profits. The problem is that higher l';'PV s lead to 
higher corporate taxes. In addition, higher decommissioning estimates, may lead to higher 
financial assurance requirements. 
Companies are not the only parties impacted by high ex -post costs. Such costs involve 
direct and indirect impacts on governments, taxpayers, and society as a whole. Current tax 
structures determine that governments, and consequently taxpayers, bear part of the cost for 
decommissioning, providing tax relief for oil companies. In some countries where the debate on 
decommissioning related issues is more advanced, the matter of charging the taxpayer for 
decommissioning operations of private oil companies is being severely questioned. However, 
most regimes do provide legal basis for dividing the costs of meeting ex-post obligations between 
the state and the private sector. In some countries, the government bears the majority of the 
financial responsibility, as it is the case of Norway. 
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Deduction rates may vary significantly from country to country. In the UK, for example, 
oil companies are taxed on their earnings from oil and gas production but since decommissioning 
expenditures are allowable against taxable earnings, the UK government loses revenues 
equivalent to 50% to 70% of ex-post costs (PROGNOS, 1997). 
In Norway, government covers the greatest part of platform removal costs and companies 
cannot deduct removal expenses in their corporate income tax (NPD 1999; PHILLIPS, 1999b). 
Decommissioning obligations are not subjected to ordinary tax handling. They are kept outside 
the tax system. In any case, other costs involved in the decommissioning of installations are fully 
deductible. 
In 1975, Phillips Petroleum Norway claimed deduction for future removal costs. That 
was when NPD established its first special tax rule for decommissioning costs: "based on the 
principle of taxation, all costs are deductible but due to the uncertainties involving anticipating 
costs, no tax deduction for future costs are allowed" (PHILLIPS, 1999a; PHILLIPS, 1999b; 
NPD, 1999). 
The Norwegian Removal Grant Act (25/04/1986) states that when installations are to be 
removed, the State will bear a share of removal and disposal costs. Other ex-post obligations are 
not included in this cost sharing treatment. This Act is only applicable for expenses directly 
related to the removal and disposal of installations. Other ex -post costs such as preparation, 
assessments, well plugging, etc., are considered legitimate operation costs and are deductible 
(NPD, 1993). 
A better way of understanding this system is: "State's percent share is equal to the 
average tax rate for each licensee over the lifetime of an installation" (PHILLIPS, 1999b ). 
Payment of tax before 1975 is not included. The State share for removal costs are based on the 
estimates of each licensee. The State contribution cannot exceed accumulated paid taxes. The 
final decision is not taken by NPD, but rather by the Ministry of Finance, which defines removal 
costs. This calculation will include all years from the development of the platform up to its 
removal and disposal. The calculation does not include taxes paid when the platform was not 
installed. For instance, if the average corporate tax paid during the 20 years of operations of a 
platform was 75%, the Norwegian government will pay for 75% of the disposal costs. One 
problem that can be anticipated is, for instance, if at the time of the decommissioning of a 
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specific platform the tax rate is around 80% and the average was calculated at 75%, the company 
will loose 5% on possible deductions. 
Even losing considerable funds by allowing tax relief for ex-post expenditures, 
governments will earn tax revenues from income tax of workers and other several levies imposed 
on companies involved in ex-post environmental activities. In addition, by allowing fiscal 
incentives governments may significantly reduce the risk of noncompliance and undesirable 
environmental liabilities. 
Within this context, parameters such as decommissioning options (total or partial platform 
removal) may cause significant fiscal effects. For instance, North Sea government's expenditure, 
or the amount by which tax receipts are reduced as a result of decommissioning, amount to about 
US$ 6.3 billion in the case of total removal and between US$ 3.8 billion and US$ 5.8 billion for 
partial removal. Consequently, possible "savings" offered by partial removal options are 
somewhere between US$ I billion and US$ 2.5 billion up to the year 2020, just for North Sea 
projects. The income tax revenue generated by new jobs and related decommissioning activities, 
total about US$ 1.4 billion for total removal, which is US$ 0.1 billion and US$ 0.3 billion higher 
than in the case of partial removal (PROGNOS, 1997). 
According to these numbers, considering total and partial removal options, taxpayers from 
North Sea producing countries would save between 8% to 44% (US$ 15 million to US$ 95 
million) per year, if partial removal options were to be adopted for all installations. If total 
removal is adopted, taxpayer from North Sea producing countries will be paying for 
decommissioning up to the year 2020 between US$ 400 million to US$ 2.2 billion. 
The fiscal environment may also contribute to the adoption of even more improved 
practices. KAPOEN (200 1) suggests that in order to encourage the reutilization of redundant 
offshore installations and components, depreciation should not only apply to new business assets. 
In addition, authorities should accept that remaining partners could rollover their tax bookvalues. 
Fiscal incentives may help improve the market for used structures, mainly to be used in small 
and/or marginal projects. 
Therefore, for most tax regimes, ex-post environmental obligations, including 
decommissioning costs, are ordinary and necessary expenses. In general, such expenditures are 
tax-deductible only when services have been performed and payments have been made. When 
progressive abandonment is adopted, the same rule applies. Deductions are usually not allowed 
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for decommissioning activities carried on during non-income years (when production has 
ceased). In such situations, companies are usually allowed to carry a "credit" towards a future 
project, as it is the case in the current Brazilian fiscal regime. Some regimes offer provisions 
allowing some type of "anticipated tax-deduction provisioning" spread over a period during 
revenue-producing years. The approximate goverrnnent participation in Brazil is around 65%, 
not including bond related expenditures (BARBOSA, 2001). Figure 5.1 shows the profit-split 
between the goverrnnent and the producing companies. 
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Figure 5.1. A simplified fiscal system including bonding system. 
5.2. BOND FISCAL TREATMENT- DISCUSSION 
Within financial assurance regimes, companies depositing funds into escrow accounts 
pledged to the goverrnnent (bonds), no deduction is available until the company loses ownership 
of the funds. However, within most financial assurance regimes, if a company pays fees or 
premiums to keep surety bonds or environmental insurance po Jicies, such expenditures would be 
amortized over the time period covered by the bond. 
167 

In general, the rule for deductibility is that the expense has to be an ordinary and 
necessary business expense and not a capital expenditure (IRS, 1999). The fact that a company is 
contractually liable for ex -post expenditures or provides anticipated funds to guarantee such 
obligations (bonds), does not entitle it to deduct the cost of such services before they have in fact 
been performed. 
In Canada, Japan e South Africa, collateral bonding instruments such as escrow accounts 
that allocate upfront capital are also conferred with deductions. However, any revenue awarded 
from financial application of allocated funds (i.e. interest from escrow accounts) is subjected to 
ordinary taxation. Under more mature bonding regimes such as in Canada, there is a common 
notion among specialists and regulators that offering a net fiscal incentive is better than risking 
inheriting ex -post environmental liabilities from the mining and oil sector. Indeed, a very 
interesting study proposal would be the assessment of potential fiscal incentives for financial 
assurance instruments. 
On the other hand, some other aspects must be considered. Would further fiscal 
incentives reduce or eliminate the main motivation for compliance with ex-post obligations? If 
deductions are extended to cash collateral accounts, for instance, the main motivation for 
compliance, which is "doing it right in order to get the bonded money refunded", may be 
annulled. As a result, if a company can get its allocated capital back through tax deductions 
before the end of the project, what kind of incentive is left for compliance? Three variables can 
act as catalytic factors within bonding regimes: flexibilities demanded by the industry, 
requirements established by regulators, and risks offered by flexibilities. Providing fiscal 
incentives could be considered a form of flexibility. Figure 2.3 illustrates the dynamics of the 
bonding system where, due to public pressure, regulators establish stringent performance bond 
requirements generating direct and indirect economical impacts on the profitability of petroleum 
projects. The industry demands flexibilities that may come in the form of softer instruments, 
fiscal incentives, or lower bonding estimations. These flexibilities increase the risk of 
noncompliance triggering public concern and involvement, closing a very common cycle. 
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CHAPTER VI- DECISION TOOLS: ECONOMIC MODELS 
How to anticipate and reduce the impacts of environmental regulations, more specifically, 
financial assurance requirements, upon the profitability of offshore petroleum projects? Answer: 
developing decision tolls and economic models for managing oil project decisions involving ex-
post and financial assurance mechanisms, providing a way to anticipate economic impacts of 
several bond alternatives. 
In this chapter, two articles are presented. The first article offers an algorithm in order to 
assist decision makers, both regulators and industry, evaluate potential NPV impacts of financial 
instruments used to satisfY bonding requirements. The second article deals with potential 
financial impacts of bonding instruments on offshore oil projects. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with potential financial impacts of different bonding instruments on oil projects. 
An algorithm was prepared in order to assist decision makers, both regulators and industry, 
evaluate potential NPV impacts of financial instruments used to satisfy bonding requirements. 
Instrument option is the main variable for the proposed modeL The user will be able to chose 
between four commonly used instruments (letters of credit, prepaid collateral closure accounts, 
leasing specific closure accounts, and ex-post insurance policies). This study includes 
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simulations for three producing fields of different reserves (9 MMbbl, 53 MMbbl and 148 
MMbbl), where four financial instruments, in addition to a "no instrument" scenario, are tested 
under a proposed bonding regime. Sensitivity analysis of Net Present Value and Government 
Take value indicate ex -post insurance policies and letters of credit cause fewer impacts yielding 
significantly better payoffs. Preliminary simulations also confirm that small projects can be 
severely affected when collateral account instruments are used. 
KEY WORDS: Financial Assurance; Economic Model; Bonds 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide, several countries have adopted or are in the process of adopting financial 
assurance requirements (bonds). A number of natural resources agencies, petroleum and mining, 
have already established some form of bonding system aimed at ensuring the performance of ex-
post environmental obligations (end-of-leasing or closure requirements). Such systems can be 
seen in operation in countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and Brazil, among others (OSM, 1987; YOUNG, 1996; JAMES, 1997; MMS, 2000; OSM, 
2000b; FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2000; DTI, 2000a; ANP, 2000b; UNICAMP/CEPETRO, 
2001). 
The present study includes cash flow simulations and sensitivity analyses of four 
commonly used financial instruments: Letters of Credit, Prepaid Collateral Closure Accounts, 
Leasing Specific Closure Accounts, and Ex-post Insurance Policies. Denominations for bonding 
instruments can vary significantly. 
The first section of this paper provides an overview of bonding systems. Section two 
describes the methods, algorithms, and variables for the model. It also includes a brief 
explanation of the fiscal parameters used. Section three offers an analysis of the data resulting 
from these preliminary Petrobond simulations. 
6.2. BONDING SYSTEMS 
Current attempts of extending the lives of mature fields and turning small and marginal 
fields into profitable projects has attracted the interest of a number of risky small and recently 
established, and, possibly, marginal and spurious companies. Bonds come as a response to 
170 
environmental liability concerns, aimed at reducing the risk of noncompliance with ex -post 
environmental obligations (e.g. plugging, abandonment, decommissioning, reclamation). 
Bonds are hybrids of market mechanisms and command and control regulations. Despite 
not being pure market instruments, bonds force companies to internalize ex -post environmental 
liabilities directly into their cash flow accounting, making costs explicit to shareholders. 
Bonding systems currently in use include one or two of the following bond categories: 
Financial and Performance bonds. A financial bond does not guarantee the performance of an 
obligation. Instead, it can be compared to a token pledging, under the penalty of loosing no more 
than the amount bonded, the candidate's intention of keeping all financial commitments (e.g. 
timely payment of royalties and rents, honoring bids, etc.). A performance bond, in contrast, 
guarantees the performance of all closure obligations. In case of insolvency or default, the 
amount bonded will be available to the agency to perform all closure operations, as contractually 
required. 
Bonding instruments can come in several forms with unique attributes and requirements. 
Some forms of bonds are pledged assets of oil companies (cash, securities, real estate, escrow 
accounts, etc.); performance guarantee of a project (surety bonds); securities issued by insurance 
companies, banks or other financial institutions; some are instruments that indicate the deposit of 
cash (certificates of deposit) or the existence of a line of credit (letters of credit) (BRYAN, 1998; 
FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 1999). Other common forms of bonds are: self bonds (a type of 
fmancial test or balance sheet test), trust accounts; other forms of bank guarantees, cash bonds or 
cash deposit certificates, cash trust funds, corporate guarantees, parent company guarantees, other 
forms of third-party guarantees, deposit of securities, financial reserve, and security agreements. 
Four commonly used instruments were selected and tested by the proposed model. The 
choice of these instruments was primarily based on their applicability under the current Brazilian 
legal framework, although it can be applied to any other form of concession contract. These 
instruments are briefly described below: 
• Prepaid Collateral Closure Account (PCCA): instrument option PCCA is a three-
party irrevocable agreement. The lessee transfers assets to a financial institution (trustee) 
to be managed in behalf of a third party (the regulatory agency). The full amount of the 
bond must be deposit at once when the account is established. This collateral account 
cannot be released without the prior approval of the agency. 
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• Leasing Specific Closure Accounts (LSCA): option LSCA works like option PCCA, 
but instead of requiring upfi:ont bond disbursement, it allows the spreading of payments 
during a pre-determined period (usually four years), or until production reaches 80% of 
the recoverable reserves; whatever comes first. Since the application of option LSCA 
depends on data from recovered reserves, it is only applicable to oil producing phases 
(development/production). 
• Letter of Credit (LOC): option LOC is an instrument of collateral guarantee. A 
financial institution establishes a line of credit in behalf of the lessee guaranteeing the 
payment of the bond amount to the agency in case of default. 
• Ex-post Insurance Policy (EIP): option EIP transfers liabilities to an insurer, which 
becomes the principal payer. The insurance policy will be maintained over the entire life 
of the project. The bond will be released only upon the fulfillment of all closure 
obligations. 
6.3. METHODS 
In order to perform cash flow calculations simulating a variety of oil projects scenarios 
under different bonding regimes, an algorithm (named PETROBOND) was prepared in Visual 
Basics (version 6.0) enabling decision makers evaluate potential impacts of financial instruments 
used to satisfY bonding requirements. This algorithm was developed for the Brazilian National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP) allowing the handling of operational variables, permitting realistic 
simulations taking into consideration oil and gas production profiles, costs, investments, closure 
costs, estimated life of projects, estimated oil and gas reserves, and market variations. For further 
calculations, results are displayed in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Figure 6.1 shows the general 
algorithm layout. 
Three categories of input variables are used in the proposed algorithm: (I) operational, (2) 
financial, and (3) bond-related. Under the "operational" category, the user is required to provide 
operation parameters such as production, operational costs and capital expenditures, project life, 
and field characteristics. Appendix C Tables C.l, C.2, and C.3 provide a thorough description 
of all algorithm variables. Under the "financial" category, the user is asked to provide 
information on the applicable market scenario, fiscal regime, and other government contributions. 
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Under the "bond-related" category, the user is asked to define the desired bonding rule (an 
existing or theoretical system). 
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Figure 6.1. Macro-structure for the Petrobond Algorithm. 
The proposed model incorporates the main variables of an ordinary upstream petroleum 
project (oil price, operational costs, investments, oil type, and production schedule) determining 
the ideal rate of royalty relief for an array of input combinations. Sensitivity analyses are also 
incorporated into the model in order to test all instrument options, and potential impacts caused 
by other input variables. 
A general description of bonding mechanisms within some phases of ordinary upstream 
oil projects is explained bellow. 
Since there is no environmental risk involved in the bidding phase, the user may opt to 
require (1) no bonds, or (2) a single fmancial bond. Choices are made by keying in values inside 
the input variable window (zero to switch bonding requirements off, and the desired bond amount 
to switch requirements on). In the case of compliance, bonds are reimbursed to the lessee or 
redirect towards the next project phase (exploration phase). 
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In the exploration phase, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, the user may opt to require (1) no 
bonds, (2) a single fmancial bond, (3) a single performance bond, or ( 4) a combination of a 
financial bond and a performance bond. If the lessee decides not to develop the project, all 
exploration sites must be properly "abandoned", in accordance with closure contracts. In the case 
of compliance, the bond is released and/or reimbursed to the lessee. Otherwise, if the lessee 
decides to develop the project, the bond may be reimbursed or redirected to the next phase of the 
project (development/production phase). 
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Figure 6.2. Diagram for the exploration phase. 
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Similarly to the exploration phase, for the development/production phase the user may 
choose to require (I) no bonds, (2) a single financial bond, (3) a single performance bond, or ( 4) a 
combination of a fmancial bond and a performance bond. All ex-post closure obligations must be 
satisfactorily met before development/production bonds are released or reimbursed. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the closure and post-closure phases. In the case of compliance, 
bonds are released or reimbursed. In the case of noncompliance, bonds are forfeited and the 
agency takes all required steps to ensure compliance with all end-of-leasing obligations. The user 
may decide on requiring a post-closure extended guarantee. In this case, the 
development/production performance bond is withheld for a post-closure period of monitoring 
(e.g. 6 years). After this period, if there are no incidents, the bond is finally released and 
174 
reimbursed. Some bonding instruments may come with an additional guarantee for residual 
liability (e.g. some surety bonds). 
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Figure 6.3. Diagram for the Closure and Post-Closure phases. 
Simulations 
The performance of the Petrobond algorithm was tested on three producing fields with 
reserves of 9 MMbbl, 53 MMbbl, and 148 MMbbl. In order to assist decision makers in selecting 
the most appropriate bonding instrument, Petrobond offers: 
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• Applicability, allowing the control of variables and manipulation of parameters; 
• Flexibility, allowing the application of all options independently or combinations of 
options; 
• Versatility, allowing the reproduction of a particular regulatory framework; 
• User-friendly, providing help menus for user not acquainted with all aspects of 
bonding systems; 
• Expediency, allowing the evaluation of best instrument performance under the 
perspective of regulators or the industry. 
Table 6.1 indicates project parameters for all simulations. The following describes the 
hypothetical38 bonding regime proposed to rule algorithm simulations performed under this 
present study: 
Financial bonds are required in every phase, for all projects. Performance bonds are only 
required in the exploration and development/production phases. Bond amounts are indicated on 
Table 6.2. Post-closure operations will not be required; consequently, extended guarantees to 
cover eventual residual liabilities will not be necessary. For all simulations, it is assumed that 
lessees fully comply with all end-of-leasing and bonding requirements (no project default; no 
bond forfeit). Regarding bond amount calculation, the agency requires a 15% bond increment to 
cover indirect costs, such as third-party profit and management fees, in case of default. 
All project cash flow simulations are carried out under an identical hypothetical bonding 
regime. Base-case costs for closure operations are indicated on Table 6.2. 
For all simulations, production starts at "Year One" (since some tax categories depend on 
production, this assumption does affect government earnings). In addition, "end-of-project" 
coincides with "end-of-production". 
Even after complying with all bonding requirements, oil companies must disburse out-of-
pocket funds to pay for closure operations at the end of each phase. Bonds are released when 
bonded activities have been satisfactorily completed (in the case of collateral accounts, options 
PCCA and LSCA, bonds are released and refunded). 
38 The proposed scenario is based on proposed rules for the Brazilian bonding system, but can be applied to any 
concession modeL 
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TABLE 6.1. PROJECT PARAMETERS 
Items 
Field Characteristics 
Oil Reserves (MMbbl) 
Gas Reserves (MMBoe) 
Oil Type ('API) 
General Characteristics 
Exploration Period (years) 
Development Period (years) 
Production Period (years) 
Water Depth (meters) 
Costs 
OpEx (US$/boe) 
Investments 
CapEx (US$/boe) 
Depreciable Value(%) 
Government Take 
Royalties (%) 
COFINS (%) 
PIS(%) 
CIT(%) 
BID(MMUS$) 
CSLL(%) 
PE(%) 
Rent Area (Km2) (for all phases) 
Rent - Exploration Phase 
• Rent (US$/Km2) 
Rent - Development Phase 
• Rent (US$/Km2) 
Rent - Production Phase 
• Rent (US$/Km2) 
Market Parameters 
Field A 
9.00 
0.00 
1.0 
1.0 
12.0 
1000.0 
2.25 
2.50 
65.00 
10.00 
3.00 
0.65 
25.00 
0.50 
12.00 
* 
400.00 
125.95 
251.91 
1259.54 
Inputs 
Field B 
53.00 
0.00 
1.0 
1.0 
16.0 
1000.0 
2.25 
2.50 
65.00 
10.00 
3.00 
0.65 
25.00 
0.50 
12.00 
* 
400.00 
125.95 
251.91 
1259.54 
Field C 
148.00 
0.00 
1.0 
1.0 
21.0 
1000.0 
2.25 
2.50 
65.00 
10.00 
3.00 
0.65 
25.00 
0.50 
12.00 
* 
400.00 
125.95 
251.91 
1259.54 
Oil Price (US$/BBL) 21.00 21.00 21.00 
Gas Price (R$/m3) 0.13 0.13 0.13 
(*) Special Participation based on recovery volume, reservoir location 
(onshore/offshore), and depth (when offshore) according to a differentiated rate 
table. 
Based on an exploration project, the lessee submits a closure plan to the agency. The 
agency then establishes a performance bond requirement that should be sufficient to cover 
closure costs relative to potential ex-post damage generated by exploration activities. If the 
lessee decides to proceed and develop the project, a development/production plan is submitted 
along with a closure plan. The agency then establishes a performance bond requirement that 
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should be sufficient to cover closure costs relative to potential ex-post damage generated by 
development and production activities. Under the present study, for comparison purposes, all 
projects will be developed; therefore, all phases of a successful petroleum project will be present. 
TABLE 6.2. BOND PARAMETERS 
Items Inputs 
Field A Field B Field C 
Bid Phase 
Instrwnent Type LOC LOC LOC 
Financial Bond Amount (MMUS$) O.Q2 0.05 0.05 
LOC Rate(%) 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Exeloration Phase 
Closure Costs (base case) 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Financial Bond Amount (MMUS$) 0.05 0.10 0.10 
• Instrwnent Type LOC LOC LOC 
Performance Bond Amount (MMUS$) 1.15 2.30 2.30 
• Instrwnent Type LOC LOC LOC 
LOC Rate(%) 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Develoement/Production Phase 
Closure Costs (base case) 2.00 15.00 15.00 
Financial Bond Amount (MMUS$) 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Performance Bond Amount (MMUS$) 2.30 17.25 17.25 
• LOC Rate(%) 3.50 3.50 3.50 
• PCCA Rate(%) 5.50 5.50 5.50 
• LSCA Rate (%) 5.50 5.50 5.50 
• EIP Rate(%) 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Discount rate based risk evaluation(%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Credit Rating Top Top Top 
It is assumed that all lessees have top credit and performance rating. Therefore, 
instrument options LOC and EIP will be offered reasonable premium rates, low fees, and, in 
addition, supplementary collateral guarantees will not be required39• 
The terminology "Government Take" (GT) herein applied comprises several taxes and 
levies including, Signature Bonus (BID), Royalties (ROY), Special Participation Compensation 
(PE), Rental Area Fees (Rent), social contribution for funding Social Security (COFINS) and 
Workers Social futegration Programs (PIS), Corporate Income Tax (CIT), and Social 
Contribution over Net Profit (CSLL) (Table 6.3). 
39 Letters of credit are very complex tools and fmancial institutions tend to be very conservative in tbe underwriting 
process. Collaterals are often required. 
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TABLE 6.3. FISCAL CALCULATIONS 
Gross Income = total income from oil and natural gas sale 
{
• Royalties 
L - Operation Costs 
ess - Closure Costs (if allowable against tax) 
- Depreciation 
Taxable Basis = Gross Income- Amortization 
Plus { + Bond Interests (for PC CAs or LSCAs) 
Investment Credits 
- Financing Interests 
- Fiscal Loss Compensation 
Less 
-BID 
-Fees (for LOCs) 
- Premiums (for EIPs) 
Note: the following taxes are calculated: PE, P&D (1% of the gross income, according to production limits 
obeying PE criteria). CIT, and CSLL (these calculations take into consideration loss compensation of up to 
30% and deduction of 113 ofCOFINS annual values. 
In most countries closure costs are treated as operational costs (ordinary and necessary 
expenses), and, for this reason, can be fully deducted. This issue of charging taxpayers for 
closure operations of private oil companies is being questioned in some countries (PROGNOS, 
1997). However, most regimes do provide legal basis for sharing the costs of meeting end-of-
leasing obligations between the public and the industry. In general, closure expenditures are tax-
deductible only when services have been performed and payments have been made. The same 
rule applies when progressive closure approach is adopted. Under some regimes, deductions are 
not allowed for closure activities carried out during non-income years (when production has 
ceased). In this case, companies are allowed to carry a "credit" towards future projects, as it is 
the case in the current Brazilian fiscal regime (ANP, 2000b). 
Under most fiscal regimes where bonding systems are currently in use, deductions are not 
available for companies allocating funds as collateral guarantee (e.g. PCCA and LSCA). 
Deductions are only available when the lessee loses ownership of funds, closure services have 
been performed and payments have been made. However, if a company pays fees or premiums 
to keep bonding instruments in place (e.g. LOC, LOC and surety bonds), expenditures may be 
amortized over the period covered by the bond. The basic rule is that, only ordinary and 
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necessary business expenses are deductible; capital expenditure is not. Being contractually liable 
for closure operations and issuing bonds (in anticipation) to guarantee such operations, does not 
entitle companies to deduct cost of services before they are actually performed (FERREIRA and 
SUSLICK, 2001; BARBOSA, 2000). 
Simulations performed under this proposed model were ruled by the current Brazilian 
fiscal regulation. Figure 6.4 provides a visual analysis of the proportion of the main cash flow 
components. 
Special Participation Compensation (PE) is an additional financial compensation paid by 
lessees in fields of high productivity or high profitability. Its calculation is based on the gross 
revenue from production minus royalties, exploration investments, operational costs, closure 
costs, depreciation, and other tributes required under the current regulation (IR, COFINS/PIS) 
(BARBOSA and BASTOS, 2001; BARBOSA, 2001). Rental fees are based on the area leased 
(in Km2). Cash flow calculations for government participations are illustrated on Table 6.3. 
For the specific case of instrument options EIP and LOC, premiums are deducted for 
CSLL and CIT calculations according to the allowable deduction rate supplied by the user. 
Interest earnings from instrument options PCCA and LSCA are subjected to CIT. For all 
simulations, interest earnings are paid as earned. 
6.4. Al~AL YSIS 
The traditional discounted cash flow method (DCF) was used to measure the profitability 
of projects. The standard indicator NPV (Net Present Value) was used to measure the returns 
obtained by the firms. The ratio NPV by recoverable volume (the weighted NPV per barrel 
discounted at 15%) was applied for assessing the relationship between volume and value for 
future stand-alone comparisons. Government Earnings (GT) was also used as basis for 
comparison. The total net production was estimated excluding the volume of re-injected oil and 
natural gas or petroleum consumed during production operations. 
The following approaches were used on the algorithm Petrobond for evaluating the results 
obtained in the simulations: (1) company's perspective: the preferable choice should have the 
highest payoff (1\'PV); and (2) government's perspective: the preferable choice should comprise a 
combination of reasonable government earnings to maintain the regulatory role, an adequate 
guarantee to ensure performance, and a cost considered tolerable by the industry. 
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Financial instruments are used here to determine the sensitivity of the variable "Bond 
Option". This study includes five simulations for each of the three oil-producing projects: one 
simulation for each bond scenario (NoBond, PCCA, LSCA, LOC, and EIP) with recoverable 
reserves ranging from 9 MMboe to 148 MMboe (million ofbarrcls of oil equivalent). 
Gross PIS/COFINS 
+ 
Income 
CapEx 
Figure 6.4. Comparison diagram indicating taxes and other government contributions. 
Based on the proposed fiscal rnle currently adopted in Brazil (SCHIOZER. 2002 -
MODIFIED). 
6.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Bonding instruments behave differently in terms of allocation of valuable initial resources 
and in the way taxes and levies are collected. Instrument choice may impact, with distinct 
intensity, various sections of a project cash flow leading to different NPV and GT outcomes. 
Choosing the appropriate bonding instrument may determine the viability of some projects; 
primarily, marginal, and mature fields. 
Preliminary results show that, under the proposed regime, total government participations 
vary from approximately 34% to 38% of the total gross revenue, not including bond-related 
expenditures. These GT values are calculated through the sum of participations within each 
group (of governmental participations) divided by total gross revenue. If instead, NPV (with 
discount rate of 15%) were calculated individually for each participation, summing up all 
participations, and dividing by total field production, GT values would represent approximately 
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65.9% (Equations 1 and 2). IfNPV were to be calculated with a discount rate of 0%, GT values 
would represent approximately 55.7%. Results also indicate that among selected instrument 
options, EIP allows better NPV performances, followed by LOC. 
n IVPL(k,w;) 
]=1 
TP 
where: 
i =number of groups-? i = 1, ... ,5 
n = total number of participations within each group 
k = Discount Rate 
w; i = /h participation within the i1h group 
TP =Total Production 
n 
z:w;i 
j:;l 
TGR 
where: 
i =number of groups-? i = 1, ... ,5 
n = total number of participations within each group 
w; i = r participation within the i1" group 
TGR =Total Gross Revenue 
Equation (5.1) 
Equation (5.2) 
All instrument options affect government earnings on direct and indirect taxation. 
Collateral account instruments (PCCA and LSCA) improve government earnings due to interest 
revenues from escrow accounts. Options EIP and LOC allow deductions of premiums and fees, 
significantly eroding government earnings. 
Figure 6.5 compares direct and indirect government participations and other project 
expenditures with total project gross revenue. The three most significant participations are: 
Operational Costs (OpEx), Investment (CapEx), and Corporate Income Taxes (CIT), 
respectively. When compared to other project participations, closure costs correspond to a very 
small fraction of the total gross revenue. 
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Figure 6.5. Total participations agaiost total gross revenue (lOO%) for Field C (l-18 MMbbl). 
Government participation in this project (GD constituted. on awrage. 36.36%. not including 
bond-related earnings. EIP allows the highest payoff for this prQject. 
Figure 6.6 compares some of Field C cash flow results obtained in the simulations of all 
four instrument options. The choice of Field C (148 MMbbl) for this comparative representation 
has to do with its economics. The other projects do not reach the minimum requirement to allow 
the collection of PE compensations. Instrument choice does not affect financial expenditures 
(11.54%) or operational cost (12.21%). Option LOC (36.21%) allows the lowest GT 
participation, followed by options EIP (36.23%), and PCCA and LSCA (36.49%). 
Instrument choice affects bond expenditure values as follows: option EIP (0.78%) allows 
the lowest value, followed by option LOC (0.83%). Low expenditure is due to the payment of 
annual premiums (around 3% of the total bond requirement) in contrast to the full bond amount 
required for options PCCA and LSCA. During development and production phases, premiums 
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can be deducted from CIT. This implies that bonding costs are being shared between industry 
and government. The small difference between options PCCA (1.01%) and LSCA (0.98%) 
occurs because option LSCA allows the spreading of bond payments throughout a four-year 
period, and option PCCA requires the full payment at startup. Since interest earnings from 
escrow accounts are taxed as ordinary revenue, during the first four years option PCCA generates 
more taxable revenues than option LSCA. Consequently, GT values from option PCCA are a 
little higher than GT values for option LSCA. 
Sensitivity analyses indicates that instrument option PCCA performs better than option 
LSCA on small and medium size projects (up to approximately 53-60 MMbbl). According to 
this model, option LSCA begins to perform better than option PCCA in projects larger than 60 
MMbbl. There following aspects may explain this behavior: 
• Interest earnings from the money allocated in escrow accounts are not taxed until 
project net cash flow becomes positive. Since option PCCA allocates more immediate 
capital than option LSCA, option PCCA allows higher interest earnings, reaching positive 
net cash flow before option LSCA. 
• This model was not designed to take into consideration opportunity costs. A future 
project should include parameters such as cost of startup money and opportunity costs. 
Intuitively, it seems obvious that projects allowing the spreading of bond payments over a 
period of four years would provide better payoffs than projects requiring upfront bond 
payment. 
• Closure costs were stipulated based on a percent of project's gross revenue. In 
projects larger than 60 MMbbl, high closure costs generate high bond requirements, and, 
at this point, interest revenues earned during the first four years under option PCCA cease 
to generate the customary NPV advantages obtained in smaller projects. For larger 
projects, the negative impact of substantial upfront cash disbursement surpasses the earlier 
advantageous scenario. 
Figure 6.6 shows plots of sensitivity analysis of NPV values against closure costs for 
Fields A, B and C. Each graph demonstrates five different scenarios corresponding to one of the 
five instrument options (PCCA, LSCA, EIP, LOC, and, "Nobond", as a base case). 
184 

The most conspicuous impacts within this study can be found on Field A simulations. 
This is due to the size of the reservoir, only 9 MMbbl. Simulations under a "No Bond" scenario 
allow NPV values varying from 1.01 to 0.51 MMUS$. For option PCCA, NPV varies between 
0.91 and- 4.77 MMUS$, and GT varies between 9.59 and 13.71 MMUS$. Option LSCA allows 
NPV varying between 0.90 and - 5.82 MMUS$, and GT between 9.58 and 11.07 MMUS$. 
Option LOC allows NPV varying between 0.92 and -1.25 MMUS$, and GT between 9.56 and 
6.94 MMUS$. Option EIP allows NPV varying between 0.92 and -1.01 MMUS$, and GT 
between 9.56 and 7.31 MMUS$. 
fustrument option EIP causes the lowest impact on NPV outputs, followed by option 
LOC. Here, NPV declines and approaches zero as closure cost increases toward MMUS$ 50. 
Option LSCA performs better than option PCCA. For these plots, NPV becomes negative when 
closure cost approaches MMUS$ 15. Field A becomes unfeasible at lower closure cost values 
when compared to the other field simulations. Once again, this is due to the size of the project, 
which is considered merely marginal. 
For all instrument options in Field B simulations, NPV values do not reach zero until 
closure cost exceeds MMUS$ 100. fu this case, option EIP allows the most favorable scenario, 
followed by option LOC. Curve slopes indicate that instrument options LSCA and PCCA 
significantly impact NPV outputs as closure cost increases. 
Plots for Field C simulations indicate a slope inversion in options PCCA and LSCA, 
where option PCCA begins to perform better than option LSCA. This inversion occurs in 
projects involving reserves between 53 and 60 MMbbl. This behavior continues unaltered for all 
larger fields. The two main reasons for this shifting are: 
• For options PCCA and LSCA, all interest earnings are annually withdrawn from the 
collateral accounts and handed over to the lessee. Tax rates upon interest earnings for 
these instrument options are the same. For smaller fields (less than 53 MMbbl) 
instrument option PCCA earns more interest revenues than option LSCA. Therefore, in 
medium (up to 60 MMbbl), smaller, and, primarily, marginal projects, interest earnings 
received during the project considerably enhance project cash flow performance. fu 
addition, under this scenario, the upfront bond payment required by option PCCA seems 
not to impact significantly NPV performances. 
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• ln fields larger than 60 MMbbl, upfront payment of costlier bond requirements 
becomes a substantial burden on cash flow of projects using instrument option PCCA. 
The impact remains considerable even taking into account interest earnings during the 
entire life of the project. Therefore, option LSCA performs a little better than option 
PCCA, especially in large projects where the possibility of spreading bond payments 
throughout a period of four years does become a key factor. 
lnstrument options EIP and LOC allow superior NPV performances in all projects, but 
especially on projects requiring higher closure costs. Small projects tend to be severely affected 
by bonding requirements, regardless instrument choice. lnstrument options that require 
allocation of large amounts of cash at the startup inflict high opportunity costs. Regulators 
should recognize this condition offering flexibilities and alternative bonding instruments. 
Regulators should also consider some form of tsx incentive in order to extend the life of 
some small and marginal projects (SCHIOZER, 2002). Due to high operating costs, large 
companies may not have interest in some of these projects. However, small contractors may 
recover oil in the same projects at lower operating costs with attractive profit margins. lncentives 
may reduce direct government earnings, however small and marginal fields will have their lives 
extended, levering investments and improving competitiveness within the sector. 
Figure 6. 7 shows sensitivity analysis results under the government perspective (plots of 
GT against closure costs). For all field simulations, instrument options PCCA and LSCA show a 
pattern of linear growth for GT. lnstrument options EIP and LOC present a trend of linear 
decline for GT as closure cost increases. 
For Field A simulations, option LSCA draws attention to its steep GT increase as closure 
cost also increases. Option PCCA also displays GT improvement as closure cost increases, 
though with less intensity than observed in option LSCA. 
When options EIP and LOC are compared against the base-case option "Nobond", both 
instruments show a declining trend as closure cost increases. This occurs because it is possible to 
deduct premium and fees from CIT. Obviously, the main objective of bond requirements is not 
enhancing government revenues, however, for comparison purposes, option LOC allows lower 
GTvalues. 
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Figure 6.6. NPV vs. Closure Costs. Behavior of Net Present Values against closure costs. 
Sensitivity analysis from simulations in Fields A, B, and C. 
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Field B simulations show similar behavior. Because of taxable interest earnings over the 
entire life of the project, option PCCA accrue more GT than option LSCA. Option LSCA allows 
the spreading of bond payment during the first four years, accruing comparatively less GT. 
Field C simulations involve much larger projects; consequently, instrument options PCCA 
and LSCA display a very similar behavior. The difference generated because of the spreading of 
bond payments becomes less significant in projects of such dimensions. As expected, options 
LSCA and PCCA allow significantly higher GT, and options EIP and LOC, for allowing the 
deduction of premiums and fees, result in lower GT. 
Figure 6. 7 indicates that under a "No bond" regime, GT for the performed simulations do 
not vary even upon closure cost increases. Obviously, this observation is only valid for direct 
government earnings. Indirect government participations would involve items such as corporate 
income tax for third parties performing closure operations and income tax from workers involved 
in the process. This would lead to higher GT, as closure costs were to increase. 
Some agencies do not accept insurance policy instruments. They claim insurance 
products merely transfer liability from lessees to insurance companies, not providing a factual 
performance guarantee. On the other hand, insurance companies tend to be very dynamic and 
creative, and new insurance products are often developed to satisfy more strict bonding rules. 
Letters of credit are under similar opposition from regulators. Some agencies argue that a LOC is 
only as good as the issuing institution. If the issuer becomes insolvent, the guarantee becomes 
void. 
Sensitivity analyses were performed in order to verify whether oil price changes create a 
more favorable scenario for a specific bond instrument. Results confirm that there is a 
proportional and linear growth pattern for all field simulations involving all bond options. 
Changes in oil price may be of great importance for deciding project feasibility, but not for 
determining what is the most appropriate bond option. 
6.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The choice of bonding instrument is an important aspect of the decision making process 
and may determine the feasibility of small and marginal projects. Small projects usually imply 
limited profit margin that can be severely undermined by inapt decision-making. 
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The Petrobond algorithm provides useful flexibility for estimating economic impacts of 
bonding instruments under government and industry perspectives. Option PCCA generates 
significant impacts on all project simulations. Evidently, cash disbursement in such a manner is 
not an efficient way to finance long-term closure operations with high costs. 
For all simulations, option EIP offered better cash flow performances. Option LOC was 
rated second best in all field simulations. Nevertheless, all simulations were performed under the 
assumption that operating companies own top credit rating. This assumption permitted 
collaterals to be waived and allowed generous premium rates. Future research is needed in order 
to investigate the performance of LOC instruments under less favorable scenarios. The 
sensitivity of other components should also be further investigated in future studies. 
All simulations involving options PCCA and LSCA show that GT increases along with 
closure costs, as NPV declines. Options PCCA and LSCA combine significant negative impacts: 
worse project profitability and higher government take. In order to make these collateral account 
instruments more competitive with options EIP and LOC, tax incentives would have to be 
provided. However, it is very unlike that any form of tax incentive would surpass the benefits 
offered by option EIP, for instance. 
Even though much criticism is directed to ex -post insurance policy tools, such as option 
EIP, some insurance products may provide mechanisms to award lessees with good fmancial and 
environmental records; thus, a motivation for companies to pursue similar records. 
Proportionally, taxes, levies, and other governmental participations can affect more 
severely small, marginal, and mature projects. Additional research should be conducted on the 
impacts of incentives and relief mechanisms on small, marginal, and mature oil fields. This 
future study would be an effort to extend the life of mature fields and, concomitantly, engineering 
a viable and sound bonding system for small and marginal fields. 
Some indirect effects of bonding requirements may be very appealing. For instance, in 
order to reduce bond requirements, companies are motivated to fmd ways of demonstrating to 
authorities that closure costs can be less than previously estimated. For instance, intensification 
of investments on research can lead to technological innovations that may reduce closure costs, 
and, consequently, bond requirements. 
The results obtained in this study are primarily useful for overall strategic evaluations. 
Results may also provide guidelines for determining other potential impacts caused by other 
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bonding instruments. Decision-makers may use this study to develop general strategies for 
projects under bonding regimes. Authorities may use tbe study to determine whether a current or 
proposed bonding regime provides the necessary protection without discouraging investments. 
Finally, the proposed model may help in tbe determination of tbe approximate financial burden 
caused by different bonding instruments on different petroleum projects. 
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ABSTRACT 
The present paper deals witb the potential financial impacts of different bonding instruments on 
offshore oil projects. Three types of performance bond instruments (corporate surety, leasing-
specific abandonment account, and cash) were tested and analyzed for three offshore oil-
producing fields under a hypothetical bonding regime. Sensitivity analysis of "net present" and 
"government take" values indicates corporate surety bonds cause fewer impacts yielding 
significantly better payoffs. Several related issues are discussed considering government and 
industry perspectives. 
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6.7. INTRODUCTION 
Due to increasingly stringent policy requirements and higher operating costs, offshore 
decommissioning has the potential to become one of the major issues facing the global petroleum 
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industry in the near future. Several regulatory approaches can be adopted to guarantee that 
companies and operators will meet all decommissioning obligations, safeguarding government 
and taxpayers from noncompliance costs (environmental and financial liabilities). This study 
focuses specifically on the application of the bonding system, an incentive approach for 
environmental policy. 
Most bonding regimes allow companies to use a variety of bonding instruments. 
Petroleum companies generally prefer surety bonds since, as this bonding arrangement typically 
allows significantly better payoffs to a company, as this paper will suggest. Additional options 
are provided mainly to give flexibility to companies that fail to qualify on the difficult surety 
bond underwriting process. Even though the superiority of surety bonds may be incontestable, 
impacts caused by different bonding instruments should be assessed and compared. This paper 
is a first step in addressing the impact of currently available bonding instruments. 
The authors recognize there are other essential economic issues regarding the 
decommissioning of offshore installations that are not considered in the present study (e.g., 
optimum decommissioning startup, single or phased decommissioning approaches, technical 
decommissioning options, and technological innovations). This paper is divided into four 
sections. The first section briefly describes current decommissioning obligations in the offshore 
oil and gas industry. The second section offers a concise overview of existing regulatory 
approaches and a detailed explanation of actual bonding regimes and available instruments. The 
third section presents a financial evaluation model for three bond options. This model is based 
on a series of discounted cash flow and sensitivity analyses for three distinct offshore oil-
producing fields. The final section discusses some of the regulatory issues involving the 
application of bonding mechanisms and its financial impact from both government and company 
perspectives. 
6.8. OFFSHORE INDUSTRY AND DECOMMISSIONING 
There is no agreement on an exact figure, but it is safe to say that there are over 7,270 
offshore oil and gas installations in place around the world today. These installations are 
distributed over more than 53 countries worldwide (PM'E and HENDARJO, 1998; ODCP, 1998; 
POREMSKI, 1998; GRIFFIN, 1998a; PROGNOS, 1997). Offshore installations are usually 
planned for 20-year projects, but most platforms can have a functional life ranging from 30 to 40 
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years. At the end of this period, as recoverable reserves are depleted, unless platforms are reused 
or relocated, they must be decommissioned. This process involves several stages including 
closing, plugging and abandoning wells and pipelines; cleaning and making facilities and 
structural components safe; removing some or all of units and facilities; disposing, reusing or 
recycling them; clearing sites; and providing monitoring and surveillance where required 
(FERREIRA and SUSLICK, 2000). 
Many aging offshore fields around the world are near the end of their productive lives, 
and many others have already economically depleted their resources. Consequently, between 
now and 2025 it should be expected that over 6,500 installations will be decommissioned at an 
estimated cost of US$ 20-40 billion (COLEMAN, 1998). During the past five years there has 
been exhaustive discussion in the literature concerning decommissioning costs (UKOOA, 1995; 
ROBINSON and IRELAND, 1995; ARNEY, 1996; GRIFFIN, 1996, 1998a; DELLA, 1997; 
TW ACHTMAN, 1997; PROGNOS, 1997; MMS 1997b, 1999a; WATSON, 1998; 
PRASTHOFER, 1998; PHILLIPS, 2000). Due to great uncertainties regarding regulatory trends 
and acquired experience on the decommissioning of large platforms, cost estimates tend to vary 
significantly. Nevertheless, decommissioning costs may represent up to 10% of the total 
investment of an offshore project (BORGHlNl eta/., 1998). 
6.9. THE BONDING SYSTEM 
The main approaches to environmental policies are Command and Control (direct 
regulation) and Economic Incentives Mechanisms (market alternatives). Both Command and 
Control (CAC) and Economic Incentive Mechanisms (ElM) have been exhaustively discussed in 
the literature, including their characteristics, applications, and efficiencies (BOHM, 1981; 
STOLLERY, 1985; WEBBER and WEBBER, 1985; CONRAD, 1987; BAUMOL and OATES, 
1988; PERRlNGS, 1989; COSTANZA and PERRlNGS, 1990; CORNWELL, 1997). 
CORNWELL and COSTANZA (1994) compare CAC and ElM approaches, and some 
aspects are here adapted to the offshore oil sector: The CAC approach consists of establishing 
and enforcing laws and regulations, and of setting objectives, standards and technologies with 
which agents must comply. The ElM approach involves providing economic incentives to 
encourage desired behavior; it encourages the distribution of responsibilities among all 
stakeholders, decentralizing the decision-making process to protect lease areas; and it relieson 
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performance objectives rather than on a pre-established course of action. Economic analysis 
indicates that present methods of enviromnental protection, mostly based on CAC strategies, are 
inefficient and often provide disincentives for directing resources toward abatement. The main 
causes are: (I) great uncertainties in calculating end-of-leasing costs; (2) costly and lengthy 
litigious processes; (3) homogeneous treatment of companies and operators (no record-based 
assessment); (4) great information burden on the regulatory agency (selecting the best technology 
and enforcing penalties for noncompliance); (5) little incentive for development of innovations 
that can result in improvements and cost reductions; ( 6) incentives for regulatory evasion rather 
than regulatory compliance; and (7) vague regulatory language allowing companies to build 
persuasive cases by showing that requirements are unachievable. 
The bonding system, also know as financial assurance system, is one of the EIMs 
presently being applied in the oil sector. In a broader sense, bonds are financial instruments used 
to provide legal guarantee of indemnity in case contracting parties fail to meet contractual 
obligations. In the offshore sector, bonds indemnify authorities against failure to comply with 
lease contractual obligations. They safeguard agencies against technical and financial failure, 
premature or unplarmed decommissioning, and contingencies. The bonding system shifts the 
financial risk from the potential victims (regulatory agency and taxpayers) to the oil companies or 
operators by internalizing potential costs. In case of default, funds necessary to complete all 
decommissioning obligations would be promptly available, avoiding complicated legal processes. 
Essentially, bonds are accessories to proposed contracts and they may be used several 
times within a single contract. There are two major bond categories: (1) financial bond, a bond 
that guarantees the payment of a specific amount determined by the bond in case a contractual 
obligation is not met; and (2) perfonnance bond, a bond that guarantees the total completion cost 
of a contractual obligation (JOHNSON, 1986; ROWE, 1987; CORNWELL, 1997; MILLER, 
2000). Bonding instruments come in several forms with unique attributes and requirements: 
some are the pledged assets of a company (cash, securities, real estate, escrow accounts, etc.); 
others represent a guarantee for a company's performance or fulfillment of obligations (surety 
bonds); still others are securities issued by bonding or insurance companies, banks or other 
financial institutions; and some are instruments that indicate the deposit of cash (certificates of 
deposit) or the existence of a line of credit (letters of credit) (BRYAN, 1998). 
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The bonding system used by the United States Minerals Management Service (MMS) for 
the Gulf of Mexico is briefly described below as an example of a bonding regime currently in 
place for the offshore sector (information based on the MMS- NTL 98-18N, 1998): 
Companies acquiring oil and gas leases from the U.S. MMS post a preliminary financial 
bond (general bond) guaranteeing financial aspects of the lease contract (regular payments of 
rents and royalties, civil penalties, fines, etc.). A company holding more than one lease may opt 
for an areawide bond (blanket bond). ln this case, a single areawide bond may cover multiple 
leases. A lease may be subdivided into several aliquots. Companies wishing to explore, develop 
projects, and produce hydrocarbon resources within a specific aliquot are required to post a bond 
in advance (supplemental bond). This supplemental bond is equal to the best-cost estimate for 
completing operations under the established lease contract. Therefore, before a company is 
granted licenses or permits to drill, deepen, or alter wells, install platforms, or perform 
modifications on existing installations, a supplemental performance bond must be posted to cover 
all plugging and abandonment, decommissioning, and site clearance obligations. Either the 
leaseholder or the designated operator may place the supplemental bond. Multiple supplemental 
bonds may be found within a lease, but a single supplemental bond carmot be used to cover 
multiple operations. At present in the Gulf of Mexico there are 390 active leases and 154 
designated operators holding supplemental bonds (WILLIAMS, 2000). Decommissioning of 
pipelines is covered by a different bond regulation40 (Pipeline Rights-of-Way). 
General bonds must be maintained until the lease has been terminated or transferred. 
Supplemental bonds must be maintained in effect and in good standing for the duration of the 
project and until decommissioning obligations are met41 (or until a new party assumes 
operations). If decommissioning activities are being conducted concomitantly during the life of 
the project (phased approach), and if such activities are satisfactorily completed, authorities may 
authorize proportional releases of the bond. 
A bond may be subject to forfeiture for different reasons: (1) if a well or installation has 
been abandoned or temporarily closed without initiating procedures; (2) if an operator fails to 
meet decommissioning obligations in accordance with approved plan; or (3) if a company fails to 
maintain the amount bonded. 
"'A general bond must be posted before a pipeline is put in place (MMS- NTL 98-18N,l998). 
41 Some restrictions apply. 
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Other countries have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, bonding mechanisms. The 
UK government requires companies to provide security equal to at least I 00% of the expected 
decommissioning costs of all installations and pipelines of proposed projects (DTI, 2000a). The 
Brazilian Petroleum Agency (ANP) is in the process of offering bids for its first marginal fields. 
The Agency is studying the possibility of establishing some form of bonding regime (BRAZIL 
ENERGY, 1999). 
6.10. FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF BONDING OPTIONS FOR THREE PRODUCING 
OIL FIELDS 
The objective in this section is to determine the effect of bonding regulations on offshore project 
value. Three different bond instruments are used to determine the sensitivity of the variable 
denominated "bond option". The study shows three offshore oil-producing projects (Fields A, B, 
and C) in the Brazilian Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) with recovery reserves ranging from 50 to 
500 MMboe (million of barrels of oil equivalent). All three projects are carried out under a 
hypothetical bonding regime. Each scenario involves some convergence factor; in this case, it is 
the bond option. Each field project is tested for all possible scenarios providing cash flow 
simulations for all bond options. Each bond option yields different impacts on project 
profitability, which are based on a discount cash flow analysis. This process identifies the least 
impacted project. 
The available options are indicated in Figure 6.8 and can be sununarized as follow: (1) 
Cash Bond: the company is required to fund an escrow account in advance (before production 
starts); (2) LSAA Bond: the company is required to completely fund a leasing-specific 
abandonment escrow account within four years or by the beginning of the year in which the 
agency projects that the company will have cumulatively produced 80 percent of the originally 
recoverable reserves, whichever is earlier; and (3) Surety Bond: the company is required to obtain 
a corporate surety bond which must cover the entire life of the project. Two additional scenarios 
(benchmark scenarios) are provided as means of comparison: a "No Bond" scenario where 
decommissioning requirements are enforced, but no financial assurance is required; and a "No 
Decommissioning" scenario where no end-of-leasing obligations or bonds are required. The 
company ceases production and leaves when the field is economically exhausted. 
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All options are evaluated on the basis of two economic criteria: the weighted Net Present 
Value (NPV) per barrel discounted at 15%, and the total Government Take (GT) during the entire 
life of the project. The following approaches are used to consider the results obtained in the 
simulations: (1) the company's perspective: the preferable choice should have the highest payoff 
(NPV); and (2) the government's perspective: the preferable choice should consider a reasonable 
pattern of government earnings (GT) to maintain the regulatory role. 
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Figure 6.8. Hypothetical bond system. Note: Scheme showing three fields (A, B and C) and the three 
bond options available (surety, cash and LSAA). Surety bonds pay premiums, and cash and LSAA 
earn interest. Bond refund is available for cash and LSAA instruments after decommissioning 
obligations are satisfactorily met. 
Some assumptions and simplifications are used to allow a better differentiation of 
economic outcomes and a better way of comparing project profitability for each bond option. 
The main assumptions are: (1) for all project simulations, "end-of-project" coincides with the 
"end-of-production"; (2) the base-case cost for platform decommissioning is $15.0 million 
(including costs to remove and dispose of all platforms within the field); (3) even after complying 
with all bonding requirements, oil companies still must disburse out-of-pocket funds to pay for 
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decommissioning operations at the end of the project42; (4) bonds are released when 
decommissioning operations have been satisfactorily completed (in the case of cash and LSAA 
options, bonds are released and refunded); and (5) production starts at the first year for all 
projects (since some tax categories depend on parameters such as production, this assumption 
does affect govermnent earnings). 
Under the present hypothetical regime, before a lease is granted operations must be 
bonded in the following manner (Figure 6.9): (1) before exploration is permitted a General Bond 
of $500,000 is required; (2) when the company applies for the development license, the 
regulatory agency requires a detailed operation plan for development, production and 
decommissioning activities, and sets a supplemental bond. The base-case used for all simulations 
assumes that the cost for meeting all decommissioning obligations is equal to $15 million. The 
Supplemental Bond is equal to decommissioning costs plus 15%, which covers third party profit 
and overhead costs in case offorfeit (Table 6.4). Decommissioning costs are changed from $0 to 
$150 million for each project to assess the financial impact of each bond option. 
OFFSHORE 0 IL PROJECT 
G eneraiBond Reqnirem ent 
(US$ 50 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0) 
R is k A ssessm en t Survey 
No Risk Spectrum 
R is k Low E .. H ig h 
. . 
. . 
~ R k _________ j 
No S u p p le m en t a I ~~ Supple m en t • 
".!, •. Bond Value 't\i~ Bond required 
Figure 6.9. Scheme showing the path for the establishment of the bond value (AEP, 
1998a- MODIFIED). 
42 Note that the bond was posted only as a financial guarantee, but the company still must pay for decommissioning 
operations. 
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The hypothetical fiscal regime used for the simulations is based on the current Brazilian 
legislation, where the authors have firsthand experience. No capital expenditure is allowable 
against corporate taxes; consequently, no bond disbursements can be deducted. Annual surety 
premiums and fees are deductible since they are considered to be valid business expenses. The 
rules for premium deductions vary significantly. Under this hypothetical fiscal regime, a rate of 
40% of the total armual premium amount is allowed against corporate taxes. Decommissioning 
costs can be treated as typical operation costs. In this case, however, decommissioning-related 
expenditures take place during non-revenue years, and under such circumstances expenditures 
carmot be deducted from corporate taxes. Companies may use the allowable deduction (under the 
hypothetical scenario, 50% of decommissioning costs) as credit for future oil-producing projects. 
For the present study, such deductions are not incorporated in the cash flows. Table 6.4 indicates 
the main base-case parameters. 
TABLE 6.4. PROJECT INFORMATION SUMMARY 
Depth (meters) 
Proj eel Life (years) 
Recovered Oil Reserves (million bbl) 
Total Operational Costs (million US$) 
Total Investments (million US$) 
Flat Oil Price (US$/bbl) 
Decommissioning Costs (million US$) 
General Bond (million US$) 
Supplemental Bond (million US$) 
Total Bond Required (million US$) 
Deductible Rate for Surety Premiums 
Deductible Rate for Decomm. Costs' 
Field A 
1000 
312 
53.6 
348.8 
248.7 
Field-Specific Parameters 
Field B 
1000 
16 
148.9 
995.3 
377.4 
Basic Parameters 
20.00 
15.00 
0.50 
17.25 
17.75 
40% 
50% 
Bond Annual Rates 
Field C 
1000 
19 
494.2 
2662.3 
1666.5 
Taxable Rate Premium Deductible Rate Interest 
Earned (Interest earned) Rate (Premium paid) 
Cash Bond 
LSAABond 
Sure Bond 
5.50% 
5.50% 
1 Deduction amount can be credited to another project. 
199 
100% 
100% 
1.25% 40% 

Government take (GT) is affected by variations in decommissioning costs (DC) 
according to the application of different bond options. Changes in DC first affect supplemental 
bond values (SPB) and then net revenue values (NR). Net revenue values directly affect GT 
values. For this reason, NPV values are affected differently depending on the bond option 
adopted and according to the changes in DC. Government Take includes the following taxes: 
Royalties (ROY) (10% of gross revenue); corporate taxes (CT) (33% of net revenue); and special 
government participation (SSP) when production exceeds 50,000 bbls/day. In the case of 
projects adopting cash or LSAA bond options, Interest Earnings (BIE) from escrow accounts are 
taxed as ordinary revenue. Government participation in the project is approximately 58%, not 
including bond-related expenditures. 
Figure 6.10 is a representation of the main costs and taxes applicable to the simulation 
model. 
GROSS REVENUE 
TAXABLE REVENUE 
I SSP I 
IBml cr 
PROFIT GOVERNMENT TAKE 
Figure 6.1 0. Graphic Representation of costs and taxes using the project simulation model. 
Note: Capex ~Capital Expenditure (includes a straight line depreciation of all equipment and units over a ten-year 
period); BD ~Bond value (surety- amount is zero, either cash or LSAA -amount will be reimbursed at the end of 
the project); BFP ~ Bond Fees and Premiums (applicable only for surety); Opex ~ Operating Costs; DC ~ 
Decommissioning Costs. Roy~ Royalties (10%); SSP~ Special Government Participation (only applicable when 
production exceeds 50,000 bbl/day); BIE ~ Bond Interest Earnings (applicable only to cash and I bonds); CT ~ 
Corporate Tax (33%, it includes other government participation); BDR ~Bond Return (applicable only to cash and 
LSAA bonds). This scheme is for general visualization and does not indicate the correct proportions. 
Three bond option scenarios are tested in the financial model. Each bond option is 
described below: 
• Surety Bond Option: A surety company writes a bond guaranteeing that a specific oil 
company wil perform all required decommissioning operations; otherwise, the surety 
company will pay the regulatory agency the amount bonded. In case of default, the agency 
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will request an independent contractor to perform the operations. ln some respects, surety 
bonds are analogous to insurance policies in that companies pay annual premiums and fees to 
keep bonds in place. Each surety company follows its own financial criteria to judge an oil 
company and fix premium rates: net worth level, credit rating, decommissioning experience, 
etc. Premiums are based on a percentage of the bond amount. For the simulations where 
surety bonds are adopted, premiums of $12.50 per $1,000 per year (1.25%) are applied. 
Premiums and fees are allowable against tax (deduction rate of 40%). The total amount to be 
bonded is $17.75 million (DC plus 15% for third party profit and overhead costs) (Table 6.4). 
The annual premium for this bond amount is $221,875. 
• Cash Collateral Bond Option: Cash is placed in a federal insured bank account under an 
escrow agreement between the oil company, the bank, and the regulatory agency. The escrow 
agreement specifies that the agency has full control over the account until the bond is released 
(after obligations are met). Escrow accounts pay annual interest (5.50%) which is available to 
oil companies as it is earned. The annual interest for the established bond amount is 
$976,250. Since interest is withdrawn annually, there is no accumulation of funds in the 
escrow account. Consequently, interest earnings remain the same throughout the entire life of 
the project. Companies cannot use the deposited collateral cash to fund decommissioning 
activities. After the successful conclusion of all decommissioning-related operations, the 
bond is released and the deposited amount is refunded. In case of default, funds are used by 
the agency to contract an independent operator to complete all necessary decommissioning 
obligations. 
• Leasing-Specific Abandonment Account Option (LSAA Bond): For this trust agreement the oil 
company must fully fund a lease-specific abandonment account within four years or by the 
beginning of the year in which the agency projects the company will have cumulatively 
produced 80% of the originally recoverable reserves, whichever is earlier. The initial 
payment into the LSAA equals 50% of the required bond. Table 6.5 demonstrates the time 
schedule for incremental payments of a LSAA bond (this example describes the situation on 
Field A). The LSAA must be funded with $17.25 million (total supplemental bond amount) 
and the initial payment is 50% of the required supplemental bond ($8.63 million). By the end 
of year 4, even if the company does not produce 80% of the recoverable hydrocarbons 
originally in place, the account must be funded with the full supplemental bond amount. 
p 
201 BLIOTECA 
Cl 
• 
Interest earned is annually transferred to the oil company. After the conclusion of all 
decommissioning operations, the bond is released and the deposited amount is refunded. In 
case of default, funds are used to complete the necessary decommissioning obligations . 
TABLE 6.5. MODEL FOR LSAA BOND ANNUAL PAYMENTS 
Year Potential Recoverable Actual Recoverable $ Required at start Annual Payments Reserves' (%) Reserves (%) of year (US$ million) (US$ million) 
1 20.00 10.28 8.63 2.16 
2 40.00 34.95 10.78 2.16 
3 60.00 52.78 12.94 2.16 
4 80.00 64.97 15.09 2.16 
Total 17.25 
Percent of recoverable hydrocarbons produced at the end of year as a % of recoverable 
hydrocarbons originally in place. 
As mentioned before, for benchmark comparison purposes, all project simulations include 
two additional scenarios: (1) "No Bond" and (2) "No Decommissioning". In the "No Bond" 
scenario the company is not expected to provide any anticipated funds to guarantee that 
decommissioning obligations will be met. At the end of the project, during the first non-
producing year, the company must pay for all decommissioning operations. The "No 
Decommissioning" scenario is used to demonstrate the financial performance of a project where 
no decommissioning or bonding is required. At the end of the project, the company walks away 
without performing any decommissioning-related operation. 
6.11. RESULTS 
Effects on NPV values from Field A simulations are more significant than in larger 
projects (Field B and C). In Field A, when the cash bond option is used, as decommissioning 
costs increase beyond $90 million, NPV values become negative (Table 6.6). 
Regardless the size of the field, LSAA bonds yield less significant impacts than cash 
bonds. For simulations on Fields B and C, although maintaining a declining trend, NPV values 
remain positive under decommissioning cost variations (from 0 to $150 million). 
Surety bonds are the best option in all simulations, in that they yield higher NPV values. 
Surety bonds are appealing tools mainly because they do not require upfront cash disbursement. 
Eliminating upfront costs is a good strategy for improving project performance. In addition, 
annual surety premiums and fees are allowable against corporate taxes. The level of deductibility 
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allowed is debatable and may vary from regime to regime. The deduction rate allowed during 
simulations was 40%. In some cases, due to surety-related deductions, goverurnent earnings 
(GT) decrease as decommissioning costs increased (Table 6.6). 
TABLE 6.6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR FIELDS A, BAND C, Al'ID BOND OPTIONS 
FIELD A 
DEC OM CASH LSAA SURETY 
(MMUS$) NPV GT NPV GT NPV GT 
150 -0.80 5.12 -0.60 5.07 0.82 4.62 
100 -0.07 4.94 0.06 4.91 1.01 4.63 
75 0.30 4.85 0.40 4.83 1.10 4.63 
50 0.66 4.78 0.73 4.77 1.20 4.64 
25 1.02 4.71 1.05 4.71 1.29 4.64 
10 1.24 4.67 1.25 4.67 1.35 4.65 
0 1.38 4.65 1.38 4.65 1.38 4.65 
FIELDB 
DECOM CASH LSAA SURETY 
(MMUS$) NPV GT NPV GT NPV GT 
150 1.72 5.60 1.79 5.59 2.39 5.25 
100 1.98 5.49 2.03 5.48 2.43 5.26 
75 2.12 5.44 2.15 5.43 2.45 5.27 
50 2.25 5.39 2.27 5.38 2.47 5.27 
25 2.38 5.33 2.39 5.33 2.49 5.28 
10 2.46 5.30 2.46 5.30 2.51 5.28 
0 2.51 5.28 2.51 5.28 2.51 5.28 
FIELDC 
DEC OM CASH LSAA SURETY 
(MMUS$) NPV GT NPV GT NPV GT 
150 1.26 6.74 1.28 6.73 1.47 6.60 
100 1.34 6.70 1.35 6.69 1.48 6.61 
75 1.38 6.68 1.39 6.67 1.48 6.61 
50 1.42 6.66 1.43 6.65 1.49 6.61 
25 1.46 6.64 1.46 6.63 1.49 6.61 
10 1.48 6.62 1.48 6.62 !.50 6.61 
0 !.50 6.62 !.50 6.62 !.50 6.61 
Note: The increasing cash and LSAA values, despite reduction in NPV values, are caused by the 
taxation of bond interest earned b~ such bond instnnnents. All values exEressed in US$/boe 
For simulations using cash bonds, GT values increase as decommissioning costs rise and 
NPV falls. The reason for this is that as DC increases, bond values also increase, providing 
higher taxable interest earnings on escrow accounts. 
LSAA is the second preferable bond option. The main difference between cash and 
LSAA bonds is that cash bonds require immediate cash disbursement. On the other hand, LSAA 
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accounts can be funded in four years. For better comparison, interest rates for cash and LSAA 
bonds are the same. 
Considering all three bonding options, the cash bond option is least preferable. It impacts 
projects negatively despite interest earned from escrow accounts. Cash disbursement in such a 
manner is not an efficient way to finance long-term offshore operations with high 
decommissioning costs. The same is true for LSAA bonds, but impacts are attenuated by time-
allowance. The combination of "significant negative impacts on project profitability" and "high 
government earnings" may provide a disincentive for investment flow within the offshore 
industry. To make Cash and LSAA bonds more competitive with surety bonds, some tax 
incentives would have to be provided. It seems though, it would be very unlikely that any form 
of tax incentive would provide benefits comparable to the ones offered by surety bonds. Surety 
bonds are a form of award for companies with good financial and environmental records, and an 
incentive for new companies to pursue similar records. 
Sensitivity analyses were performed in order to verify whether oil price changes create a 
more favorable scenario for a specific bond instrument. The analyses verify that there is a 
proportional and linear growth pattern for all fields and bond options. Changes in oil price may 
be of great importance for deciding project feasibility, but not for deciding what is the most 
appropriate bond option. 
Table 6.7 presents an overall qualitative evaluation of the bond-option simulations. 
Further studies are also needed to better assess cash flow financial performance under different 
fiscal regimes. The results obtained in this study are primarily useful for overall strategic 
evaluations. Results may also provide guidelines for determining other potential impacts caused 
by bonding instruments. Decision-makers may use this study to develop general strategies for 
projects under bonding regimes. Authorities may use the study to determine whether a current or 
proposed bonding regime will provide protection without discouraging investments. Finally, the 
proposed methodology may be used to determine the financial burden to be carried by the main 
stakeholders (industry and government). 
6.12. REGULATORY ISSUES AND BONDING SYSTEMS 
Government officials provided the following answers when asked about the motivations 
for establishing a bonding regime: (1) the government is very interested in achieving appropriate 
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decommissioning and addressing all environmental and safety issues; (2) there is no interest in 
raising revenues through bonding mechanisms; (3) there is no interest in keeping bonds longer 
than contractually established; and ( 4) the government is very interested in safeguarding 
taxpayers from future liabilities43. 
TABLE 6.7. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF BONDS USING THE SIMULATION MODEL 
Regulator's Perspective Industry's Perspective 
Surety 
Cash 
LSAA 
Level of Cost of 
Security for Regulatory Impact on GT Impact on NPV 
Values' Values the Agency Compliance 
***** • •' • 
***** ••• • •• ***** 
••• ** •• **** 
NPV- Net Present Value; GT = Government Take. 
Level of Difficulty for 
Instrument Acquisition 
***** 
• 
** 
***** = High; **** = High-Moderate; *** =Moderate; ** = ModeratewLow; * = Low 
(l) From Government's perspective; <'>Depends on allowable deductible rate (40% was assumed in the 
model). 
In the oil sector, the main motivation is the concern over small parties acquiring small or 
marginal production areas from larger companies (MMS, 2000a, 2000e; WILLIAMS, 2000; DTI, 
2000b; ANP, 2000b). Without a financial assurance mechanism, large companies could open 
small spurious companies to evade decommissioning liabilities. 
Setting the appropriate bond requirement (amount) may be one of the greatest 
predicaments within a bonding system. If bonds are set too low, the system may not provide the 
desired incentive effect. On the other hand, setting bonds too high may discourage investments 
in the sector. If authorities are primarily concerned with protecting environmental resources, then 
all externalities must be addressed. If that is the case, the required bond must be high enough to 
discourage projects involving great environmental risk and uncertainties. 
Assessing the monetary value of potential environmental damages may be a problem. It 
is not always possible to calculate the total monetary value of complex non-market goods such as 
ecosystem functions and services, though many methodologies currently exist to calculate partial 
values (COSTANZA, et al., 1997). In the past, due to inadequate bonding estimation, many 
43 This question was addressed to bonding experts from the US Office of Surface Mining - OSM, US Bureau of Land 
Management - BLM, US Minerals Management Services - MMS, the UK Department of Trade Industry - DTI, and 
the Brazilian National Petroleum Agency- ANP (between 1999-200 I). 
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problems arose when mining companies became insolvent and the bond m place was not 
sufficient to cover closure and rehabilitation costs (ALBERSWERTH, 1991). 
To avoid liquidity constraints, most companies are encouraged to obtain surety bonds. As 
mentioned before, these instruments do not require allocation of funds, only armual premiums 
and fees. However, most small and newly formed companies may encounter some difficulty in 
going through surety underwriting processes. For this reason, bonding instruments may appear to 
work as market-restricting agents. As a remedy, most regimes offer alternative instruments. The 
MMS currently offers two additional options as guarantee: ( 1) a trust agreement: a Leasing-
Specific Abandonment Account (LSAA); and (2) US Treasury Notes. Usually, small companies 
keep one of these two alternatives during approximately two years until they qualifY for the 
surety bond underwriting process (MMS, 2000b). The UK government accepts cash, irrevocable 
standby Letters of Credit, on-demand performance bonds, etc. (DTI, 2000a). Although a pool 
bond alternative is accepted in other bonding systems, such an arrangement is not offered by the 
U.S. MMS. The MMS argues that it is difficult to measure the potential risks of all companies in 
a consortium, and consortiums tend to primarily benefit irresponsible parties. At present, for 
Gulf operations the MMS holds approximately $900 million in surety bonds, $30 million in 
Treasury Notes, and $10 million in trust agreements (LSAAs) (WILLIAMS, 2000). 
Bonds may also appear to benefit large companies since requirements may be waived if 
certain financial requirements are met (net worth44, assets, and projected revenue from other 
fields and activities). The main concept is: low fmancial risk equals lower bonds. This waiving 
process is sometimes referred to as financial capability or self-bonding. In the Gulf of Mexico 
around 80% of the potential bonded operations are waived through such mechanisms 
(WILLIAMS, 2000). 
Costs to make some environmental policies work (monitoring and enforcement) may 
become a great financial burden for agencies. Bonding mechanisms have been successful in 
allowing lower regulatory compliance costs (MMS, 2000b). For instance, some monitoring 
activities that could provide additional financial burden to the MMS are transferred to other 
parties: (l) surety companies, which provide financial assessments for applicant companies 
44 Some restrictions apply: plugging and abandonment costs cannot exceed 20% of a company's net worth. 
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(underwriting process), and closely monitor the financial health of their clients; and (2) the U.S. 
Treasury Department, which monitors surety companies. 
Another predicament within bonding regimes is tax treatment. In some countries, the 
issue of charging taxpayers for decommissioning operations of private oil companies is being 
severely questioned (PROGNOS, 1997). However, most regimes do provide a legal basis for 
dividing the costs of meeting end-of-leasing obligations between the public and the industry. For 
most tax regimes, decommissioning obligations are ordinary and necessary expenses. In general, 
decommissioning expenditures are tax-deductible only when services have been performed and 
payments have been made. The same rule applies when progressive decommissioning (the 
phased approach) is adopted. Under some regimes, deductions are not allowed for 
decommissioning activities carried out during non-income years (when production has ceased). 
In this case, companies are allowed to carry a "credit" towards a future project, as is the case in 
the current Brazilian fiscal regime (ANP, 2000b). 
Tax deduction rates vary significantly from country to country. Deduction rates for 
decommissioning expenditures in the UK range from 50% to 70% (PROGNOS, 1997). In 
Norway, the government undertakes a great percentage of platform removal and disposal costs. 
Companies cannot deduct such expenses in their corporate income tax45 (it does not include other 
end-of-leasing activities such as well plugging and abandonment, site clearance, etc.). Therefore, 
platform removal and disposal costs are not subjected to ordinary tax handling; they are kept 
outside the Norwegian tax system. All other end-of-leasing costs are deductible as ordinary 
operation costs (NPD, 1993 and NPD, 1999). 
Under most fmancial assurance regimes, there is no deduction available for companies 
depositing funds into escrow accounts (pledged to the government) until the company loses 
ownership of funds. However, if a company pays fees or premiums to keep surety bonds or 
environmental insurance policies, expenditures would be amortized over the time period covered 
by the bond. The basic rule is that only an ordinary and necessary business expense is 
deductible; capital expenditure is not. Being contractually liable for decommissioning operations 
and emitting bonds (in anticipation) to guarantee such operations, does not entitle companies to 
deduct cost of services before they are actually performed. 
45 Government covers removal and disposal costs depending on corporate tax rates being paid at the time of 
decommissioning. 
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6.13. CONCLUSIONS 
The application of bonding policies in the oil sector faces several obstacles. There are 
different competing interests from several stakeholders, including oil companies, governments, 
environmental interest groups, and other users of the sea. For this reason, solutions should share 
the support of all stakeholders. 
Simulations performed in this study indicate that further research on bonding instruments 
is still needed to identify impacts, measure sensitivity of components, and improve the NPV 
performance of offshore oil projects under bond regimes. Special attention should be given to 
fiscal planning. 
This study concludes that the most favorable bonding instrument under the given 
circumstances is the surety bond. Surety bonds significantly attenuate impacts on such projects; 
however, applicant companies must provide good fmancial and regulatory compliance records. 
Bonding policies affect government earnings more significantly in small projects; therefore, 
additional research should be conducted focusing on small and marginal fields. 
Tbe impact on GT values is usually slightly negative with the application of corporate 
surety bonds. For cash bond simulations in medium and large fields, GT values remain mostly 
unchanged, indicating only minor reductions over significant decommissioning cost variations (0 
to $150 million). 
Under the bonding system, a company concerned with its image and corporate record is 
motivated to comply with all decommissioning obligations (good records allow lower bonds and 
premiums). In addition, to reduce effects on project profitability, companies are motivated to 
fmd ways of demonstrating to authorities that decommissioning costs can be less than previously 
estimated. For instance, investment in research may lead to technological innovations that may 
reduce decommissioning costs and bond requirements. 
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CHAPTER VII- CONCLUSIONS 
According to the information provided on Chapter II and III, the following answers can 
be given to the questions asked in the introductory parts: 
Question 1: How to guarantee that oil and gas leasing areas will be returned in similar 
preexisting environmental conditions? 
Answer 1: The establishment of comprehensive ex-post requirements, which must include well 
plugging and abandonment, decommissioning of offihore installations, and clearing the area of 
all obstructions. 
Question 2: How to ensure that all ex-post obligations will be satisfactorily met, safeguarding 
public economic interests by maintaining investments in the sector and, at the same time, 
providing guarantees against negligent lessees and eventual economic and natural 
contingencies? 
Answer 2: The establishment of a performance bond regime. 
Question 3: How to make such regime viable? 
Answer 3: Make available a portfolio of bonding instruments, providing adequate flexibility for 
accommodating the needs of dijJerent companies, but at same time, not eliminating incentives for 
compliance; requiring the approval of an ex-post operation plan before operations begin. 
Question 4: How to anticipate and attenuate the financial impacts caused by each of the dijJerent 
forms of performance bonds required as financial guarantee for the completion of ex-post 
obligations? 
Answer 4: Design a decision tool to assist in the financial planning of offihore oil and gas 
projects, simulating possible scenarios, giving the choice of dijferent bonding instruments, and 
assessing their respective impacts on the profitability of offihore projects. 
The marn contributions provided in the present thesis were: (1) A classification for 
different forms of environmental damages in the upstream petroleum sector (accidental, 
continuous, and ex-post damages); (2) The definition between financial bonds and performance 
bonds; (3) A comprehensive assessment of currently available financial instruments used as 
bonding tools; (4) A systematic classification for bonding instruments; (5) A series of modeling 
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exercises with the modeling tool STELLA®; and (6) A decision toll for managing offshore oil 
projects under bonding regimes (Petrobond). 
In the upstream oil sector, bonds are aimed at indemnifying authorities against costs 
related to noncompliance of ex-post environmental obligations. An ideal bonding regime shifts 
the fmancial risk from the agency to the lessees, forcing companies to internalize ex-post 
damages and no compliance costs, motivating lessees to monitor the consequences of their 
decisions. In case of noncompliance, funds necessary to complete all ex -post obligations would 
be promptly available to regulators. Though a hybrid of market mechanisms and command and 
control regulations, bonds are likely to achieve noncompliance protection objectives far more 
cost efficiently than non-market regulations. Figure 7.1 illustrates the summary of risks offered 
to the regulatory agency in case of noncompliance. 
Bonds were found to be best suited to cover ex-post environmental damages. The main 
factors include cost assessment and duration of mitigating operations. Some complications are 
expected in the near future as emerging ex-post issues are further considered. 
Since international legal provisions cannot specifY ex -post procedures for internal waters, 
territorial seas, etc., guidelines and conventions can only be recommendatory in nature, and the 
nation is sovereign in regulating and enforcing their offshore oil projects. For this reason, local 
agencies or legislators should work on establishing requirements that may satisfY domestic and 
international environmental demands and are economically feasible. Solutions must take into 
consideration technical, environmental, and economic parameters, avoiding unfounded and 
ineffective restrictive policies that can affect the continuation of long-term investment 
commitments in the sector. Regulatory costs must be carefully examined. Figure 7.2 shows a 
sununary of most significant regulatory cost producing aspects. 
Compliance with all international, regional, and domestic policies might not necessarily 
satisfY the expectations of public and interest groups. When oil companies are pressured by 
public opinion, they will be compelled to surpass current regulations and even scientific 
recommendations, despite significant economic impacts. To avoid this scenario, an open and 
transparent dialogue with all stakeholders and an efficient flow of information with the Media is 
highly recommended. 
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Figure 7.1. Summary of risks to regulatory agencies within bonding systems. 
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issuing the bond Financial institution trying to exonerate 
themselves from paying the bond 
Figure 7.2. Summary of regulatory cost producing agents. 
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Partial removals cover a great range of different alternatives and combinations, and, if this 
option were viable, it would represent cumulative savings ranging between 8% and 39%, 
depending on variants, as it was demonstrated in the North Sea province. The main argument 
used by interest groups to call for a ban on partial removal is the potential environmental impact 
generated by partial decommissioning. However, the adoption of high cost solutions offers only 
marginal or debatable environmental benefits. 
Another advisable option for some, not all, environmental settings are artificial reefs, 
which not only improve ecosystems services but also create new business opportunities. Another 
interesting aspect of environmental issues is that the fishing industry has greater disturbing 
effects on biodiversity than the offshore petroleum industry. 
Technology leaps may offer, in the near future, profound impact on developments. 
Minimal facilities and platformless development may become tomorrow's main option, reducing 
both cost and implementation, and reducing decommissioning costs. It is also noticeable the 
number of innovative offshore removal technology becoming available since 1995, most of them 
in GOM and Norway. Incentives should be provided to ensure ever-improving technologies, 
addressing needs and aspirations of all stakeholders, and, mainly, ensuring that the industry is 
able to comply with all ex-post obligations. 
Since decommissioning is unavoidable, ex-post planning must begin in early stages of 
project preparation. The 5 R's approach should be considered: reduction, reengineering, 
reutilization, rigs-to-reef programs, and then recycling, in this specific order. The best strategy is 
planning, rendering offshore installations long and productive lives, allowing a high facility 
utilization and delaying decommissioning costs as long as possible. Decommissioning several 
fields at same time or sharing equipment and expertise may also provide substantial savings. 
Observations indicate that, among the bonding systems studied, the MMS has the most 
efficient system. It is important to emphasize that the offshore oil sector presents different and 
more favorable characteristics than the remaining agencies and the areas under their jurisdiction. 
The MMS deals with a scenario where monetary values are usually greater than in other sectors 
such as hardrock mining, onshore petroleum, and coal mining. Even dealing with greater 
financial responsibilities, non-compliance risks are significantly lower. The hardrock branch of 
the BLM seems to hold the most vulnerable bonding system followed by the onshore petroleum 
branch of the same agency. The main problems include the absence of a true incentive for 
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compliance by either ignoring true ex-post costs, or by requiring fmancial bonds instead of 
performance bonds. Excessive flexibility granted in the form of instruments may be also 
increasing liability risks. 
For the Brazilian scenario, both financial and performance bonds are suggested. All 
phases of projects should be bonded with financial and performance requirements, except for the 
bidding phase, which does not offer performance risks. In order to provide the industry with 
adequate flexibility and the agency with necessary guarantee, four types of financial instruments 
are proposed: surety bonds, letters of credit, collateral accounts, and insurance policies. These 
instruments were chosen based on the criteria defined on Chapter IV. Surety bonds may pose a 
problem, since this instrument category is not yet available in the Brazilian market. Models 
presented on Chapter VI also confirm the choice ofthis portfolio of instruments. 
Large and historical companies are not the targets of the proposed bonding system. Since 
some of these companies tend to accmnulate several leases at the same time causing the 
allocation of large amounts of capital that could be applied in other productive ventures, some 
form of blanket-bond should be offered. Some well-defined criteria, including a very strict 
underwriting process, could be establish to provide historical companies with the opportunity to 
use some form of self-bonding mechanisms. Such flexibility would reduce opportunity costs for 
large investors, corroborating to the maintenance of investments within the sector. 
The implementation of financial assurance requirements, as any other process, demands a 
learning period that affects all stakeholders. The petrolemn sector is very dynamic and the 
leaning process will follow the same course. The search for deficiencies and, mainly, loopholes 
should be continuous. Consequently, reviews and minor adjustments should be frequent 
(approximately every two or three years). 
The administrative organization of governments may generate some problems for the 
implementation of bonding regulations. In order to implement a feasible and efficient regulation, 
the regulatory agency must coordinate all functions attributed to other agencies or government 
offices. This will allow a harmonic management. The establishment of a central database is also 
critical. 
For most tax reg~mes, ex-post environmental obligations, including decommissioning 
costs, are ordinary and necessary expenses. In general, such expenditures are tax-deductible only 
when services have been performed and payments have been made. In general, the rule for 
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deductibility is that the expense has to be an ordinary and necessary business expense and not a 
capital expenditure. The fact that a company is contractually liable for ex-post expenditures or 
provides anticipated funds to guarantee such obligations (bonds), does not entitle it to deduct the 
cost of such services before they have in fact been performed. 
Additional research should be conducted on the impacts of incentives and relief 
mechanisms on marginal and mature oil fields. This future study would be an effort to extend the 
life of mature fields and, concomitantly, engineering a viable and sound bonding system for these 
fields. 
The choice of bonding instrument is an important aspect of the decision making process 
and may determine the feasibility of small and marginal projects. For this reason, the 
applicability of bonding systems must consider ongoing projects and projects near the end of 
their lives. 
For all algorithm simulations performed on the Petro bond program, environmental 
insurance policy options offered better cash flow performances. The next best results were 
attained by LOCs. Nevertheless, all simulations were performed under the assumption that 
operating companies own top credit rating. Future research is needed in order to investigate the 
performance of rating-dependent instruments under less favorable scenarios. The sensitivity of 
other components should also be further investigated in future studies. Even though much 
criticism is directed to ex -post insurance policy tools, such as option EIP, some insurance 
products may provide mechanisms to award lessees with good financial and environmental 
records, creating a motivation for companies to pursue similar records. Simulations performed in 
this study indicate that further research on bonding instruments is still needed to identify impacts, 
measure sensitivity of components, and improve the NPV performance of offshore oil projects 
under bond regimes. Special attention should be given to fiscal planning. 
Simulations performed in the Stella model conclude that the most favorable bonding 
instrument under the given circumstances is the surety bond. Surety bonds significantly 
attenuated impacts on tested projects; however, applicant companies must provide good financial 
and regulatory compliance records. Bonding policies affect government earnings more 
significantly in small projects; therefore, additional research should be conducted focusing on 
small and marginal fields. Impacts on GT values are usually slightly negative with the application 
of corporate surety bonds. For cash bond simulations in medium and large fields, GT values 
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remain mostly unchanged, indicating only minor reductions over significant decommissioning 
cost variations. 
Under the bonding system, a company concerned with its image and corporate record is 
motivated to comply with all decommissioning obligations (good records allow lower bonds and 
premiums). In addition, to reduce effects on project profitability, companies are motivated to 
find ways of demonstrating to authorities that ex -post costs can be less than previously estimated. 
Results obtained in this study are primarily useful for overall strategic evaluations. 
Results may also provide guidelines for determining other potential impacts caused by other 
bonding instruments. Decision-makers may use this study to develop general strategies for 
projects under bonding regimes. Authorities may use the study to determine whether a current or 
proposed bonding regime provides the necessary protection without discouraging investments. 
Finally, the proposed model may help in the determination of the approximate financial burden 
caused by different bonding instruments on different petroleum projects. 
The application of ex -post environmental obligations and bonding policies in the oil 
sector faces several obstacles. There are different competing interests from several stakeholders, 
including oil companies, governments, environmental interest groups, and other users of the sea. 
For this reason, solutions should share the support of all stakeholders. 
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'14-C AT HANDLING? 
~0.<- fl) 0::: 
.s>v. w w 0 0::: 1- 1- ..JO::: 
'b :::> ~ u <(W ~IS' li: 0::: ~ i=::!: 0 w zo IS'~ u. w ll. ~ 1- WI-IS' 
...1 > 0::: 0 z 1-f/) LIST CRITERIA I'~ w 0 0 0::: 0 0:::> v fl) u u DJ u ll.U 
Water depth 50% X X X X X X 
Processing 50% 
Reservoir site/quality 50% 
Geographic location 50% 
Scale of modification 50% 
Cost of modification 50% 
Age of technology 50% 
Early production 50% 
Reputation 50% 
Government influence 50% 
Geopolitics 50% 
Project manager attitude 50% 
Marine rates 50% 
Corporate culture 50% 
NGOs 50% 
Willingness 50% 
Covertures alignment 50% 
18 factors were suggested, but there are many others. Suppose each crrtenon had a s1mple 50:50 
chance of success. The overall chance of a perfect match would be about 0.0004%, or 1 in 26,200. 
Finding a perfect match for an installation is not an easy task (Tilling, 2001- modified). 
/:::,. NEEDS CULTURE CHANGE • ATTITUDE DRIVEN 
0 STUDY WILL DEFINE X YOU CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT 
Possibility of recommissioning: Who would be best handling each criterion 
(based on methodology by TILLING, 2001) 
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TABLE B.2. DECOMMISSIONING COST ESTIMATE FORM 
Activities 
Decommissioning Planning 
• Engineering analysis 
• Contracting 
• Operation plan elaboration 
Partial Cost: 
Regulatory Conformity 
• Permits and licenses (for all activities) 
• Environmental consultancy 
• Cost involved in reaching regulatory adequacy 
Partial Cost: 
Decommissioning Preparation Services and "Safeout" 
• Cleaning and disposal of residual hydrocarbon 
• Safety preparation 
• Dismantling and separation of modules and equipment 
• Structural Reinforcement 
Partial Cost: 
Well Plugging aud Abandonment 
• Assessment of well condition (data collection) 
• Inspections 
• Elaborating a P&A plan (method) 
• Operations 
• Sale Price of Reusable or Recyclable items 
Partial Cost: 
Conductor Removal 
• Assessing regulatory requirements and difficulty level 
• Severing 
• Pulling (requires rig) 
• Oftloading (requires platform crane) 
• Transportation and Disposal 
• Sale Price of Reusable or Recyclable items 
Partial Cost: 
Mobilization and Demobilization 
• Planning (assessing the type ofHLV required and availability) 
• Contracting the HL V 
Partial Cost: 
Platform and Structural Removal 
• Planning (Removal in one piece or large pieces, or reducing them to small pieces) 
• Dec kiT opside Removal (including contracting HL V and cargo barge) 
• Pile and explosive Severing services (cutting and lifting) 
• Platform/Structural Removal (including contracting HLV and cargo barge) 
• Sale Price of Reusable or Recyclable items 
Partial Cost: 
Decommissioning Pipelines and Cables 
• Assessing regulatory requirements 
• Engineering Planning 
• Diver related services (surveying, cleaning, cutting, plugging, burying and 
removing) 
• Contingencies 
• Lift vessels 
• Sale Price of Reusable or Recyclable items 
Partial Cost: 
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Estimate ($) 
Transportation and Disposal 
• Assessing regulatory requirements 
• Cargo Barge Services 
• Deciding on disposal methods (refurbish and reuse, scrap and recycle, or landfills) 
• Revenue from reuse destination and recycling 
• Disposal costs (steel, cement, marine growth, mud, etc.) 
Site Clearance and Verification 
• Pre-demolition side scan sonar survey 
• Post-demolition side scan sonar survey 
• ROY deployment 
• Diving spread 
• Trawl test program 
• Contingency 
Miscellaneous 
Project Management and Inspection 
Contingencies 
TOTAL GROSS COST 
TOTAL SALE EARNINGS 
SALE% OF GROSS COST 
NET COST 
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Partial Cost: 
Partial Cost: 
APPENDIX C- PETROBOND VARIABLES 
TABLE C.l. OPERATIONAL VARIABLES 
Field-Specific Characteristics 
a) Basin location of the basin 
b) Field name of the producing filed 
c) Oil Reserves total oil reserves in millions ofbarrel (MBBL) 
d) Gas Reserves total gas reserves in millions of barrel of oil equivalent (MBBL) 
e) Oil type type of the oil being produced in the field 
General Characteristics 
a) Exploration Period 
b) Development Period 
c) Production Period 
d) Water Depth 
Production 
a) Given Production 
• Gas Royalties 
b) Simulated Production 
• Production Peak 
• Declining Curve 
• Gas/Oil Ratio 
• Time to Production 
Peak 
• Gas Royalties 
• Peak Duration 
Cost 
a) Cost Input 
b) Calculated Cost 
Investment 
a) Annual Investment 
b) Calculated Investment 
length of the exploration phase (years) 
length of the development phase (years) 
length of the production phase (years) 
depth (meters) 
annual oil (MBBL) and gas (Mm3) production data is provided for the production 
phase' 
portion of gas production, which will be subjected to the established royalty rate 
(in%) 
the software will simulate the production of the field based on information 
provided2 
maximum production value 
declining rate for the oil production curve 
Portion of gas in the oil production 
time to reach production peak 
portion of gas production, which will be subjected to the established royalty rate 
(in%) 
duration of the peak production 
annual operation costs provided in MMUS$ (maximum of20 years) 
costs may be calculated through an estimation of operational cost per barrel of oil 
equivalent adjusted by the inflation (inflation is provide in the input of financial 
parameters) 
in this input option investments are divided into expenditures (MMUS$) during 
the exploration phase and well cost, which is depreciable and amortizable 
(MMUS$) during the first five years of the project 
in this input option the total investment is calculated based on the value provided 
by barrel of oil equivalent. These values are divided into depreciable and non-
depreciable according to the proportion provided. In addition, as in "Annual 
Investments", values are divided into five years. 
1 Production is then converted in Mm3 in order to facilitate the calculation of special participation values (PE). 
2 The decline model used was exponential according to the given rate provided by the user. 
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TABLE C.2. FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
Royalties 
CO FINS 
PIS 
CIT 
BID 
Depreciation 
Amortization 
Discount Rate 
CSLL 
Rent { 
Price 
Oil Price 
Gas Price 
Inflation 
Exchange Rate 
royalty rate on gross income 
social Contribution Tax rate on gross income 
PIS rate on gross income 
tax rate on taxable income 
bidding bonus paid in year zero 
portion ofthe investment allowed to be depreciated 
portion on the investment allowed to be amortized 
discount rate used by the lessee 
CSLL rate on taxable income 
amount paid by the occupation of the area during exploration, development and 
production phases. The value is calculated in R$ and then converted to US$ according to 
the money exchange rate input. 
oil price is calculated based on the Brent price according to the respective conversion 
factors for each oil type. The values are adjusted for current inflation. 
given in US$ per BBL 
given in US$ per m3 
annual rate if inflation 
US$/R$ exchange rate 
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Figure C. I. Petrobond Computational Algorithm (Photo: courtesyofTWACHTMAN SNYDER& BYRD, 
INc.). 
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TABLE C.3. BOND RELATED VARIABLES 
Instrument Options: 
a) Bidding phase: 
b) Exploration Phase: 
c) Development & 
Production: 
Letter of Credit: 
a) Financial Bond 
b) Rate/Fees 
c) Discount rate 
d) Performance bond 
e) Closure cost 
Insurance Policy: 
a) Lessee classification 
b) Financial Bond 
c) Premium Rate 
d) Risk Discount Rate 
e) Performance Bond 
Amount 
f) Closure costs 
Paid-in Collateral 
Account: 
a) Financial Bond 
b) Performance Bond 
c) Discount Rate 
d) Interest Rate 
e) Closure Costs 
Cash 
Periodic Payment Collateral 
Cash Account: 
a) Financial Bond 
b) Performance Bond 
c) Closure Costs 
d) Interest Rate 
e) Discount Rate 
(!)Financial Bond- Letter o Credit, pre-paid collateral account, Insurance 
policy; 
(2) Performance bond- Not available for this phase 
(I) Financial Bond- Letter o Credit, pre-paid collateral account, Insurance 
policy; 
(2) Performance Bond- Letter o Credit, pre-paid collateral account, Insurance 
policy. 
(I) Financial Bond - Letter o Credit, pre-paid collateral account, periodic 
payment collateral account, Insurance policy; 
(2) Performance Bond- Letter o Credit, pre-paid collateral account, periodic 
payment collateral account, Insurance policy. 
fixed value in MMUS$ 
annual rate for maintaining the bond (around 2% of the total bond value) 
discount rate allowed based on risk offered. Based on the performance bond 
amount. 
required bond amount in MMUS$ 
total closure cost (estimation) in MMUS$. Input for exploration and 
development/production phases 
classification according to the SERASA (Brazilian credit evaluation center -
A, B, C and D). The premium rate will be established according to this 
classification. 
fmancial guarantee amount in MMUS$ 
annual rate based on the total performance bond requirement (from 1.25 to 
3.00%, according to the lessee classification rating) 
risk discount rate based on the risk offered by the lessee. The discount is on 
the performance bond amount. 
bond value in MMUS$ 
total closure costs for exploration and development/production phases. 
Values in MMUS$. 
fixed value in MMUS$. 
performance bond amount in MMUS$. 
discount rate based on the risk offered by the lessee. This discount rate will 
only impact the performance bond amount 
Annual interest rate on the total bond amount (usually around 5.5%). 
closure costs estimation for the exploration and development/production 
phases in MMUS$. 
fixed value in MMUS$. 
performance bond amount in MMUS$. 
closure costs estimation for the exploration and development/production 
phases in MMUS$. 
annual interest rate on the total bond amount (usually around 5.5%). 
discount rate based on the risk offered by the lessee. This discount rate will 
only impact the performance bond amount. 
244 

APPENDIX D - STELLA MODELING TOOL: DECOMMISSIONING AND BONDING 
SCENARIOS 
Developing decision tolls, complex models, for managing oil project decisions involving 
decommissioning and financial assurance mechanisms, provides a way to anticipate economic 
impacts of the several bond alternatives. 
Complex models are essential for managing oil projects. The use of economic models is 
an innovative approach to deal with the business decision uncertainties involved in the oil sector. 
This approach integrates multidisciplinary segments (policy, environmental, social, fiscaL etc.) 
with economics dynamics, providing a way to anticipate the economic impacts of the manifold 
alternatives. Figure D.l illustrates the Interface Level of the Decision Model descnbed m 
Chapter 2, where the current choice of bonding instruments is investigated. 
This tool considers ten different bonding instruments: 
1. Corporate Surety Bonds 
2. Paid-In Cash Collateral Bonds 
3. Periodic-Payment cash Collateral Bonds 
4. Letter of Credit Collateral Bonds 
5. Self Bonds 
6. Third-Party Bonds 
7. Real Estate Collateral Bonds 
8. Environmental Insurance Policy Bonds 
9.Poo1Bonds 
10. State Funds 
Each instrument will cause different impacts on the industry and 
on regulators. 
The main objective of this model is to systematize the 
decision..making process by ranking each impact-parameter 
according to its importance (to both industry and regulators). 
Each parameter will be assigned a degree of importance (from 
0.0 to 1.0} in such way that the sum of all panuneters will be 
equal to 1.0. 
When the degree of importance of each parameter is defined, all 
instruments will be ranked (from 0.0 to 5.0) according to 
industry's and regulator's perspective. 
BOND INSTRUMENT 
OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
~ 
·-........ 
Figure D.l. Part of the conceptual introduction ofthe decision model designed in the Stella tool. This control panel is 
located at the interface level of the software. 
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The three following model exercises were designed using the software package STELLA® 
(Structured Thinking Experimental Learning Laboratory with Animation) which was developed 
by High Performance Inc. for the Windows™ and Macintosh® operating environments. The 
STELLA® is a multi-level, hierarchical environment for constructing and interacting with models 
(STELLA, 2001). The present modeling was designed using the STELLA Research version for 
Windows™. 
COR.l\TWELL M'D COSTANZA (1994) were the first to apply the STELLA® in a 
dynamic, interactive simulation model intended to examine the pollution abatement systems. As 
described by Cornwell and Costanza, models are a trade-off between realism, precision, and 
generality. 
D.L A DECISION MODEL FOR A PERFORMANCE BOND REGIME 
The offshore oil industry, by its very nature, is exposed to hazardous events with very 
large consequences (TOPE, 1999). The economic impacts of safety and environmental 
regulations are enormous. A company must have a clear understanding how decisions are made, 
systematizing the decision-making process, and providing an effective consultation and 
communication tool. 
It is evident that regulations will be the main factor, but engineering and good practice 
will largely form the bases for the decision-making process. It will also include the use of 
innovative technology, choosing the best decommissioning options, etc. Decisions will 
sometimes involve higher costs, uncertainties and risk tradeoffs. 
The aim of these models is to establish a framework that best reflects the context of the 
decision being considered. This framework developed is intended to aid in financial management 
decision-making process. Its structure can be modified and adapted to suit the scenario or 
situation being considered and to reflect future changes in technology, practices, and values. The 
use of such framework for decision support may make the decision making process more 
consistent, but it will not necessarily lead to consistent decisions. The actual decisions will 
depend on the values and perceptions of stakeholders, which will vary from stakeholder to 
stakeholder, and company to company. Several steps can be shown in the Interface Level of the 
Stella model as illustrated in Figure D.2. The user, the decision maker, is able to control all 
variables of the project. 
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MO!JEUJPERATION 
PANNEL 
Only one option may be on 
i _ Project Scenario: 
a. Onshore 
ONSHORE 
i 
OFFSHORE 
' 
Figure D.2. Interface Level: Basic project parameters Input Window. Knobs are macros to activate commands. 
Illustration of Stella tools for user input of project type (onshore or offshore). The two meters above show total 
annual production and total government liability. Alarms go off if current production leads to negative NPV and if 
liabilities are high. 
D.2. FORECASTING 
The first approach in this appendix must be to relate the sciences of forecasting and 
developing models. Analyzing patterns and circumstances of past events and activities, 
examining the parameters involved in a specific scenario, identifYing direct and indirect 
relationships among cause and effect, understanding the driving forces behind occurrences, 
systematizing the decision making process, formalizing potential outcomes, what is likely or even 
could happen in the future, are vital procedures considered whenever there is an important 
decision to be made. One or several of the steps above may be used unconsciously during 
common daily decisions. But in fact, the science that systematizes such procedures to improve 
the decision-making process is called forecasting. The reasoning that generates the fimdaments 
for forecasts can be described as modeling, which is the systematization of all reasoning taking 
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into consideration all parameters involved in the decision-making process. Even while not 
always recognized as forecasting, whenever we make a decision on capital goods, we make some 
assumption on the future value and costs (FERREIRA, 2002). 
Numerical forecasts are not meant to produce the factual numerical outcome. The results 
of such attempts are meant to be interpreted by specialists that will identify probable trends and 
eventually predict scenarios that will correspond to actual events. If a model is properly designed 
it will be adequate to point out in the direction that a decision needs to be made, even if the 
predicted numerical outcome is accurate. 
The science of forecasting and modeling, both having the objective of providing the decision-
maker with a tool for systematize the decision-making process, is hardly an academic program, 
but any corporation, government agency, or manager wishing to make successful decisions will 
make use of such sciences. Figure D.3. shows the Mapping Level of the Decommissioning 
Process Submodel. 
Computers have been used to model several scenarios. The use of computers allow the 
forecast of scenarios taking into account several parameters and allow a range of values that 
provide the sensibility of the model and its output to realistic variations in the key parameters and 
assumptions, or scenarios. Alternative views (or scenarios) on how the future may develop can 
usually be attained by changing the values of the various parameters (FERREIRA, 2002). 
Computers are used to build and run complex models. Computers also allow the incorporation 
within the model, of many variables and relationship that can be easily modified. The other 
advantage provided by computers is the possibility of using a great range of database to run 
simulations of different scenarios. It can also integrate variables such as policies, historical data, 
public response, political will, physical data, etc. 
• Defining the issue/problem: What is the explicit purpose for the modeling effort? The 
purpose of this effort is to develop an understanding of how different forms of bonds impact 
the profitability of an offshore project, and then to use this understanding to generate practical 
charts showing the best types of bonding instruments for different project scenarios - a tool 
for helping in the decision making process. 
• Developing a reference behavior pattern: in order to make the written statement of purpose 
more operational, it will be translated into a Reference Behavior Pattern, a graph over time of 
the variable which best characterizes or represents the phenomenon attempted to be 
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understood. Sometimes a good reference behavior pattern IS not available to guide the 
investigation. 
CLOSURE EXPEND1TUR_E 
Engineering & P!ann!ng 
Platform Preparation 
Conductor Remov.a! 
We!! Piugglng & Abandonment 
Closure Savings 
OFFSHORE Ciosure Cost Estimate 
Estimated Closure osts 
Platform & Structural Removal 
Site Clearance & Verification 
Mobilization & Demobi!lzatlon 
CLOSURE SAV!NGS~~~'i:ation & Disposal 
CLOSURE TfiBLE 
PERFORMANCE FACTOR% 
CLOSUHE EXPENDiTURE 
CLOSURE EXPEtliD1TUREjipUAJ-1CE 
!N CASE OF DEF.D-JJL T 
CLOSURE EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL CLOSURE EXPENDITURE 
Closure Addition 
CLOSURE ADJTiONAL COST FACTOR% Estimated C!osure Costs 
Figure D.3. Map Level view of decommissioning submodel. 
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D.3. CASH FLOW STELLA SUBMODEL. 
This Stella model guides the decision maker through several ex-post related reflections 
including the use of three different bonding mechanisms (surety bonds, paid-in cash collateral 
account and periodic payment cash collateral account). At the end, the model provides the user 
with results in Dollar values, percentages, and BOE. Stella is certainly not the easiest way to 
create a cash flow spreadsheet, however, it is an excellent didactic tool to demonstrate all the 
possible changes in variables and parameters and their impact on project value. 
D.4. BOND CHOICE MODEL. 
This Stella model attempts to systematize the bond choice paradigm. Why the majority of 
regulatory agencies choose the instruments they choose? In opting from certain instrument 
regulators try to reach equilibrium. Due to public pressure, regulators must impose sound 
bonding requirements; however, such requirements will generate some negative impacts on the 
industry, which in turn, will call for flexibility. Regulators must respond, in order to keep the 
market competitive and maintain the investment flow in the sector. Flexibility, usually, increase 
the risk for the regulators. Some instruments will be very positive for the industry, but very 
negative for the regulators. A balance must be obtained. This cycle is also illustrated in Figure 
2.3. 
The main objective of this model is to systematize the decision-making process by 
ranking each impact-parameter according to its importance (to both industry and regulators). 
Each parameter will be assigned a degree of importance (from 0.0 to 1.0) in such way that the 
sum of all parameters will be equal to 1.0. When the degree of importance of each parameter is 
defined, all instruments will be ranked (from 0.0 to 5.0) according to industry and regulator's 
perspective. This is all demonstrated in Table 2.5. 
D.S. OFFSHORE PLATFORM REMOVAL: ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS. 
Some decommissioning activities are likely to have enormous benefits m terms of 
preventing pollution, environmental degradation, and accidents. Removing offshore structures 
also has important safety benefits. However, the presence of offshore structures does improve 
ecosystem services. 
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Figure D.4. Carbon Model, map level modeling. This model simulates ecosystems around offshore platforms. The four main stocks include Carbon Detrital, Ca 
C02, Carbon Consumer, and Carbon Plants and Phytoplankton. Submodel "Decommissioning Scenario" internalizes ecological impacts of decommissioning operati 
including C02 emissions (FERREIRA and BOUMANS, 2001). 

Several issues rise regarding commercial fishing (i.e. exclusion areas, sanctuaries, etc.). 
This theme has attracted a passionate discussion between the oil and fishery industry, 
environmentalists, and several NGOs (MMS, 1997; SANCHIRICO, 2000). As mentioned 
before, fishing has serious disturbing effects on biodiversity. Plowing the top layer of the soil 
with heavy nets is very harmful to crabs, shrimps and starfish, favoring only certain worms on 
which flatfish feed. Offshore platforms, according to the study, even have a beneficiary effect on 
the ecosystem, because fishing within 500 meters of a platform is prohibited, a interdiction that is 
very questioned by NGOs connected to the fishery industry. Figures D.4 and D.5 illustrates a 
modeling exercise where life around a platform is measured by carbon amounts. Although just a 
modeling exercise, the output in Figure D.5 gives an idea of the ecosystem services improvement 
during the presence of the offshore platform and the fishing (harvesting) restriction in the area. 
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